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

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Substance and Process: Leibniz and Whitehead

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Abstract:

This essay aims to show the relevance of Leibnizian metaphysics to process philosophy in Whitehead. To that end, we will show how it is possible to construct a theory of the monads that transcends the traditional categories of substantial thought.

Keywords: Substance, Process, Monads, Leibniz, Whitehead

The purpose of this essay is to explore the following hypothesis: is it possible to think Leibniz's *Monadology* beyond a substantial view of Nature? Aiming for that, I will resort to some nuclear intuitions defended by Whitehead in *Process and Reality*. What I intend to do is not an easy task considering that Leibniz's monads are *eo ipso* substances, in the same way, that many of their properties seem to be in the antipodes of reality categorization proposed by the English philosopher. The challenge remains: to investigate if the value of a monadic vision is, or isn't, hostage of a *substantial* interpretation of the world.

It matters, in a first moment, to clarify what we understand by "substance". We use this term in our common use of language but it is only indirectly connected with the way the philosophical tradition analysed it. So, we use expressions such as "illegal substances" or "substantial reasons" that, on their own already translate very different meanings. In the first case, we are referring to objects, whereas in the second case we aim for something that is essential.

According to Howard Robinson, strictly in philosophical terms, it is possible to discover seven distinct meanings, many times articulated between them. Beyond the scholastic interest of the problem, it is interesting to note the strength of and the presence of this concept in the philosophical tradition. So, in short, substance designates: (1) the ultimate foundation of reality; (2) what is not ephemeral and dependent; (3) the subject of predication; (4) what remains beyond change; (5) types of objects; (6) stuff; (7) all enduring entities that provide unity to our time-spacial structure of the world.

The first meaning allows to identify the notion of substance as Whitehead's category of "ultimate". In this context, it is close to the notion of "ultimate reality". William James shows us the psychological meaning of this problem. "It is as if there were in the human consciousness a *sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception* of what we may call '*something there*', more deep and more general than any of the special and particular 'senses' by which the current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed." (James 1987, 59).

In turn, van Inwagen claims that we are facing a crucial metaphysical concept (van Inwagen 2009, 4). In fact, denying this category endangers hurting the basic principles of rationality. In fact, if we claim that there is nothing real because everything, at the end of the day, is apparent and illusory, we are stating a self-defeating sentence as we are denying the same thing we are claiming. In fact, as Ingwagen highlights, when we claim that everything is apparent, we are, unintentionally, stating a global proposition about the world's reality – that appearance is the world's ultimate feature.

Certainly, it is not by chance that Whitehead puts the category "ultimate" heading his scheme of categories. It unfolds into (1) "creativity", or the "the principle of *novelty*", (2) "many", or "disjunctive diversity" and (3) "one" meaning the "singularity on an entity". These are the main categories of the philosophy of organism. When we apply the ultimate category to the different expression levels of reality, the "actual entities" emerge as key elements. "'Actual entities' - also termed 'actual occasions' - are the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real. (...) The final facts are, all alike, actual entities; and these actual entities are drops of experience, complex and interdependent." (Whitehead 1978, 18). Actual entities are the ultimate reality in the creative process. Similarly, the monads are the ultimate reality of everything that exists, although they have different properties from the ones presented by Whitehead. So, we can conclude that, in the theme of substance, both authors agree. As stated by Robinson, "substances are the things from which everything else is made of, or by which it is metaphysically sustained". Or, quoting Whitehead, "The notion of 'substance' is transformed into that of 'actual entity" (Whitehead 1978, 18/19).

A second philosophical meaning to the category substance is to compare what is relatively independent and long-lasting with what is dependent and ephemeral. It seems clear to us that authors disagree on this aspect. Whitehead insists on interdependence and time dimension. In Leibniz's case, we should analyse this situation carefully. As we will see, it is possible to distinguish in his thought two meanings concerning time; yet, the monads, with exception to God, are relatively independent. Even God, in Leibniz's opinion, follows a set of logical principles that can't be subtracted. The reason for the insistence in the "relatively independent" character of the monads in Leibniz is connected with the idealist vision embedded in his thought. Different parts can't constitute the ultimate reality because if that was the case, it would be dependent on something else, and as such, it wouldn't be the ultimate one. This is why Leibniz rejected the notion of spatiality when characterizing the monads. They are multiple in their diversity and one in their particularity – as in Whitehead – however, at the limit, they are independent and autonomous.

The third meaning of substance has to do with the relationship subject-predicate in a proposition. Probably, this is the most traditional meaning of this word, maybe because it carries the metaphysical- logical vision of Aristotle. In this Aristotelian analysis of statements, some predicates are essential whereas others are secondary. The end of the first ones means the dissolution of subjects while in the second ones the annulment is accidental and the subject or substance remains. In one simple example, this rose is, essentially, a flower; the fact that it is red is accidental. The rose wouldn't stop being a rose if it was yellow or white or if it loses some of its petals. The substance is, in this way, a singular individual's expression as a support (*ὑποκείμενον*) for essential (*οὐσία*) or accidental properties. What makes it possible to distinguish between substance and essential predicates is that the substance can never be said to belong to a subject. For different reasons, both Leibniz and Whitehead are going to change this conceptual schema; in Leibniz's case by demonstrating that each monad not only contains *ab origine* all its predicates, as its revelation offers itself in a process that we could name as unfolding or blossom. Going back to the example of the flower, its blossom means the appearance in the flower of its characteristic parts either sepals, petals or stamens. All these attributes, necessary ones or contingent ones are potential in the flower and the blossom of the flower is the actualization of the attributes.

Although Leibniz clearly distinguishes between necessary and contingent properties, the identity of a monad potentially contains its own individual history. Each monad expresses, in its own way, all the others, which means that each substance reflects like a mirror, all nature. Without defending the idea of a unique substance, very much like Spinoza, Leibniz shows us that, in its own way, each atom of experience contains in itself all nature. In the case of Whitehead, in an attitude very similar to Russell's, the propositional structure is criticised, a point from which the traditional metaphysical distinction between substance and attributes is based. As the philosopher will say referring to Spinoza, "the philosophy of organism is closely allied to Spinoza's scheme of thought. But it differs by the abandonment of the subject-predicate forms of thought (...). The result is that the 'substance-quality' concept is avoided; and that a morphological description is replaced by description of a dynamic process." (Whitehead 1978, 7). By privileging the S-P relationship, Leibniz will consider the relational structures as being something merely ideal, that is, not real. In his correspondence with Clarke (Leibniz 1978b, 398-420), the German philosopher questions relational judgments demonstrating that if it is not possible to reduce them to the schema S-P, then that means that they are merely mental operations. When, for example, we establish a ratio or a relationship between two lines and we ask which one is bigger or smaller or which one precedes the other, it is pointless to ask which one of them is subject and predicate. "Therefore we must say that this relation (...) is indeed *out of* the subjects; but being neither a substance, nor an accident, it must be *a mere ideal thing*, the consideration of which is nevertheless useful." (Leibniz 1978b, 401).

The fourth meaning for substance aims for the notion of what endures beyond change. In this aspect, Leibniz's and Whitehead's visions are diametrically opposed. Again, the roots of this thesis are found in Aristotle. To understand change one must assume an invariant subject. That invariant subject is assumed as the "primary substance". If one wants to rethink the monadology in non-substantial terms, it is precisely at this point we should focus our attention. To what extent the metaphysical theory about the monads is hostage of a substantial conception, as a statement of something enduring beyond all change? We are constantly experiencing change but at the same time, we assume that both us people and the objects possess something that remains changeless across time. If there were nothing permanent what meaning would it have to talk about one particular entity? When we talk about individuation we think about three different things: its relative independence from other entities; its unity that allows us to think we are contemplating one thing and not many. Yet, we need – or Leibniz thought so – something stable across time. The monads have this three properties: they are autonomous and independent even if they were created by someone else; they are one – by the way, the primeval meaning of the word monad from the Greek "monas", one; lastly, they persist beyond time change and are, because of that, called substances. The substances qualities are types of them. What meaning would it have to consider real – and not only a metaphor – the smile Cheshire's cat would give after leaving? What meaning would it have to claim that the bumps in a car would exist beyond the car's existence, flying around the world waiting for a car to belong to? (Blackburn 1999, 65). In this way, Leibniz will insist on the substantial character of the monads: one, independent and subsisting beyond its attributes' temporality.

The way we see it, the only way to overcome this substantial notion vision of monadology is to introduce the factor "time" as a constitutive element of the very own reality of the monads. Is this appropriate? The answer is a positive one if we acknowledge the fact that Leibniz admits two types of time experience. In one hand we have the physical time, relational structure, ideal that circumscribes what is real in itself. This physical time has a similar nature as the notion of space. As later Kant will state, time and space are not inherent to the thing itself, but rather forms that circumscribe our representation of the world. However, it is possible to find in Leibniz a temporal aspect that isn't reduced to the relational sphere. In fact, as highlighted at the beginning of this essay, predicates are folded up within the monad and blossom by active power in the monad. That is why Leibniz used, in his essay on monadology, the Aristotelian notion of *entelechy* or the actualization of what is still merely potential. Beyond the most known monad predicates, the *perceptio* – perception – and *appetitus* – desire, it matters to refer that the active power is the essence of the monad. Leibniz refers to it via several notions such as entelechy, internal principle of change, and even "conatus", as in Spinoza.

To Leibniz, at any moment the monads are passive, as continuous unfolding is part of their essence. Each state of the monad carries its past and is pregnant with the future. So, we can say the monads have an intrinsic time associated to becoming-itself of the monad as entelechy, very different from time as a chronology (external framework). So, it isn't rushed to join Whitehead claiming that occasions or actual entities, this "drops of experience", are not distant of monads as "atoms of experience". If we take those atoms as instantaneous, constantly recreated, then, Whitehead's philosophy of organisms isn't distant from Leibniz's metaphysical vision. In this new reading of monadology, continual change, the creative process, would be ultimate, ontological primary, whereas permanence would be simply an optical illusion. The active power of the monad matches the notion of creativity in Whitehead. “Each monadic creature is a mode of the process of ‘feeling’ the world, of housing the world in one unit of complex feeling, in every way determinate. Such a unit is an ‘actual occasion’; it is the ultimate creature derivative from the creative process.” (Whitehead 1978, 80). It doesn’t mean, with this interpretation of Leibniz’s theory, that we intend to neglect the deep differences between both philosophies. As well highlighted by Teixeira, “The temptation of describing (the actual entities) as small atoms in Democritus’s way, only subsisting an instant, creeps into almost all readings on Whitehead’s doctrine. The constant references to atomic entities such as electrons and protons made by Whitehead, as well as the atomism epithet that Whitehead ostensibly imputes to his doctrine certainly contribute a lot to this confusion.” (Teixeira 2011, 39). In lack of a better term, Teixeira talks about “cells” driving us far away from the implicit materialism in the notion of an atom. However, there is a second reason leading us to not mistaking Leibniz’s and Whitehead’s systems and it has to do with the last meaning of the substance that we will analyse.

As we have seen, in philosophical terms, the substance is, many times, thought as “stuff” or kind of objects. The root of this identification is Cartesian. Sometimes we forget how Descartes was key in the history of modern thinking by considering substance as stuff, as kind of objects more than things or individuals. In a certain way, Leibniz’s thinking seems an Aristotelic backward step, if I can put it like this, by insisting on the problem of individuation. The context is well known. A famous example: no matter how many metamorphoses the wax goes through it is still the same wax. That is why Descartes tells us about two substances, getting close to Spinoza’s monism. Leibniz insists in the monads’ plurality, but they are, at the limit, mental. And this will be Whitehead’s explicit critic to Leibniz. “His monads are best conceived as generalizations of contemporary notions of mentality. The contemporary notions of physical bodies only enter into his philosophy subordinately and derivatively. The philosophy of organisms endeavours to hold the balance more evenly” (Whitehead 1978, 19).

In fact, in spite Leibniz’s distinction between perception and apperception, the way he puts monads into perspective isn’t strange to the vision we have nowadays of consciousness. As highlighted by Martine de Gaudemar: "One monad, from the Greek monas, unity, is a unit in itself, possible to analyse in an active principle called (...) entelechy, and a passive principle, mass or *first matter*, that is, an active principle and a passive one. The monad contains a kind of perception and appetite. It is a simple substance, without parts, with actions of its own, that continually changes its relationships. Each monad is a living mirror, representative of the universe, according to its own point of view.” (Gaudemar 2001, 39). The way Leibniz presents the monad’s functioning extraordinarily resembles the functioning of consciousness.

> The model Leibniz draws on to explain how such diversity and unity is possible is one quite close to us - our own consciousness. As I look out on this coffee shop, it is undeniable that I have a multiplicity of perceptions. I see tables and chairs, the chequered tiles on the floor, a handful of people, cars passing outside the window. In fact, one could say that this one view contains an infinite

> multiplicity of perceptions, a fact illustrated by the simple question, how many colours am I now seeing? One wooden chair contains an infinite variety of shades of brown. I could never fully describe what I see in any one of these people. I probably could not even fully describe the shades of colour on one strand of their hair. The infinite complexity of these perceptions is rooted in the infinite divisibility of any continuum - any aspect I pick out can be divided and divided into finer and finer detail. At the same time, it is just as undeniable that my perception has a kind of unity. My very ability to see *a* chair shows that I take all those shades of brown together as one. On a broader level, the whole view of the coffee shop seems to be distinctly *mine*. All these perceptions appear as a multiplicity in my one consciousness. This unity applies not only at any given moment but also over time. The multiplicity of qualities in my consciousness can change radically in a moment. I can simply turn my head, or close my eyes and picture myself lying in the sun on the beach, seeing as much detail as my imagination allows. Yet in spite of the radical shift from coffee shop to beach, it still seems to be my consciousness. These perceptions have a fundamental unity simply because they all are *mine*. (Perkins 2007, 81-82).

Through this example, the points of alignment between the intrinsic structure of each monad and the consciousness are demonstrated. The monad, as does the consciousness, presumably has a point of view, a particular perception. It is just that this last one is not unique. It is part of the consciousness's power to change points of view and, in that way, capture infinite (ultimately) diversity in its object (in this case the room of the mentioned coffee shop). Yet, in spite being possible of existing multiple perspectives, the monad, such as the consciousness, guarantees the unity in perception. By observing the multiple chromatic shades of a chair I don't transform it into multiple chairs but sum the observed diversity in one perceptive unity. In turn, the monad, as consciousness, subscribes in the subject's fundamental unit, allowing apperception, in this case, that such unity in diversity is mine and not of any other monad or consciousness. Finally, it is referred the monad's capacity of changing the nature of representations, for example, the passage from a mental representation of the coffee shop room to the representation of myself lying in the sand under the sun. The change in the mental representation is radical and, yet, the monad or consciousness is the same. This monad's capacity of changing perceptions, of performing the passage from one representation to the other is named desire (*appetitus*). If we take as plausible the identity between monad and consciousness – even if it is simply as thinking tool – the nonobservable and private character of consciousness finds in Leibniz's metaphorical words a privileged moment. I refer to the strange claim made by the German philosopher according to whom the monad has no windows from which to enter or leave (Leibniz 1978a, 607). It is clear that the monad is a particular sphere of representations, a representative atom of the world and, as such, perception is a key feature. With this metaphor, Leibniz wants to highlight that each monad is indivisible, non-observable from the exterior, as consciousness is. Whitehead's critique of the exclusively mental character of the monads isn't indifferent to the vision of the monads as drops of experience in which the windows are, on the contrary, always open.

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The Postmodern Anti-Realism of Value in Caputo and Butler, and its Phenomenological Grounding

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Abstract:

In this essay, I expose what I take to be implicit phenomenological commitments of both John D. Caputo and Judith Butler's anti-realist conception of value. As anti-realists and exemplars of what some might call the postmodern tradition of ethics, I can show how their views must presuppose the very phenomenology of moral experience these thinkers would deny, and thus anyone persuaded by the elements of these philosophers should embrace the value ontologies of what I call participatory realism rather than the uncritical and untenable assumptions of anti-realism that so many in the humanities embrace.

Keywords: Caputo, Butler, Postmodern ethics, Value anti-realism, Scheler, Participatory realism

In this essay, I will cite two examples of what might satisfy Continental anti-realism about value: John D. Caputo and Judith Butler. As the reader knows now from previous essays, participatory realism is the thesis that (the process of how a person's feelings and values are experienced) Scheler's account of affective-intentionality (specifically the act-being character of feeling acts) constitutes the values immanently connected to those feeling acts. The act-object relations are experienced by persons, and the facets of this entire process are mind-independent mechanisms that explain how subjects experience value in the world—while also explaining that in permeating and constituting experience itself there is no value-neutral standpoint. Human life is value-ladened. Therefore, participatory realism is a realism about the process that engenders the values we experience unlike the typical moral realisms that explain values as mind-independent reasons persons acquire.

In the case of Caputo and Butler, each version must rely upon affective intentionality to explain the aspects of experience both Caputo and Butler invoke. As such, each is committed to how intentional feeling acts are coupled with their corresponding value-correlates, yet this criticism is nuanced between both Caputo and Butler. Caputo's anti-realism is straightforward and follows from his commitments to deconstructionism. For Butler, the story is more complex. Extricated from her central ethical work, Butler discloses another dimension to ethical experience that Scheler's intentional feeling of love can only unearth on the surface, and as such, Butler – if interpreted through phenomenology only – opens up a phenomenological dimension of relationality that still needs fleshed out. The very reasons they are considered anti-realists must give way to what underlies their positions. But this underlying commitment to a phenomenological realism is more of a conceptual claim and transcendental argument about both Continental and Analytic anti-realists in general. All ethical anti-realisms rely upon aspects of phenomenological realism about the process by which values are experienced, and phenomenology on its own, as I explained in the moral realism essay collapses the usual ontological separation of mind and world, subject and object.

What is Postmodernism?

Some years ago, I attended a dinner party put on by an unnamed psychologist. She made a quip against what she called "postmodernism," diagnosed it as part of larger divide between her scientific approach to truth and what she saw in the work her colleagues in the humanities. These quips are quite common: "postmodernism says that all truth is relative," or that "truth is historical only." If postmodernism amounts to a type of relativism or historicism, then how can it really help know and describe the world around us? At this time, I claimed the difference between phenomenology and postmodernism consisted in their treatment of truth. Needless to say, this claim was partly true, depending upon how one might conceive of both.

What I should have said is that there is nothing exactly like postmodernism *simpliciter*. The caricatures some maintain about their opponents are rarely ever accurate, and the caricature inspired by philosophers to those outside are extremely inaccurate. In this situation and numerous like it, *postmodernism* is a fancy term of art; mostly the term is used by those outside philosophy to generalize several French thinkers without coming to know their work in detail. Like William James's idea of truth, however, postmodern thought is more than what its opponents report it to be. Derrida's deconstructionism, Foucault's genealogy, and Lyotard's death of metanarrative are all singular skeptical efforts in their own right. Better put, there are many *postmodernisms*, and these *postmodernisms* are *skeptical about one or several aspects of philosophy's pretension to think universally about what is really real*. As such, Lyotard's eventual "incredulity for metanarratives" cuts two ways. First, postmodernists are skeptical about knowing reality. Second, postmodernists are skeptical about having access to reality itself as an object for speculation. Moving past the modern philosophy means giving up on the fact that reality is agent-accessible. For Derrida, the target is metaphysical language; for Foucault, the target is subjectivity and power; and for Lyotard, the target is the cultural conditions of scientific inquiry itself, which by itself could absorb and subsume both Foucault and Derrida's versions (and the reason why I pay a little attention to it here). Lyotard's discourse is the most general about the cultural conditions of inquiry whereas the efforts of Foucault and Derrida are more localized within specific horizons of inquiry.

In each philosopher, the "postmodern project" shifts depending on the target of that discourse. To boil down these specific projects to the overall implication of what those discourses might say about truth is simply a distortion of their overwhelming complexity and beauty—even if we fundamentally disagree with them. In analytic philosophy, the parallel might be thinking that while cultural relativism in ethics leads to the classical difficulties we all teach but, surely, Gilbert Harman's 1976 paper *Moral Relativism Defended* is a more refined and sophisticated piece than the relativism we teach in our introductory ethics classes. The same is true about any of the postmodern theorists.

In Jean-François Lyotard's *Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge,* a concentrated interrogation of Lyotard's *Preface* can introduce elements common enough to the various other thinkers, enough to set the stage for engaging in a lengthy discussion of Caputo's postmodern ethics. First, I will make some distinctions to refine our understanding of postmodernism itself.

Distinguishing the Complexity of Postmodern Critiques

Postmodernism can be divided into two distinctions: postmodern epistemological anti-realism and postmodern metaphysical anti-realism. Postmodern epistemological anti-realism is the view that epistemic agents cannot claim to know anything outside their own lived-contexts, and as such, knowing what there is created and bound to those same lived-contexts. In postmodern metaphysical anti-realism, the metaphysical thesis is that the only things that exist are the projects and fabrics of lived-contexts. The fabric of reality is a woven construction of mind-dependent factors inhering in lived-contexts. For both Lyotard (and Caputo to follow), they are both postmodern epistemological anti-realists and postmodern metaphysical anti-realists.[1] From the fact that human beings are no longer bound to metanarratives in terms of knowing also indicates that we have no access to reality itself apart from them.

In Lyotard's *Postmodern Condition*, he develops a conception of postmodernism as a report on the status of knowledge in the post-industrial age from the 1950s even until today. (Lyotard 1999, 3) In this way, his work could be understood as either a particular discourse in either social epistemology or the philosophy of science, but more broadly, his work could capture the spirit under which the other postmodernists might embrace. Ultimately, however, Lyotard's project amounts to a type of sociology of knowledge about science as it is practiced in today's *ethos*. Specifically, science seeks truth within its own discourse, but the legitimation of science, its contents, theories and practices is what Lyotard defines as philosophy. (Lyotard 1999, xxiii) Furthermore, Lyotard defines the modern as "any science that legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse of this kind making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative." (Lyotard 1999, xxiii) For example, Kant's first critique provides the possible conditions of possible knowledge such that it legitimates Newtonian mechanics. Put another way, Kant's transcendental critique defends why we experience objects of experience that Newtonian mechanics studies. In another example, Descartes removes the uncertainty about God and souls from 17th century natural philosophy's domain in the *res extensa*, securing certainty of their existence in a realm untouchable by physics in his *res cogitans*. Therefore, the grand/meta narrative is that which grounds and motivates a particular discourse like in the examples above. The ground and motivation are often implicit in a discourse. What is implicit is brought to the surface. Lyotard attributes the role of the metanarrative historically to several examples: the dialects of spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working class, or the creation of wealth. (Lyotard 1999, xxiii) One could easily imagine Hegel, Gadamer, Kant, Marx, or Smith in those examples.

In contrast to the modern, the postmodern is "an incredulity toward metanarratives." (Lyotard 1999, xxiv) Each metanarrative is an apparatus of legitimation that justifies the sciences at that particular historical moment. The purpose of what Lyotard labels postmodern knowledge is in the cultivated "sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable." (Lyotard 1999, xxv) In this way, the postmodern condition explains the condition under which information is controlled since the practices of legitimation are interlinked with the normative problems of ethics and politics. For Lyotard, the interlinkage between science *and* values (ethics and politics) "stem from the same perspective, the same 'choice' if you will, the choice of the Occident." (Lyotard 1999, 8) By that "choice," The West (since Plato) has always linked the normativity of what is just with the expectations of what knowledge can serve. The metaphysical and epistemological projects are tied to the social dimensions of knowledge and power—"revealing that knowledge and power are two sides of the same question: who decides what knowledge is and who knows what needs to be decided?" (Lyotard 1999, 9) In addition, since both metaphysical and epistemological efforts can secure the social dimensions of knowledge and power, this *inextricability of the social* underlies both metaphysics and epistemology, and that provides evidence to the view established above, namely, that Lyotard is both a postmodern epistemological anti-realist and a postmodern metaphysical anti-realist.

Lyotard's method for assessing the condition of postmodernism is Wittgenstein's conception of a language game. For him, there are three features of language games and these features best elicit how the social dimensions of knowledge and power are at play in any particular discourse. First, the rules of language games are by no means insular; "they do not carry the within themselves their own legitimation." (Lyotard 1999, 10) Second, "if there are no moral rules, then there is no game." (Lyotard 1999, 10) In other words, even a slight modification of the tiniest rule changes the nature of the language game and if the participant makes a move not beholden to the current rules, then that participant is not playing that particular language game. Finally, "every utterance should be thought of as a 'move' in a language game." (Lyotard 1999, 10) Every utterance in speech or writing is like moving a chess piece. In other words, every utterance made in written and spoken form takes place within a specific language game, in a particular discourse interlinked to the dimensions of knowledge and power.

Lyotard's appropriation of the language game fits very well with Caputo's thought. There's good reason to think that Caputo does not think that any epistemological justification can be given for any knowledge claim, but simply we can only give various interpretations about the way we talk and communicate about a given concept. According to Caputo, "[Postmodernism} is not simply a way to delimit human knowledge...it shows us more mercilessly how exposed we are to the possibility that the world is not known comprehensively." (Caputo 2005, 294) In very similar fashion, Richard Rorty thought that philosophers should move away from epistemology. Philosophers, he argued, should seek the resources of hermeneutics since hermeneutics *does not* assume that reality is agent-accessible and that various parts of reality, being so accessible, are commensurable. (Rorty 1979, 315-316) Like Lyotard, both Caputo and Rorty accept that reality is incommensurable because reality and our experience of it consists entirely of various moves in a language game. This Lyotardian emphasis (that all discourses are participation in language games) implies that reality is as incommensurable as Caputo and Rorty believe. Therefore, they are wholly compatible with anti-realist discourse. Anti-realism is the thesis that reality is incommensurable through and through and that no external standard apart from us fixes the truth of any discourse, no matter what it is about.

By contrast, phenomenology identifies the relationality we have with the world that Continental anti-realists draw from, but in the constitutive framework of phenomenomenology, the division between mind and world is collapsed. What is revealed is the co-relation to reality, the mechanisms that constitute the process by which values are discovered in the very medium of experience. In that way, phenomenological descriptions discover fundamental aspects of the world to which we all have access, and as such, reality just is the very agent-accessibility postmodernism denies since accessing what I've called "affective intentionality" is the source of value's being.

Clarifying Elements of Caputo's *Against Ethics*

For the last twenty years, no other statement of deconstructionist ethics has been as effective in its skepticism about ethics than John Caputo's *Against Ethics.* As such, I am singling out this work as the best example of a postmodern ethics. At the beginning, I will outline the opening of his text, and explain the central features of why Caputo is against ethics.

Caputo's situation, he claims, can be likened to a man adrift "who discovers that the ground he hitherto took to be *terra firma* is in fact an island adrift in a vast sea, so that even if he stands absolutely firm he is in fact in constant motion." (Caputo 1993, 3) For Caputo, ethics no longer has a secure path to its promised safe passage, its privileges, judgments, and concepts that compel us towards the good. The net of these safe concepts is exposed by deconstructionism. The idea of obligation "is not safe, that ethics cannot make it safe, that it is not nearly as safe as ethics would have believe." (Caputo 1993, 4) At first, one might read this claim as a reiteration of a concern about moral luck or the presence of contingency that could undermine moral experience.[3] However, Caputo's program is a deconstructionist attempt at understanding ethics. As such, understanding Caputo's position will involve two features. We must locate the exact reasons he is against ethics, and that criticism turns on what he will say about obligation. Second, we must understand what grounds the deconstructionist critique of obligation.

Before we proceed, I want to speak a little about the experience of reading Caputo. At the very outset, Caputo's deconstructionism is performative. Caputo's *Against Ethics* is a text that is attempting to dissolve ethics right before us. When he writes, Caputo is implicitly committed to the tensions inherent in a deconstructionist interpretation of language and the reader is invited to accompany the dissolution of ethics. The real question is therefore: What does it mean to accompany the dissolution of ethics in Caputo's work? As a point of method, I will not impose upon Caputo the charge of obscurantism or the familiar incomprehensibility of those quick to dismiss deconstructionism (let alone any area of Continental philosophy one does not want to read), but let his analysis come to fruition on its own merits while accepting the limits of how Caputo employs deconstructionism. What we will find is that despite the claim that deconstructionism can undermine the stability of language, the givenness of obligation cannot be washed away from the concretion of its ontology so easily as Caputo thinks it can.

Caputo thinks the experience of obligation is messy, not as safe as ethicists (or metaethicists for that matter) pretend. This messiness is not a claim about ethics and its objectivity. Instead, the accompanying certainty of some moral philosophies claiming objectivity is a stance. Caputo is resisting this stance. Ethics is built around methodological pretensions to universal truth employed to secure obligation as a knowable concept. Caputo is not the only one that is very skeptical about the claims of universality and impartiality built into ethics. Bernard Williams achieved hallmark fame in the analytic world for his critique of the very same methodological pretensions that Caputo may be talking about. However, the problem with Caputo is that the lack of precision could amount to a number of things when interpreted back to those of us (even those of us that have tried to be philosophically ambidextrous) that work in ethics. Does resisting ethics here indicate Caputo's resistance advocates a form of moral particularism? Is it a form of skepticism about decision-procedures? Impartial standpoints? I take his resistance to indicate *all these things*, but I am not going to shy away from his rather bizarre—if not completely uncharitable and inflated presentation of what ethics could be. For Caputo, this resistance against ethics is not motivated by reasons independent of presupposing the legitimacy of deconstructionism.

With this admitted presupposition, Caputo is also never really clear what he means by ethics throughout *Against Ethics*. Like Kierkegaard assuming ethics means a system of universal principles that admit no exception in his own writings, the sense of the term ethics finds resonance neither with Levinas nor Kant completely, yet they are also called into question by Caputo's efforts. The generality of "ethics" conveys to us any philosophical attempt to render the content of morality clear to us. In general, moral philosophy/ethics means a sustained philosophical attempt that codifies morality by generating action-guiding principles for situations where the answer is not entirely clear, ambiguous, and confusing. These principles are often regarded as decision-procedures. Decision-procedures that guide deliberation about morality are what makes "obligation safe."

Caputo on Obligation

As a long time scholar of Heidegger, Caputo reads obligation through the same factical givenness characteristic of Heidegger's early analysis of Dasein. "Obligation is a fact as it were, not of pure practical reason, as in Kant, but of our factical life." He continues and equates the appearance of obligations as prescriptives found in language. Even then, however "they do not succumb to reduction, that no one...is able to put them out of action, to bracket or suspend them. You may 'redescribe' them however as you wish but they still keep coming in, still keep arriving." (Caputo 1993, 25) According to Caputo, obligations exist outside of phenomenological study, along with factical life as well.

Despite the massive demandingness of obligation upon my life, obligation itself is unavoidable. It cannot be avoided. Obligations occur beyond my control. "They happen to me." (Caputo 1993, 7) They occur without warning and constitute the field of my experience. Caputo writes,

> Obligations do not ask for my consent. Obligation is not like a contract I have signed after having had a chance to review it carefully and to have consulted my lawyer. It is not anything I have agreed to be a party to. It binds me. It comes over me and binds me...Obligation is a feeling, the feeling of being bound (*ligare, obligare, re-ligare*), an element of my feeling (*Befindlichkeit*), but I cannot get on top of it, scale its height, catch a glimpse of its rising up. (Caputo 1993, 7)

Elsewhere, Caputo links obligation with feeling. "I cannot found or ground my obligations. I do not issue obligatory phrases; I receive them. I find myself under their spell; it is part of my *Befindlichkeit*." (Caputo 1993, 25) In embracing Heidegger's *Befindlichkeit*, Caputo has identified a self-contained ontologically constitutive category that has no order beyond its immanent manifestation.

On its own, obligation just happens, but it happens as an event of feeling. Like Gadamer's ontology of play of the artwork, obligation possesses its own intelligibility as it unfolds in activity, constituting a language game all on its own. Obligation plays. "It plays because it plays. It plays without a why, without any founding grounds or great grounding founders." (Caputo 1993, 25) This playing is the same self-concealing groundless ground that functions at the heart of Heidegger's thinking. As Michael Zimmerman states, the meaning of being is equal to "the temporal-historical (and thus non-foundational) context that makes possible any historical epochal understanding of Being." (Zimmerman 1998, 8) Here, Caputo draws on the mytho-poetic features of Heidegger's thinking that agrees, at least in principle, with Caputo that there is no foundation, no Geist, no Logos that cuts "all the way down."[2] (Caputo 1993, 234) Instead, every value-experience is singular and disclosive just like what Heidegger calls *Eriegnis,* which names self-concealing groundless ground that gives and sends the various understandings of Being that governs the various historical epochs that configure it.[4]

Phenomenological Underpinning of Caputo's Obligation

Caputo entangles the sense of ought in feeling as a force that overpowers its experiencers. This affective (and evaluative) force determines both the obligation and the something that *moves me to respond.* Yet, even here the unity of sense and implicit claim of phenomenology can recover the unity of experience Caputo resists. Caputo is rejecting the familiar sense of the term ethics, but also explaining this unity of moral experience. Even as an event, such unity is discoverable in moral experience without succumbing to the deconstructionist dismissiveness he maintains about ethics and what he calls "value theory,"

> I do not hold "value theory" in high regard either, which is form me just more "ethics," i.e., more metaphysics...I am not prepared to turn over the question of "obligation" to value theory. I do not regard the bond that binds obligation to disaster to be a matter of a "value" we should "hold" or a "claim" we "make." Obligation is rather—this is what a poetics of obligations brings out and where it starts—a matter of being claimed, in which something has a hold on us, something that is older than us, that has us before we have it. (Caputo 1993, 31)

For Caputo, the skepticism of grounding obligation into a discipline called ethics is mistaken, and yet note the ambiguity about what "value theory" truly entails, naming it, labeling it, but never being exactly clear what he means by the term (just like ethics). Yet, in the following passage, we can see that skepticism of ethics is co-extensive with any attempt to ground the concept of obligation. All that Caputo tells us is that obligation comes to us, that it binds us, and we can never get on top of it. Obligation is based on its own power to pull us and attract us, to feel it working itself on us. Obligation is an event in feeling, but nothing more. So let me interpret the two co-extensive claims Caputo is arguing. On the one hand, ethics implies an untenable metaphysics and on the other hand, that untenable metaphysics corresponds directly to the fact that all forms of ethics cannot contain conceptually and explain obligations "just happening." As he says later, "the element of obligation, by which I mean the space of obligation, where obligations happen—down low, well below philosophical conceptuality." (Caputo 1993, 72) Scheler's phenomenology can accomplish these two tasks.

Phenomenologically, Caputo blurs the boundaries of feeling and the boundaries of the value-contents given to feeling. A deconstructionist is thoroughly committed to the playfulness of language and exploiting the ambiguity of the articulated experience and the inherent openness language captures. For the deconstructionist, language does not refer to a stable mind-independent world, and the propositions about the world uttered by the philosopher are not universal, impartial and ahistorical. As such, one can easily understand how I come to an anti-realist reading of deconstructionism and postmodernism. Accordingly, philosophical propositions, including those of ethics, are constituted by the historicity of an epoch, its various implicit assumptions and biases of culture and the author infect the ideal of objectivity. The fact that deconstruction works at the in-between the universal and individual might be a reason to find comfort in Heidegger's destruction of metaphysics and why Caputo is looking to factical *Befindlichkeit* as a way of talking about obligation.[5] (Caputo 1993, 72-74)

Phenomenologically speaking, this complete openness can be resisted since the denial of the givenness of feeling does not negate the fact that something is given. Moreover, different forms of givenness demand their careful phenomenological discourse. As such, a phenomenology of value is different than a phenomenology of perception. For this reason, Scheler's phenomenology can interpret the explanatory force of the given and the constitution of consciousness in the very experience exposed as "factical life." Without intentionality in factical life, there can be no experience. Phenomenology opens us up to the immanent essences revealed in acts that constitute a person's interconnection between act and objects. If that is true, then there is a constituting/constituted relationship here underscoring Caputo's claim about obligation and ethics in *Against Ethics*. Caputo fails to dismiss the intentionality underlying his account. Put another way, Caputo blurs the phenomenological distinctness of obligation in its very givenness with the intentional feeling necessary to account for obligation's transcendence:

> Obligation has a kind of impenetrability and density that I cannot master that neither my knowledge nor my freedom can surmount, that prevents me from getting on top of it, on the side of it. Obligation transcends me; it is not one of my transcendental projects. If an obligation is 'mine' it is not one more there I comprehend and want to do, but something that intervenes and disrupts the sphere of I wants, something that troubles and disturbs the I, that pulls the I out of the circle of the same, as Levinas would say. (Caputo 1993, 8)

Caputo picks up on and articulates how value-laden personal life is. How easily do we let moral experience disrupt the congruence of a person's desires, how disturbed we are by the entrance of moral values into the field of our own subjectivity! They come from on top, from the side, and are themselves, like substance in Locke, the I-know-not-what for Caputo. Yet to speak of values, Caputo's efforts are an attempt to make the constitutive aspects of personal life more out of control, to give them a sense of mystery and allure beyond the coherence of meaning such constitutive aspects acquire in factical life and co-related to intentional feeling. This mystery is the fact of their givenness only. Since Caputo wants to find the manner in which obligation enters into experience in factical life, like Heidegger, Caputo stands on the fence of the very phenomenological givenness of factical life, but does not seek to get under experience anymore than calling for the excess of obligation's givenness.[6] Notice the move to disaster strictly after describing the ineffable movement of obligation and values that emerge in the event of experience. (See Caputo 1993, 27-30) Such a move involves thinking that obligations make demands upon us, but no values can contain the singularity of such disastrous events. And as such, we can find the whole of ethics wanting since no ethical system or coherent way to articulate the event's givenness could be conceptually encompassed. Yet, why not think that the overflowing of value and obligation given in feeling acts might call for our response, but not quite delimit what the response needs to be? Certainly, we can have an ethics that responds to the demands of disaster and the Other without thinking that no such framework can be created or devised.

Had Caputo gone in a quasi-Levinasian direction, which admittedly is very similar to the Schelerian position that better explains why "obligation just happens," Caputo would not be confused as to the merits of his disparaging tendency towards "value theory." Caputo chooses, like Derrida, to avoid affirming ethical demands (or what he is calling obligation) to either a transcendence of the Other, or the infinity such transcendence implies. (Caputo 1993, 18) Ironically, Caputo retained the power of phenomenological description of experiencing value with how he describes obligation, he just never sought the phenomenological ontology of value and obligation to be rooted in experience.

Let's look at what would happen if we *did not* take a phenomenological approach. Let us assume a decision-procedure of the greatest happiness principle: An act is morally right just because it promotes the best consequences overall in one's particular situation. Say we are convinced of its utilitarian power to solve all practical problems. When we apply the greatest happiness principle, the content of morality is determined and funneled into a moral code. What the act utilitarian is after is a principle that could guide moral deliberation for all human beings no matter where they are in the world, what their situation is like, and the extra-rational factors surrounding it up to and including moral luck. In this way, the act utilitarian forces all singularity of moral events, people, and circumstance into one rubric—the same is true of Kant's "supreme principle of morality." Instead, there are phenomenological presuppositions that should first be investigated before we force the event and people through one rubric. Chief among them, Scheler discloses the pre-rational and emotional a priori structure of value that all ethical systems depend on.

Taken phenomenologically, persons are not held in hostage by values and obligation despite Caputo's misgivings. Instead, values and obligation are the manner in which persons experience life. With Scheler's *ordo amoris,* we cannot help but experience the whole of life as valuable. Hence, the "impenetrability" of obligation is the givenness of value-contents in feeling, and their appeal and demand of obligation "binding" us occurs in feeling-acts. The binding demand of an infant's vulnerability is felt more substantively than sating the desire for dessert. Value-contents cannot help but be experience as constituting experience at all. That's why "obligation just happens." The ultimacy of otherness in the person is the highest feeling capable and also that which pulls us to recognize the singular uniqueness of the Other - feelings and value of the Holy. The ultimacy is the execessive givenness of value entering into experience. That holds sway over us, especially for Levinas. For Scheler, the person is the locus of value and brings values into being through their realization, but it is in feeling these values that action, deeds, goods, and persons are valuable in the first place.

When Caputo mentioned numerous times that the factical life of obligation is exactly like Heidegger's *Befindlichkeit,* which means the emotional tonality life acquires in its pre-cognitive ontological dimension, he should have looked at the phenomenological depth of Scheler's affective intentionality. A value's relativity and absoluteness "is given in emotive immediacy." (Scheler 1973, 99) For Scheler, values are given in intentional feeling. "The value itself must be intuitively given or must refer back to that kind of givenness" and the only type of givenness in which values are experienced refers to those "non-formal qualities of contents possessing a determinate order of ranks with respect to higher and lower." (Scheler 1973, 14-17) The non-formal is the emotive content in feeling acts. "Values are given first in of all in feeling [*Fühlen*]." (Scheler 1973, 35) Caputo's mistake is remaining Heideggerian about obligation and feeling. They are not two separate moments let alone two separate things, but one experience. As I argued in my first article "Scheler, Heidegger, and the Hermeneutics of Value," (See Hackett 2013, 1-19) Heidegger has no order of preferencing, no "*logique du coeur*" in the Pascalian sense, to commensurate which of those value-qualities perceived in feeling and subsequently values cannot be ranked in Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity. Faced with the choice betwee two obligations is to be faced with two competing values in a situation about a good, deed, or ourselves. In that experience, we ought to prefer the higher to the lower. According to Scheler, there is pre-rational and therefore emotional basis for these values when compared to each other in the order of preferencing worked out in Scheler's phenomenology. Higher values *will always be given* as more enduring, indivisible, and fulfilling than lower values that are less enduring, more divisible, and less fulfilling. This fact follows from the givenness of value itself.

According to this value-ranking, the values of the Holy are the deepest, most endurable and more fulfilling, and I take special note of this deep and endurable sense of the Holy just as much as Caputo unites philosophical criticism in *Against Ethics* with the prophetic voice of the Biblical God, the God of justice and mercy. These Holy feelings permeate the entire dimension of the person to the point that in all experiences of spiritual feeling and Holy values, the dignity of the person is entirely felt (emotionally intuited) in love, and therefore valued for their singular uniqueness. At root of the Holy, the deepest forms of concrete love and acceptance of radical alterity take root. Quentin Lauer describes it best,

> [Scheler] describes [the ascetical preparation of value] as a "surrender" to being characterized by *love*, a willingness to be dominated rather than to dominate, to bathe in the richness of being rather than to impoverish being by seeking to control it for the sake of one's own subjective assurance. This attitude can scarcely be described more eloquently than it is by Scheler himself "This new attitude," he says, "might first of all be characterized vaguely enough from the emotional point of view as a surrender of self to the intuitional content of things," as a movement of profound trust in the unshakeableness of all that is simply and evidently "given," as a courageous letting-onself-go in intuition and in the loving movement toward the world in its capacity for being intuited. (Lauer 1965, 166)

The motive here is the love of being. Love is the form of intentional feeling that opens us up to ascending the value-rankings. Hatred closes us off and blinds us to the fact that a lower value may be standing in where a higher value ought to be. And while Lauer is right in one respect, he is wrong in emphasizing the complete submission to being required. In fact, the alleged surrender to being in love is but only mode of being possible given the process Scheler unearths. Accepting the intuitive contents of feeling consciousness as the proper account of where values originate and are experienced, persons cannot help but feel their efficacious pull on us. Love is the one intentional act that opens us up to the elevation of ever increasing "richness of being." Love does not ask us to control but let the phenomenon be as it is, and to promote what it is for the beloved to be. In this way, Scheler's phenomenology is more attuned to listen; it is in listening to Being and not a willingness to be dominated or surrender, but to remain attuned to the demands of ever actualizing spirit and the higher values that call us forth to act.

The fact that we find human life saturated with values and obligations is a phenomenological one. We find goods, others, and deeds valuable since we have the same capacity of co-feeling to sympathize and be opened to the same range of feeling acts and conjoined value-correlates as other persons, which also explains the phenomenological intersubjectivity of why we all experience life saturated in value. Since Caputo wants a poetics of obligation, he wants to respect the "just happening of obligation" to respect the uniqueness of the event, but not tie it down to untenable metaphysics as ethics often does. In tying obligation to feeling, he seems implicitly phenomenological. If he adopted the correct phenomenological approach (Schelerian), then phenomenology would lead Caputo to ontologize the descriptions, and that could help secure the ontological necessity of values emerging in feeling acts. Without an appropriate ontology, values cannot be secured as a real experience. To have answers to moral problems, however, values need to be experienced coherently as genuine answers to moral problems, and if we accept the quasi-pronouncements against metaphysics from Heidegger *qua* Caputo, then we might have the resources to explain how values and obligations are experienced and to secure an ontology of values in factical life. Such an ontology of value is, therefore, sought in the intelligibility of experience itself.

As such, we can dispel the two theses of his worry. Phenomenology is not an untenable metaphysics that precludes openness to others since values are felt through the emotional *a priori* intuitions of the same structure that attracted Caputo on its surface to find refuge in Heidegger's notion of attunement. Contrary to Caputo, a form of metaphysics would only be untenable if and only if the content never entered experience. The deconstructionist's worry about language unwittingly commits Caputo to be suspicious of the universal access phenomenology claims about the contents of experience. That's why the concretion of love coupled with the Holiness of the Other can be resources to further undermine Caputo's suspicions about ethical metaphysics. Second, in adopting the similar if not identical Levinasian radical alterity and the singular uniqueness of Scheler's person, an ethicist can be as responsive to the uniqueness of the situation as Caputo desires.[7] In recognizing the higher value over the lower one, there is no precise prescriptive element. We are open to choose as we must in how we realize the higher value that calls us. The only injunction is to realize more love into the world! The decidability of the event is not foreclosed as a utilitarian or Kantian might have it, and it's debatable whether or not Scheler has given us a prescriptive ethics or an ethics of comportment in which we are charged with realizing more love into the world as a surrender and listening to Being. In my reading of Scheler, I prefer the latter. Assuming that reading, then, Caputo can have what he ultimately wanted, an ethics that respected the vulnerability, suffering, and catastrophe of ordinary people (Caputo 1993, 231-234) but without the uncritical and ambiguous jettisoning of ethical metaphysics that underlie what he adamantly denied but is no less present as a transcendental feature of value-experience.

Performativity for Ontology?

Judith Butler is usually regarded as a postmodern thinker, and the only thing that seemingly identifies her with this label is the host of thinkers employed in her thinking about gender. However, given the under-theorization of gender in the history of philosophy, the lesson about gender might be that one could not help but be "postmodern" in addressing the concept and its relations to other concepts. Butler's concern with gender also marks what is regarded as her most famous contribution to philosophy: her critique of the gender and sex distinction that cuts all the way through her work from her first book *Performative Acts and Gender Constitutions* (1988) to her often cited and very famous *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (1990). One might even say that continuing threads of performativity in her works like *Excitable Speech*: *A Politics of the Performative* (1997). In many ways, the label "constructivist" is applied to many of her works since gender and sexual orientation are "constructed" out of their performance and continual repetition in performing acts. Indeed, someone looking for anything resembling an ontology in her work might just focus on the stylized performances and repetition of those acts in time and look only to performativity as the basis of an ontology. Then again, the reader of this essay knows the participation in intentional acts is somewhat similar, but carries a more significant ontological weight for Scheler than Butler. For Scheler, phenomenology identifies the realist elements by which values are experienced, Butler – like Caputo – relies on an affective dimension of experience that constitutes the value of another. The question: Is there is a structure underlying the manner in which values are constituted in their affective dimension she offers or if they are constructed out just those elements that constitute it?

In approaching this question, one might simply work from her thoughts that follow from the ontological limitations of performativity. It would seem that performativity is very much like Heidegger's being-in-the-world (*Sein-in-der-welt*), but without the quasi-transcendental of the care structure. She attempts to give a theory of ethics in *Giving an Account of Oneself* (2005). In that text, Butler offers a theory of how the ethical subject forms in narration and identify the problematic elements of self-transparent accounts of responsibility. As such, one could see that work to suggest a constructivism about values based on performativity and narrativity. However, Butler also thinks that an ethical relation between two people is illuminated when a story cannot be told, or has to be told again. As such, the failure in narration has ethical implications in her view. Therefore, I can investigate how the affective dimensions opens us up to that same ethical relationship in *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* that underlies her thought and simultaneous engagement with Levinas.

Before that, however, I should mention what Butler means by ethics. In her essay, "Ethical Ambivalence," she is suspicious of ethics, and like Caputo somewhat unclear about what it means for her,

> I do not have much to say about why there is a return to ethics, if there is one, in recent years, except to say that I have for the most part resisted this return…I've worried that the return to ethics has constituted an escape from politics, and I've also worried that it has meant a certain heightening of moralism. (Butler 2009, 70)

Such a moralism can often oversimplify the unique singular event of how an Other is disclosed in the self-other relation and the situation with which he or she is accompanied by. This thought echoes the opening of Preface of Levinas's *Totality and Infinity,* "Everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by morality." (Levinas 1969, 21) Butler uses ethics as, I think, Levinas intends the meaning of morality in the previous quote. The role of traditional ethical theory or moral theory tends to oversimplification for the purposes of theoretical unity. The oversimplification can often universalize the complexity of several facets the singular relation, the individuality of the one responsible, or the other we are responding to. All facets can be subsumed, all particular events into one-overall-sameness. As we saw before, this is especially true if one is a convinced act utilitarian or Kantian deontologist. In fact, ethical reflection and some versions of normative theories seem to rely on the oversimplifying and over-abstraction of the moral principles they supply to such an extent that one can escape, justify, and supply justified reasons over learning how best to execute what it takes to truly respond to the singularity of the other and the event of the self-other relation Butler demands. In many ways, Butler does not abandon these Levinasian assumptions, and in other ways, she develops them.

Grieving and Mourning

Butler attempts to rethink a way into the ethical self-other relation and specifically applies this within the specific cultural context of a post-9/11 discourse. Like Scheler, she opens up with the question about affective experience and she sees what those specific emotions reveal. Like Caputo's appropriation of Heidegger's *Befindlichkeit,* there is no ordering of feelings offered. In the essay, she targets mourning and grieving. These emotions open up to reveal a social and political order, revealing who counts as the Levinasian other. In her words, grieving "furnishes a sense of political community of complex order, and does this first of all by bringing to the fore the relational ties that have implications for theorizing fundamental dependency and ethical responsibility." (Butler 2006, 22) Her observation seems to be if we pay attention to who counts as a grievable person, "who counts as human," then we open up and are revealed to an ethical dimension of the self-other relationality that would allow for us to reimagine the social and political community in a post-9/11 world based in part on the vulnerability shared in such experiences.

There is little distinction between how she uses the terms "grieving" and "mourning." Both lead to a transformation, a revelatory insight contained within the experiences, but we submit to that experience. "The transformative effect of loss" and this effect "cannot be charted or planned." (Butler 2006, 21) As such, she is describing the experience as we undergo it. When I lose you, I don't just lose somebody distant as if they are just another person over there. In essence, I lose that very real constituting tie and relation that is in constant contact with a world of others. There is a sociality, or a public dimension to this experience for Butler, and in mourning, I can lose myself in the experience. When I submit to the transformative effect of loss, I can lose myself in the grieving process. I can find myself entirely absorbed in the experience of loss of that tie I found so necessary that "I can't go on." Somehow, I must learn to be without, and some never truly learn to cope with such loss. The only positive feature of this experience is *the tie*. Grieving reveals those ties and relations between self and others at the basis of Levinasian subjectivity. The ethical subject is revealed in the traumatic loss and attachment that such loss reveals.

Butler's Implicit Phenomenology of Vulnerability

Even more than that, this tie is the explanation of how my subjectivity is formed. If we see the formation of the subject's narrative or enactment in recognition, then Butler could simply be an anti-realist about values. We could see the performativity of ethical relationships and the performativity as two examples of incommensurable performativity that animated Rorty and Lyotard. However, the anti-realism does not fit here since the relevant ontology for Butler would still be identical in the medium of experience, the very medium of experience that vulnerability and gender both require.

Despite the inherent postmodern proclivity of her thinking, her claims about vulnerability are surprisingly phenomenological, and I'd recommend that we think of her claims in precisely that way. When we see performativity of ethical relationality and how the subject is formed in Butler's thought, we see her work as offering descriptions of affectivity. These are descriptions of emotions that lead us to unveil these constitutive ties of relationality. The very relation she defines in relation to vulnerability in her work, "ethical obligations not only depend upon our vulnerability to the claims of others but establishes us as creatures who are fundamentally defined by that ethical relation." (Butler 2012, 141) In that relationality, we discover the invariably public dimension of vulnerability and site of our vulnerability is corporeal. As such, these phenomenological descriptions are embodied in Merleau-Ponty-like fashion. Moreover, the constitution of this public dimension finds concrete value in the meaning of our bodies and the embodied life we experience. My body is my own and not my own all at the same time. In this way, Butler discloses vulnerability in a twofold, but interrelated distinction between the individual subject and the intersubjective (what she calls the *public*) dimension. The meaning of these ties underscore the individualizing and intersubjective dimension of vulnerability, and these dimensions become the basis "for the ongoing normative dimension of our social and political lives." (Butler 2006, 27)

There are two lessons to draw from the ongoing normative dimension of our social and political lives based on the shared vulnerability and interdependence revealed in mourning. First, the self-other relationality is not just a theoretical device for explaining why obligation just happens. Instead, the self-other relation returns the possibility of ethics understood as an analysis and affirmation of the shared vulnerability forming the exact tie between the self and other. As such, Butler is still consistent with her earlier remarks about being suspicious of ethics escaping politics. Instead, vulnerability is very concrete, actual, and immanent in the unfolding of communal life, and within the ethical action, we don't know all the risks. To stand in that ethical relation is to risk oneself and the other. The ties that bind are risked, may be lessened and utterly destroyed. As such, Butler reminds us, "ethics requires us to risk ourselves precisely at moments of unknowingness." (Butler 2005, 136) Such actions demand that we risk ourselves for others, but also that others may in turn risk themselves for me. The risk comes at the price of possibly undoing ourselves since we may not know what will happen. As such, this risk is everywhere ontologically because we are vulnerable. This constitutes the very possibility of communal life. Understood as an "existential claim," she writes, "everyone is precarious and this follows from our social existence as bodily beings who depend upon one another for shelter and sustenance and who, therefore, are at risk of statelessness, homelessness, and destitution under unjust and unequal political conditions." (Butler 2012, 148)

While Butler will theorize vulnerability for the concrete political situation of our contemporary global and political situations, I would like to focus on the phenomenological insight gleaned from being led by the experience of mourning. In mourning, the self-other relationality is revealed and found necessarily vulnerable. In fact, vulnerability is the precondition of all social and political activity. In her words, "We cannot, however, will away this vulnerability. We must attend to it, even abide by it." (Butler 2006, 29) Vulnerability, we are told, "emerges with life itself," the source of which can never be recovered since vulnerability "precedes the formation of 'I'." (Butler 2006, 31)

For Butler, the recognition of this insight is important for its pragmatic effect. If we can identify vulnerability with the face-to-face encounter as the demand, which comes from "elsewhere, unbidden, and unexpected" (Butler 2006, 130) in the face-to-face encounter in which I am always addressed, then this identification opens up the possibility to preserve the ties that truly bind us since in preserving the other, we always preserve and create the conditions under which the vulnerability and singularity of the other is constantly recognized. "To respond to the face, to understand its meaning means to be awake to what is precarious in another's life or, rather, the precariousness of life itself." (Butler 2006, 134) The precariousness of the face is the vulnerability of the tie and bonds that constitute us. Like Scheler, there's no decision procedure or method of deliberation to secure this insight other than its pure recognition of vulnerability in the face-to-face encounter, which is just recognizing the phenomenological insight of this relation. If we foster conditions of culture to respect difference and recognize the shared vulnerability of the ties between individuals, groups, and states, then that recognition can reconfigure the productive power of vulnerability itself, and as such, vulnerability becomes the content of those relational ties that continually present themselves to us such that there is a dimension of feeling that leads us into the ongoing normative dimension of our social and political lives. Not only those realms, but this vulnerability precedes and constitutes any human activity. It is the condition to which we are continually delivered into.

Before deciding the anti-realism and realism of value in her philosophy, I wanted to present Butler's findings on the ethical relationships between self and other. I wholly admit that I also dissociate those self-other relations from the political context in *Precarious Life.* I needed to pause since the tone and projects reliant upon performativity are clearly anti-realist, but here the close proximity of vulnerability to Levinas takes on a non-formal approach to ethics similar with Scheler's efforts. In Scheler, the act intentionality of love is the elevation of participation to higher strata of feeling and value, and while there is no clear way to act when Holy values flash forth in feeling, the language of and commitment to infinite demand is marginally present in Butler. This marginal presence of the Holy is the secular language of vulnerability as a factical ontology and acquires *prima facie* religious invocation when she applies Levinas to support a Jewish ethics of nonviolence. Here, however, Judaism resonates only on the surface of Caputo's God of mercy and justice. Unlike Caputo, Butler views vulnerability as a concrete process, and as such, I find little reason to see her work under the postmodern epistemic anti-realism or postmodern metaphysical realism I outlined earlier that apply to Caputo.

If anything, this process-oriented view of vulnerability and grounding ethics in the sphere of intrapersonal relationships outlines a thinly-veiled process realism. For her, persons must recognize the vulnerability in the mutual self-other relations and ties that continually bind us and facilitate the reimagining the prospects for community organization and all levels of political activity. They must participate and comport themselves in such a way as to elevate the moral demands originating from the other, and therefore the whole person must participate and realize the values of otherness. These are insights opened up by a limited affective intentionality outlined in grieving and mourning, and in Scheler, they are opened up at the highest levels to which love can deliver us. As such, Levinas's thought, its active appropriation and synthesis in Butler, and Scheler articulate the highest dimension of singular otherness. Of course, I would hope and possibly argue in the future that love is a way to recognize this vulnerability as much as mourning's transformation of us.

These operative insights given to us in mourning command the same elements of Scheler's personalism. So far, I've discussed the benefits of recognizing vulnerability in Butler. What about the lack of vulnerability's recognition? If vulnerability is not recognized, then "derealization of loss, the insensitivity to human suffering and death becomes the mechanism through which dehumanization is accomplished." (Butler 2006, 148) Violence is always enacted on the other's body, and in order to perpetuate violence one must constantly negate the other, pretend that one's own vulnerability is not called into question by finding oneself as human as the victim. In effect, this is de-personalization for Scheler. For Butler, this humanization of the other is her secular language, a Judaistic humanism that attempts to accomplish with the label "human" what Levinas employs as the "other." Moreover, her language refers to the really real and present elements of the process value-realization, the value of the other into the world through identifying with the human-other.

In the end, Butler discloses a level of human life that Levinas only implicitly details, and Scheler could not. In Scheler's thought, there is an ascetic component. The vital sphere and life-drives gravitate to higher forms of spirit to actualize ideals and values into life, but spirit must pause and suspend the life-drives of the body long enough for their manifestation. As such, Scheler's thought is still governed by the anciently-derived and always present opposition between the body and spirit found in religious asceticism and entrenched in the Platonism of Western religion. Butler's focus on vulnerability functions as a way to synthesize and develop vulnerability phenomenologically. Vulnerability is a mode of experience that works in tandem with the intentionality of loving acts to open us up to the efficacious reality of ontologically participating in values and being a co-creator with others since only persons are the origin and bearer of values. Through actualizing the spirit, we all participate in building the spirit of community together, and that is the true metaphysical origin of all values.

Endnotes

1. I really have to thank J. Aaron Simmons of Furman University for a discussion on this point.
2. The foundationless commitment that surpasses its own limit is what Caputo describes as "deflection" on p. 231. He borrows this term from Professor Foti in making sense of Heidegger, and I wonder if the term is fittingly ironic as I gauge Caputo's entire *Against Ethics.*
3. See Martha Nussbaum's *Fragility of Goodness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) for the view I have in mind about how vulnerable our moral lives are from external threats outside of our control.
4. Clearly, a form of moral particularism, but such connections will have to wait.
5. For a complete description of how ethical claims are double-bound to speak about individuals universally in a discourse (let alone metaphysical discourse) despite the particular nature of being a proper name and individuated. This commitment to the indeterminacy of language itself is an attempt to preserve the uniqueness of individuals and not do violence to a being's particularity very much like Derrida attempts in *Violence and Metaphysics.* The interesting irony is this section of the book is to do justice to individuals can be sustained in Scheler's ethical

personalism as much as it can be in Levinasian ethical demand of the face-to-face encounter of an-other's radical alterity.

6. While one might want to say that it could be a phenomenological point that obligation is akin to Levinas's self-other relationship in which the alterity of the other captivates me infinitely, constantly demanding of me I acknowledge and respect the other, I hold off on that point since while I cannot make it in the manuscript here, Scheler's notion of the Holy, the value of the person is as infinitizing in its very structure. Obligation is not as infinitizing as the other, and Scheler's hierarchy of value-rankings can give us a more nuanced account of what particular calling is being given. The excessive givenness is, therefore, not its own form of givenness here as one might think of the alterity of the other in Levinas or the excessive givenness of God in Marion.
7. Let this be an axiom to which my efforts in ethics embody. Such a synthesis of Scheler and Levinas would require that we welcome difference into our hearts and learn that we love as others do, and in that loving we could recognize the precarious vulnerability and fragility of human existence that stirs our hearts. This is my ethics of vulnerability that still awaits formulation.

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Alfarabi's Hermeneutics of Religion:
Contemporary Relevance of His Perspectives on Freedom of Religion

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Abstract:

Contemporary debates on freedom of religion are based on the following premises: a) Human beings are born free, as unique individuals with distinct personalities shaped by natural and social influences; b) human rationality, being the seat of human freedoms, is universal; c) Religion, and hence freedom thereof, might as well be relegated to the realm of individual consciousness. This explains the reference to "the freedom of consciousness and belief" in many international and legal documents. d) Therefore as an individual human right, freedom of religion, consisting of one's right to uphold any belief, dogma, conviction or practice, must be protected against external coercion and interference of any sort.

So, the question arises as to the nature of freedom of religion; does it belong inside or outside the realm of human rights? It appears that once a religion is perceived from a majority perspective, it is positioned outside and, hence, falls under the political rights - and if it is perceived from a minority perspective or from the point of view of the latecomers to a country, it is positioned inside. It comes easier for some adherents of different religious traditions to try to devalue all the "other religions" in a spirit of competition for influencing public opinion rather than focusing on the common issues facing all religions alike. Freedom of religion is unquestionably one of these issues at stake now.

In this paper, I intend to provide a short analysis of the philosophical perspectives developed by some Muslim philosophers on the question of freedom of religion. Since freedom of religion is a social and first-order political issue, it must be dealt with in the theoretical context of social and political philosophy. But contemporary philosophy has almost severed its ties with religion. To the modern view, philosophy involves rational reflection on the nature of things and religion is concerned with practices based on revealed doctrines which are presumably impervious to rational scrutiny. However, I will attempt to argue that freedom of religion can only be resolved by a philosophical perspective on truth, which was the nature of philosophy as understood by some Muslim philosophers, like Alfarabi and Avicenna. We cannot analyze freedom of religion within a single religious perspective, nor one philosophical perspective on modernity. The perspective of these Muslim philosophers of 10th to 13th century are relevant here because for them, philosophy was not just a rational discourse, as it is for us today, but also a matter of academic exchange or statements; it was about primarily ways involving 'practice of spiritual exercises with the aim of the transformation of the self by the acquisition of wisdom."

Keywords: al-Farabi, Avicenna, Averroes, Practical truth, Muslim philosophy, Philosophy of religion, Negative freedom, Enligtenment, Freedom of religion, Hermeneutics of religion.

Issues Concerning the Definition of Freedom and Religion

Hegel draws attention to ambiguities in the definition of freedom. For Hegel, since freedom has no content and it is an empty concept, there will be no definition of freedom from its substance or its negation. Only a literal meaning can apply to it.

"No idea is so generally recognized as indefinite, ambiguous, and open to the greatest misconceptions (...) as the idea of Freedom: none in the common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning." (*Hegel's Philosophy of Mind* 1971, 239). Little needs to be added to Hegel's remarks, except that freedom is also confused with liberty.

Common public usage, however, confounds the term 'liberty' with that of 'freedom' by defining it as the lack of restraint. It is in this common sense that freedom here only means political and social freedom. If one were to look for a clear definition of freedom or were to ask a series of questions designed to elicit a working definition of freedom in modern philosophy, the answer would most likely be in line with solid liberal individualistic terms. One of the modern philosophers who gives such a liberal individualistic definition is Isaiah Berlin. In his *Two Concepts of Liberty*, he argues that "we should not confuse freedom with every good thing, such as a decent income and life chances. Everything is what it is, and not something else. Freedom means lack of restraint." Berlin calls it "negative liberty". For him, this is a bad definition because the definition focuses on the limits of one's actions. "To know my freedom," writes Berlin, "I have but to ask how many doors are open to me, and how wide they are open. The rest is extension of this sense, or else metaphor." (Berlin 1969, lvi)

Defining freedom of religion is not simple either, rather more complex and complicated. The issue is primarily related to human beings, it is about human freedom in its relation to having certain beliefs and acts intertwined together in what we call religion. From the psychological perspective, we need to define our subject matter in terms of a) freedom of will, b) freedom of thought, c) freedom of expression c) freedom of worship d) freedom from coercion and e) moral freedom of personal development and f) freedom of reason.

How will we define freedom of religion by emphasizing positive freedoms in the sense freedom "of, to and for" holding beliefs about God, the meaning of life, and of nature? Or should we define it negatively as freedom from, for instance, oppression by individuals, by society or by means of political order itself etc.? Can one measure freedom or lack of it against rational truth itself? These questions are all relevant to the issue of freedom of religion.

We also need an operative definition of religion that will be applicable to the freedom of diverse adherence of religions. The premises on which the contemporary debates on freedom of religion are based are the following: a) All human beings are born free. b) Societies are made up of individuals with unique and distinct personalities, by a social contract for the pursuit of common good. c) However, natural and social influences shape the individual behavior and social order. d) The reason is the inborn universal faculty that all human beings share. e) The only reliable source and the boundary of human freedoms is individual conscience and the laws of a society. c) Religion and, hence, freedom thereof might as well be protected by laws and yet it must be relegated to the conscience of individuals -hence the references to "freedom of belief and consciousness" in most international legal documents; d) Therefore, as an individual human right, freedom of religion consisting of individual's right to uphold any belief, dogma and conviction and practice thereof must be protected against external coercion and interference of any sort. If not all, but the fundamentals of these premises depends on the tacitly accepted logical fallacies, but this is not our concern here. However, it should be noted that these premises are sublimated as the basic tenets of modernity.

The fallacy we will remark in passing consists of the tautological assumption that as if individual consciousness is a jar of cookies received as a gift, one can eat without opening the container. While in almost all academic circles, on which the psychology's scholarship is based, firm theories presuming it to be an unquestionable fact that from early on the human conscience is shaped to a greater extent by the individual response to all sorts of external factors such as nature, family, and social environment. Can we, then, still talk about an individual consciousness left intact and able to be protected by the law, when individuals reach the legal age? These kinds of legal statements are fallacies in the sense that atheists such as Dawkins declares a legal battle for protection of underage children's conscience from parental religious influence and deleting all religious reference to children of all age, i.e. reference in the international and national documents as Buddhist, Muslim or Christian should be cleared. So, the parent should have no right or privilege to teach their children any religion or faith of their choice.

The second fallacy is related to a form of tacit classification of individual's freedom into two kinds: freedom of interior and exterior actions. Freedom of conscience, thought and belief is related to an individual as a person, whereas freedom of expression is related to an individual as a member of society. This is important because depending on our definition of 'religion' it could be related to social and, therefore, political freedoms or to individual freedoms as an interior act of conscience.

So, the next question arises as to the nature of freedom; is freedom of religion interior or exterior to human action - that is religious action (assuming that there was a category called action)? It appears that since religion itself is subject to multiple interpretations so is the realm of its freedoms. Recent legislative acts and initiatives in several countries of Europe, for instance, have been interested in understanding the belief system, conduct and dress codes of Muslims. Ever since the controversies about the representation of the Prophet of Islam in literature, visual arts or media (particularly with the Salman Rushdie affair) several experts and observers have tried to suggest ways to regulate people's religious actions, interior and exterior. So, freedom of religion definitely falls under the rubric of political and social rights.

Negative Freedom in Modernity

If we define 'freedom' in negative terms as lack of restraint, we are delimiting it in its social sense. Individualist definitions mostly refer to the liberties, i.e. satisfaction of desires of body and intellect. The end for which these desires are to be fulfilled is left squarely ambivalent. For this reason, our search for satisfactory answers to these questions in modern philosophy may be in vain; we may need to look for answers elsewhere. Half a century ago, a Muslim scholar Ismail Ragi A. Faruqi gave a lecture to the faculty of the Divinity School at the University of Chicago, on April 30, 1964. His subject was "History of Religions: Its nature and significance for Christian education and The Muslim-Christian Dialogue."

The title makes it clear that collaboration between different faith groups in teaching each others' religion in fairness to its own tradition was a promising educational project at the time. However, attempts of this kind did not bring the projected results. Instead, freedom of religion is getting more and more threatened in many parts of the world, even in the countries that used to be the cradle of freedoms. The unquestionable issue at stake now is not "freedom *in abstracto*" but more concretely freedom of human beings living in a society, a community and a certain country. If philosophy is primarily a way of questioning human life situations, then all the challenges threatening not only freedoms but also foundations of human societies would be the starting point of a meaningful discussion. After all, we are all responsible for engaging constructively with the problems facing the cohesion of our modern plural societies. The problems related to the freedom of religion cannot be resolved within an antiquated conceptual framework. In the face of increasing xenophobia, racial and religious hatred, intellectual responses to these kinds of social crisis across the world seems not only inadequate but obviously less than promising in terms of expectations of harmonious social life.

Therefore, as a starting point for a fruitful discussion, I will look at the critical response to Faruqi's lecture by Charles H. Long, who was a professor of History of Religions at that time. Long writes this in his note:

> Faruqi's portrayal of the history of the discipline of religions presupposes that such discipline was carried out along rational lines of scholarship. However, such judgment may not be totally accurate. The history of religion is a child of the European enlightenment. This is to recognize that the history of religion had its beginnings in a period in which the Western World was seeking some rational as over against a religious understanding of the history of man's religious life. The history of religion during the enlightenment was for the most part rationalistically and moralistically oriented. Prior to this time, the understanding of religion from a religious point of view yielded even less on the level of scientific understanding, for while the medieval theologians were able to see Islam, for example, as a religion and not as an instance of a truncation of reason, it was nevertheless relegated to the level of paganism since it did not meet the standards of the one true revelation. The rationalistic interpretation of history had the value of establishing a criterion other than revelation as the basis of religion. This meant that to a greater degree the data of the non-Christian religions could be taken a bit more seriously. This was further validated by the idea of universalism of the enlightenment and the reports from colonizers and missionaries which established a broader if inadequate basis for the understanding of other religions and cultures. (Faruqi 1965, 50, n. 16)

The reason I mention these remarks is that the question of religious freedoms cannot be resolved within the parameters of post-Enlightenment philosophy. It may appear to be a compliment to modernity or even to Christianity if one makes a mystical interpretation of these kinds of remarks which were in the spirit of the time no more than a lip service not only to the "so-called enlightened sections of modern society" but also to the religiously sensitive ears. Enlightenment is neither really the culmination and manifestation of Christian rationality, nor can it serve as a good ground for understanding what is the true nature of freedom of religion but only feeds the self-gratification of modernity.

It is true that history of religions did not tread a clear-cut rational course.

It is also true that medieval attempts to understand any other religion from the perspective of one's own religious tradition have proven their own fallacies, too. But it would be hardly a fair judgment if one were to claim that only post-Enlightenment reason has given rise to an appreciation of inter-religious tolerance. By giving due credit to its contribution to the development of the science of comparative religion, one should not forget that the Enlightenment has also exhibited uncompromising hostility towards and skepticism about religion.

The idea of freedom has changed as it became to signify a formal sense, as freedom from tradition and authority. In the Enlightenment, freedom is understood as a rational choice which one cannot obey tradition without using judgment. As Descartes and Kant have shown, nothing could be acceptable if one knows and freely assents to it. Kant described moral decisions other than derived from autonomy reason as heteronymous. Romanticism, in opposition to the Enlightenment trust in the absolute power of reason, has changed the conception of freedom under the influence of natural and empirical sciences.

For different reasons treatment of religion underwent a substantial change. According to Morris Jastrow, at the turn of the 20th century, these changes affected the methods of study of religions in Western tradition in seven categories: indifference, superiority, intolerance under the form of suppression and persecution, then comes the era of skepticism which followed a period of hostility towards all religions. Then comes the period of historical treatment of religion ending in the comparative study of religions. (Jastrow 1902, 1-22)

This skepticism of the Enlightenment affected Christianity more than other religious traditions by severing philosophy from practical wisdom of religions and metaphysical wisdom on truth leaving and subjective hopes of individual mind. The question which now arises is this: In retrospect, by making the object of human will its own self-regulating reason, did philosophical enlightenment give man his own freedom or make it an object determined by the forces of nature? In other words, have individual human beings discovered the inner source of their freedom in "self-regulating reason" at the expense of losing spiritual and moral freedom of self-realization ever since?

Some Muslim Philosophers' Approaches to Freedom

For some of the major Muslim thinkers, like Alfarabi, freedom is a human faculty or potency not only to the satisfaction of desires of the body, but also of spirit and mind, and human dignity in his social milieu. The end for which human beings are born free is towards completion or attainment of happiness and excellence of individual self, as well as social. To will something means that the subject is devoid of the object of his will. For an agent, having a purpose signifies that he is in need of fulfillment through the object aimed at.

It is entirely fair to say that Muslim philosophers emphasize freedom of will more strongly than, say, Enlightenment philosophers, like Kant. For Kant, freedom should be defined on its own term and could only be understood in terms of its contrary, i.e. the lack of freedom. Therefore, for Kant, freedom is its own negativity. What we call a deficiency in being human or being in need of fulfillment is the evidence of something beyond human substance, as Averroes would have said. According to Ghazali, the discovery of freedom in human beings begins with the recognition of what is already known. These words sound contradictory at first. But in a close analysis, it is clear that the deficiency or the perfection of which a human being finds himself lacking leads him to the desire of what is already known. Ghazali declares that "agent is an expression referring to one from whom the act proceeds, together with the will to act by way of choice and the knowledge of what is willed." (Al-Ghazali 1997, 57) The existence of freedom requires the performance of an action which is motivated by the will of something lacking or by its benefit which is already known. Therefore, it is understood as "the will seeking after something known" by the willing subject. "If then, a quest is supposed without knowledge, there would be no will" (Al-Ghazali 1997, 179)

There are three Islamic terms to be treated in relation to the concept of freedom: liberty, choice, and will. In modern usage, probably the Arabic term *hurriyya* means both liberty and freedom interchangeably. But it was not commonly in use in philosophical treatises, except in Abu'l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī's later usage of the term in referring to Aristotle's definition of freedom: "[Aristotle] said that freedom (*al-hurriyya*) is a faculty of soul protecting itself substantively not artificially. Again he says that freedom belongs primarily to substance and secondly it does not belong to habits" (al-Baghdādī, 1998, 279-280) That means freedom is not acquired through actions and habits but is the inborn quality of human substance. In other words, freedom is understood through actions of human agents aimed at self-protection, but it cannot be reduced to these habits.

The concept of freedom has a moral and even an aesthetic sense. Some Muslim writers, for instance, Thanawi gives a literal definition of freedom as "antiquated and released" and adds that it also means "unsurpassable beauty and fairness." But he also gives a better meaning to the term as "pure or sincere. The term freedom means sincerity of wisdom as it appears in man to separate the truth from other than itself." (al-Tahanawi, 1996, 121) This is also the philosophical definition of freedom. He, then, continues to give a mystical definition of freedom, as "relieving the memory from being occupied with things other than the word of God." It should also be mentioned that "freedom is the ultimate end of servitude, in which there is salvation just like at the beginning of his creation." In another definition, freedom means in general sense release from desire, and in a special sense, it means release oneself from desire and put his will to the truth. (al-Jurjānî, *Kitāb al-Taʿrīfāt*, 1983, 86)

Human will is a potency which will be free only through knowledge and deliberation. By reason and by free choice, human will becomes free. The agent is the one who causes some other thing "to pass from potency to actuality (...); this actualization occurs sometimes from deliberation and choice (ihtiyar.)" (*Averroes' Tahafut Al-Tahafut* 1987, 89) A similar definition of freedom in relation to human act is also made by Ala al-din al-Tusi, who is referring to free will as "an attribute of human being in a state of relatedness to act or not to act whose exact fulfillment is freedom that is not compulsory, yet a requisite of it." (al-Tusi, *Tahafut al-Falasifa*, 2003, 169)

How are these philosophical and theological definitions related to freedom of religion? These are also definitions of human nature. But whilst the human body, being subject to natural causes is not free, the human soul, and hence its highest faculty of intellect, is free. The power that makes human being human -that is to say a combination of the two components is the free will. But the question about free will is something different in theological or philosophical perspective.

Let's take another example of definition by al-Ghazali; when he defines freedom from a theological perspective, he is more cautious in his choice of words. The will is attributable to the discernment of something from its like; so, without having such a faculty we would have left only with potency. At first sight, it appears as if al-Ghazali is making a concession to the philosophical doctrine of freedom of will. But he carefully avoids crossing the theological line and instead tries to give a literal definition of the term free will.

Al-Ghazali, who represents some form of theological orthodoxy and mystical outlook, is critical on philosophical and other theological doctrines of freedom. Early on, some Muslim theologians, especially the rationalist Mutazilate School, emphasized the human reason's capacity to distinguish what is morally right and wrong. They also uphold the existence of free will, a human capacity to make a moral choice between what is right and what is wrong. Inspired by the Quranic advice that "among themselves, mankind should strive to compete in the good deeds", Mutazilate School was convinced that reason and freedom were secure bases to establish moral and political order, leading to common good and justice in a plural society. However, they did not follow their own conviction when members of Mutazilate school held some political power for a short period of time; soon, not only they turned into very harsh critics of other religions but also they began to resort to oppressive ways to compelling other Muslim scholars to accept their doctrines. They left a historically bad legacy on the issue of freedom of religion, since they maintained that it cannot be dealt with theological reason alone.

Therefore, the question of the freedom of religion, in general, cannot be resolved in theological discourse because it inevitably evokes doctrinal debates. Questions regarding the veracity or truth of one religion against another cannot be resolved by theological reasoning alone. Within the dogmas of a specific religion, we cannot solve the problem of religious freedoms and it must be carried into the realm of philosophical reason.

Freedom of Religion as a Political Issue in Alfarabi

So far, I have argued that questions concerning the nature of freedom of religion or religious freedoms cannot be evaluated within the limits of modern philosophical discourse nor in theological discourse. We have to return to a so-called pre-modern understanding of philosophy or a way of doing philosophy in order to deal with the question in its own true features. Alfarabi's political philosophy is the right place to start.

In his influential work on the division of science, Alfarabi deals with the subject of the role of reason in religion. He describes three distinct approaches prevalent in his days. This same discussion is still relevant today. 1. One group claims that religion reveals truth above and beyond the reach of reason. Hence religion is a phenomenon to be reckoned with in its own terms, since reason cannot judge the content of religion. 2. The other group argues that religion not only comprises itself but also it is complementary to reason, that is to say, religion brings us certain ideas, some of which conform to reason and others are beyond the reach of reason. In other words, religion concurs with human rationality to a certain extent and opens a new horizon that elevates the human capacity. 3. This group argues that religion and reason lead to the truth from different paths. If there appears to be a contradiction, there remain two possible ways to resolve this conflict. Alfarabi suggests the philosophical method. The religious text should be revised in order to be understood correctly and/or rational knowledge is to be reviewed. Despite of this, the contradiction is still not resolved and the final solution would be to interpret the religious expression by means of rational knowledge. The other way to resolve the conflict is by denying the existence of a contradiction between religion and reason; if it is claimed to be a fact, philosophers should attribute it to either ignorance or bad intention of the claimant. Since reason is taken as the vehicle of truth, reason will judge the truth of the matter in case of conflict between two competing claims.

We may call this Muslim perspective as a philosophical moralist and rationalist approach to religion. Let's not forget that Averroes defines philosophy as the "rational inquiry into the existing things and their contemplation in so far as they are proofs of the Creator." (Ibn Rushd 2001, 3) It is a philosophical perspective that allows one to be open to the truth for moral and intellectual development within one's own religious tradition. Alfarabi is aware of the diversity of religious opinions and narratives, both in ancient literature and also in his own social circles. He was aware of what Carlos Fraenkel calls "cultural religious forms" (Fraenkel, 2012, xii), seen as reading practices:

> [T]he myths, stories, histories of peoples and histories of nations, that man narrates and to which he listens solely for the pleasure they give. For to take pleasure in something means nothing other than the achievement of comfort and delight. Likewise, looking at imitators and listening to imitative statements, listening to poems, and going over what one comprehends of the poems and the myths he recites or reads, are used by the man who delights in them and is comforted by them only for his pleasure in what he comprehends. The more certain his apprehension, the more perfect his pleasure.

> The more excellent and perfect in himself the man who comprehends the more perfect and completes his pleasure in his apprehension. (Alfarabi 1961, 73)

All people share this religious freedom that belongs to individual morality and that is part of his spiritual development. However, there is also a freedom of religion that relates to the political sphere, where the forms of good social life and social order are to be determined through philosophical analyses of human purposes in regard to the conception of ontological truth. In other words, the final question concerning the common good could only be established by an appeal to rational truth, not by the particularities of any religion. This may sound as if Alfarabi had projected secular social order where no single living religion dominated the public sphere. This was not the case, for Alfarabi, just as he believed the unity of philosophy depended on the universal human intellect, so, he equally believed in the universality of Islam as a complementary final form of all.

However, this idea of Islam as final closure of all truth never led to intolerance or hostility towards other religions. Although there was awareness of other belief systems openly in opposition to Muslim doctrine, this may not have been an excuse for violating the individual rights to life, property, honor, and reason of non-Muslims whose protection was determined by the divine purpose in Islamic revelation. Therefore, just like his own Muslim contemporaries, Alfarabi may have believed in the primordial status of Islam as well as in the finality of revelation contained in the Qur'an and revealed to the last Abrahamic Prophet, Muhammad. Therefore, religion is not understood in generic terms; rather it is perceived within the framework of both natural reason and philosophical perspective.

Philosophy for them was supplementary to religion. Moral order, providing the means for peace in society and for the individuals, needs to be tested rationally in order for the moral and political regimes to achieve the objectives in the very formation of societies. The reason Muslim philosophers have treated religious freedom as a political issue has to do with the fact that human freedom is limited only by common laws and reason. Al-Kindi has also made a distinction between the eternal truth and the truth of cognition; between "ultimate truth and practical truth." (Khadduri, 1998, 104). For al-Kindi "the truth requires that we do not reproach anyone who is even one of the causes of even small and meagre benefits to us."(al-Kindi, 1974, 57) Some political issues may not be resolved according to the assertion about the eternal truth, but according to rational statements. As Avicenna points out, every individual and social human order is limited by two bonds: "Divine law and law of reason". This statement applies to religious freedoms as well. Commenting on the purpose of divine commands Avicenna writes:

> There may also be a gain to the one who is subject to penalty, in preventing him from further wickedness, because men must be bound by one of two bonds, either the bond of the divine Law or the bond of reason, that the order of the world may be completed. Do you not see that if anyone were let loose from both bonds the load of wickedness he would commit would be unbearable, and the order of the world's affairs would be upset by the dominance of him who is released from both

bonds? (Hourani 1966, 25-48)

If we try to set the doctrinal limits to religious freedoms, this would violate both God's purpose in creation as well as divine justice that must be reflected in any social order. People could be brothers in many senses: brothers in blood, brothers in religion and brothers in humanity. This is the content of a well-rehearsed prophetic tradition that most Muslims may be familiar with.

As in Ibn Tufail's Hayy Bin Yaqzan, the philosophical truth to which reason can attain is the same as the one symbolized by the religion itself. Ibn Tufail's elder Spanish contemporary, Ibn Bajjah, known to Europe as Avempace, was the author of a work called *Tadbir al-Mutawahhid*, i.e. *The Hermit's Regime*. Ibn Bajjah's theme was to demonstrate how man, by the unaided improvement of his faculties, may attain to union with the Active Intellect. So, freedom of religion in their public manifestations is an issue to be ordained by the laws, but the question of truth of opposite religious claims can be settled only in the light of truth, as it is reflected in the human intellect. Until the ultimate truth is attained, the door to self realization of each person of will is always open.

I would like to end this reflection with the following questions. What "is the wisdom born out of religion? Is religion complementary to wisdom? Isn't philosophy the exterior form of the human soul, while religion is the interior form thereof?" (al-Tawḥīdī, 1929, 200). In order to open ourselves to these questions, we must recognize the new role to be played by a rational and philosophical debate. There are four prisons that modern human beings are capable of emancipating themselves from Nature, society, history and from themselves. Probably the road to freedom from nature has been prepared by the evolution of natural knowledge. Critical reason and democracy may help us free ourselves from the burdens of history and society. Yet, who may free us from the prisons of self, or in Freud's term, the ego? "It is the eye so long as it can see what is behind the mountains/ It is reason as long as it knows what will the future hold for it."[1] What happens if the eyes can't see, and reason cannot foresee what will the future hold? A man-made crisis of an unprecedented sort will be created by our own hands. This will be the crisis of freedom. Although it is the most abstract of all freedoms, as recognized in legal documents, freedom of religion gives rise to a concrete crisis of human identity, if it is violated.

Endnotes

1. From Tonyukuk, an ancient Turkic Bilge or sage (born c. 646, died c. 726).

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Interreligious Spirituality of Work.
Bhagavadgita and Catholic Social Teaching

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Abstract:
This essay is an interreligious study of spirituality of work. It considers the normative/doctrinal teachings on work in *Bhagavadgita* and Catholic Social Teaching. It will begin by exploring a Hindu spirituality of work based on *Bhagavadgita*. The paper will analyze salient ideas and relevant passages in the text that tackle the religio-spiritual significance of our daily engagement in the world through paid work from a Hindu perspective. A discussion on major themes in Catholic Social Teaching that resonate with *Bhagavadgita*'s tenets on spirituality of work will follow. These themes will serve as analytical elements that will frame an interreligious spirituality of work from the two points of view. This study will demonstrate that, as far as spirituality of work is concerned, there is more convergence than divergence between Catholicism and Hinduism. Spirituality of work can be a unifying force, a locus for cross-cultural dialogue, and a bridge between different beliefs in the workplace.

Keywords: Spirituality of Work, Hinduism, Catholic Social Teaching, Work Ethic, Interreligious Dialogue.

This essay is an interreligious study of spirituality of work (SW). It considers the normative/doctrinal teachings on work in *Bhagavadgita* (*BG*) and Catholic Social Teaching (CST). It will begin by exploring a Hindu SW based on *BG*. The paper will analyze salient ideas and relevant passages in the text that tackle the religio-spiritual significance of our daily engagement in the world through paid work from a Hindu perspective. A discussion on major themes in CST that resonate with *BG*'s teachings on work will follow. These themes will serve as analytical elements that will frame an interreligious SW from the two points of view. Inasmuch as the focus of this study is SW, it does not present an in-depth comparison of the two religions.

There are genuine differences between the theism of Catholicism and Hinduism, the distinctions they hold between the Creator and the created, and their respective beliefs in afterlife and salvation/liberation. Similarities and differences between the texts under consideration will be examined but such examination will be limited to the most critical and relevant points. The choice of Hinduism fills in the current gap in investigating SW outside of the Judeo-Christian tradition, which has been the predominant focus of attention. Hinduism is one of the major religions comprising 15% of the world population. *BG* is one of the most important texts in Hinduism, known to most Hindus and many recite daily by heart "Many are convinced that the *Bhagavadgita* is the key book for the re-spiritualization of humankind in our age." (Klostermaier 1994, 99)

A Hindu Spirituality of Work in *Bhagavadgita*

It is well known that the teachings of *BG* are contained in the dialogue between Arjuna, and Krishna. Prior to the start of the decisive battle, as the two opposing armies of the princely cousins Pandavas and Kauravas face each other, Arjuna experiences a profound crisis as he wonders about what will be the outcome of this fratricidal war. He questions whether proceeding with this conflict is the right thing to do. Arjuna is conflicted between his obligation to protect his family and his duty to fight as a member of the warrior class (*kshatriya*). It becomes clear, however, that the problem of Arjuna is not only moral but also existential, as it involves *moksha,* i.e. the state of release from the bondage of reincarnation.

Various systems in Hinduism have different prescriptions on how to attain *moksha*. It is in *BG* where one can find an attempt to synthesize these diverse and competing accounts. While it does not reject ascetic renunciation per se as a means to attain *moksha*, *BG* presents a different solution to Arjuna's dilemma. It argues that one can perform actions to fulfill his worldly responsibilities without incurring their binding effects or karma.[1] "It is impossible for anyone to give up action. True relinquishment consists of abandoning the desire for benefits arising from an act." (*BG* 18, 11) The key is to modify one's attitude toward actions. *BG* aims to resolve the conflict between the mystical ideal of renunciation and the necessity of actively engaging in the world by presenting different yogas or paths to enlightenment.

While there is no consensus as to the number of yogas presented, many commentators agree that three major paths can be discerned: *Jnana*, *Karma*, and *Bhakti* Yogas. The path to *moksha* includes all three, they are not mutually exclusive as no yoga is sufficient by itself. In applying them into daily life, they are to be practiced simultaneously. One must attempt at cross-fertilization of all paths in order to achieve total efficacy. This essay's interpretative treatment of *BG* will focus on the interrelationship between the three yogas.

Yoga of Knowledge – *Jnana*

The first point made by Krishna is that actions are inevitable because they are part of our lower or embodied self (*prakriti*), the controller of the body and the senses. *Prakriti* is the self that is part of nature and of the social world, the agent of our actions. Analysis of action to determine what is right presupposes understanding one's true nature. Comprehending the nature of self leads to wisdom in action. Shideler (1960, 310) describes Arjuna as one who "was caught in the error of tending to make his selfhood and his experiences of things final and ultimate." However, our higher self (*purusha*) is a pure subject without any quality, it does not act, creates no agency, and remains steady and unchanging. It is the eternal unchanging subject or witness that can never be an object.

It rather observes the individual's actions and state of emotions. *Purusha* is the passive enjoyer of experience that should not be identified with the doer or the object of experience. It is completely independent from *prakriti* and from the physical world of space-time-causality. Unlike the *prakriti*, *purusha* is the conscious and unmanifest part of oneself that is enduring and immovable, it neither kills nor is killed (*BG* 2, 17-26).

Prakriti is the "locus of all activity" (*BG* 3, 27). Within *prakriti* are the three *gunas* (qualities, threads, or modes) that are responsible for variations of things in the phenomenal world by their different combinations, permutations, and interactions. Whatever *guna* dominates determines the manifest characteristics or natural qualities of an entity. *Sattva* possesses lucidity, intelligibility, knowledge, light, pleasure, purity; *rajas* is for energy, passion, misery, greed, pride, exertion; and *tamas* for entropy, apathy, lethargy, dullness, inertia, and delusion. Because of the constant activity and interaction of the *gunas*, action is inevitable. But unlike the lower self, *purusha* is inactive and without *guna*. "While *prakriti* is involved in the operation of and changes in the phenomenal world, *purusha* provides the direction or orientation for them" (Kwak and Han 2013, 64).

BG claims that the individual is a single entity. *Prakriti* and *purusha* both comprise the person. But because *purusha* is unchanging, it is *prakriti* that evolves and constitutes the physical and psychical features and activities of human nature, including intellect (*buddhi*), which produces consciousness, mind/will (*manas*) responsible for sensations, and ego-ity or I-maker (*ahamkara*). According to Stietencron (2005, 215), "Egoism develops out of ego. If there were no *ahamkara,* no 'I-maker' in our psychic instrument, there would be no separation of subject and object and so no objects 'out there' at all." Ignorance comes from the confusion of *purusha* with the ego or I-maker, resulting into the entanglement of the former with the latter when in reality the I-maker is not part of *purusha*. Proper knowledge is to distinguish *purusha* from the evolutes of *prakriti* and cognitively detach the higher self from bodily actions.

Jnana aspires to transcend our ordinary way of knowing by acquiring the right frame of mind in order to transform the way we perceive ourselves and our relation with the world. Ordinarily, we identify our self with our external experiences and emotional responses. This knowledge is fixated on sense objects and breeds attachment, desire, delusion, and lust of possession. *Jnana* "aims at disconnecting the mind from various sense objects to which it is attached" (Theodor 2010, 8). "When a man is not attracted to external objects, he finds peace at the core of his being. When he is totally absorbed in the contemplation of the supreme being, he finds unlimited happiness" (*BG* 5, 21). This is essential so that the mind can focus on *purusha*. "Just as a lamp does not flicker in a windless place, the disciplined mind of a yogi doesn't waver in the peaceful contemplation of the higher self" (*BG* 6, 19). The goal is to acquire wisdom that discriminates the real from the unreal, the eternal from the temporal, the higher self from the embodied one. This form of intellectual discipline provides new insights for action and centered living. One becomes indifferent to the external outcomes of her actions. Happiness and sorrow, gain and loss, success and failure are all regarded with an even eye. Freed from worries, one achieves peace of mind and tranquility that enables her to act effectively.

Purusha is eternally free from all forms of desire. As pure consciousness, it is a pure subject. While the two selves are inseparable, most people fail to recognize the presence of their higher self. This is because we are so preoccupied with our sensual desires, which are activities of the lower self. When the mind is fixated on sense objects, it loses sight of *purusha* and gets absorbed with the empirical self and how the latter is affected by actions and passions. By distinguishing *prakriti* from *purusha*, one is freed from the trappings of sensual pleasures. She realizes that her higher self is not the doer her actions, and so learns to detach herself from the external results of the latter (*BG* 3, 27-28).

Yoga of Action - *Karma*

Karmayoga is the model for moral development in the Indian context that has "three interrelated constructs, duty-orientation, indifference to rewards and equanimity" (Mulla and Krishnan 2014, 348). It is not enough to do our actions with correct mind set, we must do only those actions that are right. Proper action is that which is in accord with *dharma*, improper action is contrary to it. *Dharma* stands for duty, ethics, law, righteousness, truth, or right conduct. It "has its roots in the structure of the cosmos, and the socio-ethical law of humankind is but one facet of an all-embracing law encompassing all beings" (Klostermaier 1994, 52). *Dharma* is related to the pre-Vedic notion of *rta*: a universal rule that no one can alter. *Rta* works spontaneously within each thing to guide the orderly movement of nature. As the normative function of *rta* becomes more significant, it acquires a moral dimension and is gradually replaced by *dharma* in th*e Upanishads*.

Eventually, the extension of the term is expanded in post-Vedic texts to cover a wide range of ethical and social practices, while retaining the principal Vedic position that duties and proper conducts vary by class and state in life. *Dharma* satisfies the dual demands of our physical and spiritual lives. It is both cosmic and ethical, universal and particular, personal and social – providing the organizing principles of social and individual lives. Some examples of universal *dharma* (*sadharana*) are non-injury, truthfulness, abstention from anger, purification, non-stealing, gift-giving, hospitality, compassion, and forgiveness. Personal *dharma* (*svadharma*) includes tasks and duties proper to a particular individual in connection with her physical, emotional, and mental characteristics. Muniapan and Satpathy (2013, 181) define personal *dharma* as the "individualized application of 'dharma' dependent on personal 'karma'."

Social *dharma* refers to one's familial and social duties. It is understood in terms of sets of coordinates required for each *Varna* and stage in life (*Asrama*), "for these represent the main factors of time, place, and circumstance that determine one's own specific dharma" (Koller 2006, 86). In this context, *Dharma* is one of the four objectives (*purushartas*) that define the aims of Hindu way of life.[2] The other three are *Artha* (worldly success); *Kama* (all forms of enjoyment); and *Moksha*. These ends encompass our biological, economic, social and spiritual needs. Hinduism does not condemn material success as long as it does not hinder us from the attainment of *Moksha*. Further, *Artha*, *Kama,* and *Dharma* are valid objectives only up to a certain stage in life. Thus, the four ends in life are supposed to correlate with the *Asramas*.

"Of the *asramas* the householder and the renouncer stages are clearly the most important both ideologically and in terms of concrete historical developments." (Flood 1996, 64) They represent two opposing tendencies in Hinduism: engagement and contemplation – active concern for the world and complete abandonment of ordinary life in favor of a more tranquil state. While *BG* does not reject the concept of *Asrama*, it presents a different solution to this dilemma by pointing out that one can perform action without incurring its binding effects, a sort of actionless action. In the beginning, Arjuna is not concerned with the pursuit of *Moksha*, he is worried about the outcome of war and the fate of his family and loved ones. One who discovers his higher self as disconnected from action loses interest in the outcomes of the action. Krishna advises Arjuna to focus on his action with indifference to external results, consequences or extrinsic rewards.

If *Asrama* is a model of ordering individual life, *Varna* is a system of ordering society. Both institutions ensure the application of ethical, social and spiritual values of all work. Krishna tells Arjuna to set aside his personal relationship and look into his class duty (*varna dharma*). The *Varna* system already existed as early as the Vedic period. "In the period of the Vedic hymns (1500 B.C. to 600 B.C.), there were classes and not castes. We do not find any reference to connubial or commensal restrictions. The occupations were by no means hereditary" (Radhakrishnan 1940, 372). Caste is not a Sanskrit word, it is derived from the Latin word *castus*, which means pure or chaste. *Varna* means color, not skin color as has been believed, but colors used to identify the arrangement of participants in Vedic yajna (Klostermaier 1994, 334). *Jati* is the actual social group where one is born. No one knows the origin of *jati* and how it gets related to *Varna* in practice. "The traditional view is that the jatis represent a proliferation of social groups from the varna system" (Flood 1996, 60). Unlike *Varna*, *jati* suggests no divine origin. *BG* (4, 13) declares the four classes as creation of Krishna. Class differentiation is based on the different functions rooted in human nature, i.e. the predominance of a certain *guna*. "The scholars, the warriors, the merchants and the workers are all destined to perform certain duties, according to their natures born out of these qualities." (*BG* 18, 41) *Varna* addresses the different needs of society: cultivation of knowledge and culture, food and financial security, peace and order, manual work etc. "In an ideal Hindu social order, each type is responsible for the performance and fulfilment of different functions, and proper functioning of each part is necessary for the stability of the whole society" (Richardson et al. 2014, 77). All achieve their perfection by actualizing their natural abilities.

Since *Varna* is based on the nature of an individual, birth becomes a criterion, or else the notion of *guna* and natural qualities will not make sense. But it is not the only criterion. *Varna* is much more flexible and allows upward mobility as evidenced in literature. It is not meant to restrict professional development or social progress. As the outcome of natural differences among human beings resulting from the interaction of the three *gunas*, there is no reason why it should be coercively implemented (Theodor 2010, 3). The classification is not only hierarchical but functional. "Each requirement was assigned to be fulfilled by a class possessing the particular gifts necessary for its fulfillment. The evident inequality of individual attainments was recognized, but the possession of gifts added to one's responsibility" (Desai 1946, 102). The *Upanishads* (Chandogya 4, 4.1-5) states that the ultimate basis of social class is not birth but virtue, character and ability. As known to many, this teaching is unfortunately contrary to the historical reality. When birth acquired greater significance than qualification and hierarchy took priority over function, *Varna* degenerated into casteism, racism, gender inequality and exploitation that plague India for thousands of years and cause many of its social ills.

Yoga of Love and Devotion- *Bhakti*

Bhakti is ontologically based on the nature of our higher self. Like other paths, *Bhakti* involves detachment, i.e. one detaches the self from finite things so that she can attach her higher self to Krishna. Our relationships with the world and with our fellow humans are contingent, which brings with them expectations beyond the present situation. "As long as there is the delusion of self apart from the world," Loy (1988, 284) comments, "resentment will naturally arise from any perception of a threat to that self and its desires". The way of selfless action is not complete without devotion to the highest Being, for in the final analysis selflessness is not simply the denial of oneself but the offering of oneself to God. It is not detachment from material things alone or attainment of peace of mind, but union with God which is the final stage of deliverance.

Several passages in *BG* give emphasis on *Bhakti*. If these lines are separated from the rest of the text, they give the impression that one is saved simply through the grace of Krishna. There are also passages in *BG*, however that downplay the ritualistic tradition claiming that the reward for ritualistic/devotional sacrifices is temporary and finite rather than complete salvation. Blind performance of devotional ceremonies, without understanding their meaning, does not lead to *moksha*. Thus, *Bhakti* should be not separated from the other paths. One cannot practice *Bhakti* without overcoming self-centered habits (Loy 1988, 286). The ethic of selfless action is essential in order to become a pure devotee, for sacrifice, austerity, or charity "can become vices if divorced from the rule of selflessness or detachment" (Desai 1946, 95). When prayers and rituals are performed correctly, *Bhakti* becomes a way of knowledge and selfless action (Koller 2006, 195). In addition, *Karma* and *Jnana* are both forms of devotional worship. Since *purusha* is one with God, *Jnana* includes devotion to Krishna (*BG* 4, 9-11). When duties are performed for their own sake, without any attachment to their outcomes, they become acts of devotion to Krishna (*BG* 18, 46). Conversely, devotional offerings must be performed in the spirit of non-attachment, similar to *Karma*yoga. Otherwise, they will only result in continual rebirth due to the influence of desire and ignorance.

God in *BG* is both immanent and transcendent. He pervades all and permeates all (*BG* 7, 6-10). As an avatar, Krishna is the reincarnation of the God Vishnu, the embodiment of the ultimate reality in human form. He is a God who intervenes and becomes part of human history to restore *dharma*. While His higher nature is eternally inactive, His lower nature is the source of all actions in the world. *BG* (6, 11) tells how Krishna loves and cares for each individual, for everything in the phenomenal world is a manifestation of His lower nature. The everyday realm of material concerns is not an illusion or insignificant. Krishna is the support of all beings, all things exist in him. He is ever at work, lest the worlds should come to an end, but nothing that He does affect or disturb Him (*BG* 3, 24; 4, 6-8).

Love of Krishna does not only entail performing specific actions or doing rituals or sacrifices. Krishna says (*BG* 12, 4), "They reach me too by disciplining their senses, adopting an amiable attitude toward others, and by engaging themselves in the service of others." One cannot love Krishna without cultivating universal love for His creatures. All comes from God. Seeing God everywhere, one is freed of any negative feeling toward anything. Krishna tells Arjuna to seek refuge in Him alone. "Bow devotedly to me and take shelter in me. By my grace you will achieve the eternal and peaceful abode of the supreme self" (*BG* 18, 62). This should not be interpreted as license, for in this part of the dialogue Arjuna is already committed to his *dharmic* actions. Through *Bhakti*, one eliminates any form of internal conflict in the performance of *dharma*, as one attains peaceful oneness with Krishna.

Dialogue with Catholic Social Teaching

Catholicism's SW has its roots in the scriptures, both the Old and the New Testaments. Genesis depicts the creation of the universe as God's work done in six days. According to Psalms (8,3) the universe is the work of God's hands; He is the provider of humanity (Gen. 2, 6-8); and caretaker of the created order (Ps 104, 10-22), who continues to work even until now (John 5, 17). Work is part of the divinely ordered structure of the world and of human nature, as work is God's ordinance for the life of the person from the very moment of creation. God did not create humans to be idle. Work existed even in the prelapsarian paradise. "The Lord God then took the man and settled him in the Garden of Eden, to cultivate and care for it." (Genesis 2, 5-15) In working, the person participates in God's activity. The New Testament states that we worship God with our whole existence, including our work (Rom. 12, 1). According to Matthew (25, 35), what is central to our salvation is not just faith or worship, but the work that we have done to care for those who are poor, oppressed, marginalized and exploited. St. Paul admonishes early Christians to avoid idleness and being a burden to others by working hard to earn their living. He says, "If anyone is not willing to work, let him not eat." (2 Thes. 7, 10)

While there are writings by the early fathers and medieval thinkers of Catholic church that follow the positive view of work contained in the Bible, theological reflection on SW remains largely undeveloped until the emergence of CST in its modern form, as a response to the enormous socioeconomic problems unleashed by the industrial slavery of the 19th century. Work in medieval worldview is a means to acquisition of temporal goods and to more noble ends, such as penance for one's sin. It provides the believers with opportunities to exercise virtues and practice God's commandments. CST follows this tradition, but it clarifies that sanctification of work happens not only when the latter is directly related to charitable acts and religious duties but in any type of decent work.

Work as a Vocation

Beginning with *Rerum Novarum* (1891), CST provides a vision of work as an integral part of human being and becoming. Work is a fundamental fact of our embodiment, relationality and situatedness in a particular state in life in order to fulfill God's plan. *Centesimus Annus* (*CA*) states: "Work thus belongs to the vocation of every person; indeed, man expresses and fulfils himself by working" (John Paul II 1991, 6). Work is central to our identity and self-fulfillment. It provides us with avenues to exercise and develop our natural faculties and in the process, we become fully human. "In other words, our everyday work is a means of achieving the purpose for which each of us was created" (Gomez 2006, 810).

The term *dharma* in Hinduism captures the notion of work in CST as both a duty and a calling or vocation (from Latin *vocare* – to call), in a personal and a universal sense. Similar to *dharma*, vocation in Catholicism is both universal/personal, supernatural/temporal, and generic/specific to an individual. In a universal sense, all are called to respond to God's eternal plan – a life of holiness by following Christ and living according to the universal message of the Gospel: the practice of love and justice. On a particular level, every individual is called to make specific choices that will enable her to fulfill God's plan in consideration of her actual conditions and concrete circumstances. Some call individual vocation as secondary since it has to conform to the universal calling to holiness, which is considered primary.

Human vocation is both supernatural and temporal. "The Christian who neglects his temporal duties," as stated in Vatican Council II (1965, 43) *Gaudium et Spes* (*GS*), "neglects his duties toward his neighbor and even God, and jeopardizes his eternal salvation." This calling requires thoughtful response and steadfast commitment, for seeking fulfillment is a responsibility and not a mere option. Paul VI (1967, 15) explains, "every man is called upon to develop and fulfill himself, for every life is a vocation.... Endowed with intelligence and freedom, he is responsible for his fulfillment as he is for his salvation." Work is a vocation rather than a mere career or means of livelihood. "Approaching work as a calling makes labor a duty instead of a curse. The calling establishes work's necessity apart from material necessity." (Muirhead 2004, 106) It is not simply a performance of a specific task, for vocation "is not merely something a person does, it is something one is" (Brady 2008, 48).

Laborem Exercens (*LE* 25) exhorts workers to "learn the deepest meaning and the value of all creation, and its orientation to the praise of God. Even by their secular activity, they must assist one another to live holier lives." Every person is unique in terms of talent, cultural background, character, and experiences. *Gunas* in *BG* represent our potentials for perfection. While we have different abilities and talents, all humans are made up of the same *gunas* so the idea is to develop ones nature. "The gunas not only confine, but pave a kind of an existential path for each and every individual entity; accordingly each entity progresses in a more or less predetermined path" (Theodor 2010, 112).

That work is a vocation/*dharma* implies specialization and division of labor in so far as one is expected to devote time and energy to that to which she is called. CST is not against specialization. *LE* (25) states:

> Therefore, by their competence in secular fields and by their personal activity, elevated from within by the grace of Christ, let them work vigorously so that by human labour, technical skill, and civil culture created goods may be perfected according to the design of the Creator and the light of his Word.

CST goes at some length to discuss the changing aspects of work on account of the developments in industry and technology, from the development of new tools of production, the wide-use of automation that requires new skills and training, up to the increasing interdependence of work-related activities and national economies due to financialization and globalization. Companies need to hire and promote people most suited to the job in terms of qualifications and abilities. Jobs are allotted on the basis of workers' ability and competence. CST and *BG* acknowledge and value the natural differences that exist among peoples. CST scholar Holland (2003, 181) comments, "These natural differences actually aided the whole community, for different people needed to play different parts in community life". Muniapan and Satpahty (2013, 182) describe *Karmayog*a as dexterity in action. "When one is in a profession that suites one's talents and temperaments he is peaceful, balanced and equanimous." Work is essential for one's self-actualization. It is not the division of labor itself that undermines work, but the valuation of one type of work (intellectual) at the expense of another (physical).

Human Work as Participation in the Divine Activity

The guiding principle of CST is a holistic understanding of the person grounded on the Biblical doctrine that God created human beings in His image and likeness. The person is composed of body and soul substantially united to form one nature. According to Fiorenza (1980, 96), "Christian anthropology teaches that human beings are not just externally juxtaposed bodies and souls, since body and soul interpenetrate." Sharing in God's image, the human soul is intellectual, spiritual, and immortal. "Man is the image of God partly through the mandate from his Creator to subdue, to dominate, the earth. In carrying out this mandate, man, every human being, reflects the very action of the Creator of the universe" (*LE* 4).

Commenting on *LE*, Gini (1992, 230) notes that although it never uses the term "'co-creator', John Paul II makes it clear that the divine action of creativity and human work are dynamically interrelated." As part of our nature, work is inevitable and both Hinduism and

Catholicism hold this view. It must be recalled that in *BG*, actions are a necessary aspect of our embodied lower self (*prakriti*). But this does not imply that work is a burden or something humanity has to oblige with, for Krishna is also a worker. The Bible likewise presents God as the archetypal worker in terms of his creation, providence, and redemption. "Man is a symbol, the *imago Dei*. His actions express and are the very meaning of his life. The good man reflects the glory of God as a visible manifestation of God's invisible nature" (Navone 2014, 137).

Human work is an imitation or a co-creation, not a duplication of God's work because only God works ex-nihilo. This does not make a person equal to God. The person is an *imago*, not identical to God. He is subordinate to God and subject to the latter's ordering. Perricone (2012, 825) observes that "It is important to note that God does not require creation for the splendor of His majesty; rather the work of creation is a manifestation of God's splendor." Similar to *BG,* CST presents the Divine activity as the unity of action and contemplation. The work of God in the Bible has no end outside of Himself and for this reason, Thomas Aquinas defines God as a being in pure act, who does not act for extrinsic end. God creates out of superabundance of His goodness. In the same manner, although Krishna's lower nature is the source of all actions in the world, His higher nature is eternally inactive.

He has no need to act, but he incarnates age after age to restore *dharma*. Both traditions affirm "God's inseparable *transcendent-and-immanent* presence within creation" (Holland 2012, 116-117). As a cooperative or participative activity with God/Krishna, human work needs to be modeled to Divine work – productive, good, and valued for its own sake. Hence, *BG* (18, 41-49) declares that all work has intrinsic worth, for it is not what we derive from work but what we express through it that matters. In terms of outcomes, inequality in work is evident. But as a divine participation and an offering to God, every type of decent work according to *BG* and CST has an equal value.

Social Dimension of Work

"Spirituality at work has appeared in part because people want to feel connected to work that is important, and they want to feel connected to each other at work" (Ashmos and Duchon 2000, 137). The pursuit of work as a vocation implies concern with other's welfare. Excellence in one's profession is not enough. To discern one's vocation/*dharma* requires re-examination of signs of the times and actualities of change, as well as reflection on how to make good and wise use of the gifts one received from God to serve the community.

In Catholicism, caring for others is part of human vocation. We do not just work for ourselves to pursue our personal ambition or satisfy our individual needs and desire. "To experience ourselves as fully human, we must be responsive and responsible for the needs of others" (Brady 2008, 36). The completion of human vocation and the welfare of society as a whole are closely intertwined. We are not created by God to live in isolation. "The person and society define one another as parts of God's unitary creation" (Sandelands 2009, 97). In *BG*, Krishna is not simply presenting a deontological argument to Arjuna, i.e. doing duty for its own sake. He is presenting *dharma* as a set of social demands. He tries to convince Arjuna that there is no conflict between his personal and class-nuanced/social *dharma*. As social beings, we are part of our community, our neighborhood, and the firm we work in. Work is a social need, it is a human reality as well as divine. Work is sanctified as a path toward a relationship with God and with our neighbors, as God is present in our neighbors. As mentioned above, love of Krishna and of the whole world are inseparable.

Love in *BG* is not an emotional sentiment. *Bhakti* means "a state of consciousness in which you forget yourself" (Easwaran 2011, 126). It is the total absorption of the self to Krishna (*BG* 8, 7). When our will becomes one with God's, our conduct becomes expressive of the divine. It is God who acts in us, we are only His servants or instruments. In the case of Arjuna, "The lack of ego will be expressed by his accepting the role of Krsna's servant, and accepting the fighting of the war as his service" (Theodor 2010, 105).

The search for Christian fulfillment or Hindu *moksha* does not mean negation of social concerns. In his reflection on CST's view of work, Fiorenza (1980, 96) points out that the "economy of salvation and incarnation do not imply the annihilation of the material world, but rather its transformation and incorporation into the order of grace. Work should be seen as a part of this transformation and integration." Devotion to God is not in opposition to social engagement, for in both religions, persons are called by God to care for all. A Hindu-Catholic SW enforces a set of values to workers. In all economic activities, we need to consider the wellbeing of our communities. Because work has a social character and a vehicle for social interconnectedness, "work entails a social responsibility to work in harmony with others - and with the environment - so that the rights of all are balanced" (Ford 1995, 31). We need to foster a spirit of cooperation for the maintenance of common good and solidarity with all workers, so that everyone will benefit from God's creation. Part of the notion of profession, as *dharma* in *BG* in the commentary of Easwaran (2011, 125), is to see to it that one's "occupation is not at the expense of others. Making money from products or activities that are harmful, such as cigarettes or weapons, sets a low ceiling on spiritual growth." No matter how much profits they generate, we must not engage in economic activities that degrade people, including ourselves and do not address authentic human needs.

Individual work "is naturally interrelated with the work of others. More than ever, work is work with others and for others: it is a matter of doing something for someone else" (*CA* 31). Work serves most commonly as the root of social organizations and the link between the individual and the community. Work unites people and binds them into small groups. It plays an important role in how we contribute to society and in our position in the community. "Each person's passions, talents, and resources offer that person different choices about how to participate in the community" (Collier 2014, 178). To fully comprehend the reality of work, we need to understand the spatio-temporal setting in which it takes place.

Society is the realm in which we assume our obligations to others – this is what the system of *Varna* would like to accomplish in its original intent. "Varna is a way of grouping individuals according to their own natures and qualifications so that they might make a maximum contribution to the social order while at the same time enhance their prospects for fulfillment and liberation" (Koller 2006, 95). Today, it is obvious that we are situated in our respective communities in different ways, not only by birth or occupational groups but by religion, economic status, extended family, cultural heritage etc. In India's history, *Varna* has been wrongly interpreted and practiced, which leads to the marginalization of those who have less power in traditional Hindu society (e.g. women and the poor). But this is contrary to *BG*, which states that *Varna* is for the sake of prosperity and world order (Doniger 2014, 168; Koller 2006, 94). It ought to be about service to community rather than entitlement or privileges. Radhakrishnan describes *Varna* as a kind of ethical pyramid - more is expected to higher class, in terms of moral and spiritual demands, and less in terms of personal enjoyment. "While it recognizes that men are unequal in scale and quality, it insists that every human being shall have the right and the opportunity to contribute to human achievement, so far as his capacity goes" (Radhakrishan 1940, 368). The fact is that there are external factors that have limiting effects on our career choices and occupational functions. This is what *LE* calls the objective dimension of work. From this perspective, work is an integral part of the socioeconomic realm – historical and economic realities influence its organization. Because of our embodiment, we live a conditioned existence. The work that we do and the social organizations we establish are oftentimes marked with sin and imperfection. It can lead to our bondage or entanglement with worldly concerns. Work can be a dehumanizing element in life, not because it is so by nature but by the way it is concretely organized.

The historical degradation of *Varna* into casteism, where work is imposed arbitrarily and binds many in conditions of slavery, is one example of how work can be used against the person. CST calls this condition alienation. It is the loss of the authentic meaning of work. It happens whenever people are used as means to an end. The human worker becomes subject to labor rather than the subject of labor. While CST does not explicitly address the issue of caste system, it points out that "objectification and instrumentalization of labor can happen in many subtle ways" (Gomez 2006, 810). *CA* (41) says, "the concept of alienation needs to be led back to the Christian vision of reality by recognizing in alienation a reversal of means and ends." CST is not against division of labor, as long as its end is to facilitate order, cooperation, productivity, and efficiency, and workers are not simply treated as instruments of production but as persons with rights and dignity, whose participation in management is not only welcomed but encouraged.

LE states that work is the foundation of human solidarity. Society is a complex web of relations, it is much more than a composite of autonomous, self-interested individuals, "who make a 'social contract,' but rather an organic unity of which the family is the most basic cell" (Naughton and Laczniak 1993, 985). Work makes possible the maintenance of the family and the education of children. "In fact, the family is simultaneously a community made possible by work and the first school of work, within the home, for every person" (*LE* 10) Indeed, the importance of family and its preservation is also emphasized in the first chapter of *BG* (1, 37-43). It is not surprising thus, that many Hindus sometimes "leave career development to go back to their family home and take care of their parents" (Suri and Abbott 2009, 8).

Subjective Dimension of Work

Both traditions view the person not only as a biological or social animal but as a *homo spiritualis*. Commenting on CST, Williams (2003, 17) writes that these texts give primacy to the spiritual dimension of the person, for "That which is truly human is spiritual." What is spiritual (i.e. human soul) cannot come from matter but is directly created by God. At the innermost level of who we are is the spirit that is closely related to God and is the source of our transcendence. While we see a dualistic view of the person in CST and in *BG*: body and soul, lower/embodied self and higher self – self-realization or enlightenment lies in overcoming these dichotomies. In *BG*, *prakriti* and *purusha* are not "two ontologically separate substances but as two types of reality of the soul involved in the lived experience of every human being" (Kwak and Han 2013, 64). The embodied/lower self is not meant to be negated in *BG*. What the text denies is the absoluteness of *prakriti*, for it is only a limited part of who we are. While the two texts differ in explaining how the self/soul is related to the body and the outside world, both affirm that the spirit is not opposed to the body, nor the body a hindrance to spirit. The person is an embodied being, she is also transcendent. Although there is difference on how the two texts ground this claim, they both affirm that human fulfillment is not the same as ego or physical satisfaction.

Work is not only a transitive action, it is also an immanent or a self-perfecting act. "For when a man works, he not only alters things and society, he develops himself as well. He learns much, he cultivates his resources, he goes outside of himself and beyond himself" (*GS* 35). *LE* calls this the subjective dimension work. Work is not a mere economic activity. It is an act of the person (*actus personae*) that can only be predicated to the person. It cannot have meaning and value apart from the individual worker from which it proceeds. "[W]ork bears a particular mark of man and humanity, the mark of a person... And this mark decides its interior characteristics; in a sense it constitutes its very nature" (*LE* 1). As *actus personae*, work cannot be considered a material commodity, much less valued according to the laws of market economy. The subjective dimension of work takes priority over its objective aspect. While objectively work may appear in various types, work is only a single activity subjectively considered.

As Krishna counsels Arjuna to look into his higher self (*purusha*) in order to discover the true meaning of his action, workers must develop the capacity to intend their actions as emanating from their innermost being, so that *LE*'s notion of human work as *actus personae* will be fully realized. Like Arjuna, every human worker from CST perspective is a free and responsible subject who is capable of deciding for herself and directing her actions, rather than an automaton who is bound by external circumstances. In other words, workers need a spiritual framework, or in the words of the *BG*, right understanding (*Jnana*) of work so that they can live out its subjective dimension, otherwise, they become subject to work. Subjectivity of work cannot depend solely on organizational or technological conditions. What workers need is a conscious awareness of the immanent and transcendent aspects of work. Work must be accompanied by reflection (*Jhana*) and devotion (*Bhakti*), because it is a conscious act that can only be performed by a rational being. The subjective meaning of work comes in the day to day experiences of workers - ordinary activities in the workplace that provide opportunities for exercising responsibility and value judgement, reflection, and active involvement.

Work as Path to Salvation

It is not only in the creative aspect of work that we can find its spiritual dimension but also in its redemptive aspect. "Christianity and Hindu religion have a sense of the world as alienated, fallen, and in *in need of redemption*" (Kung 1986, 226). According to *BG* our identification with our external experiences makes us lose sight of our eternal self and entices us to believe that we are isolated individuals, defined by our own individual desires and sensual experiences. But the external world of sense experience, both in the physical and social sense, is not rendered illusory, otherwise, active engagement in it will not make sense. The point made by Krishna is that the pursuit of *moksha* can be reconciled with daily work and worldly concerns. Even ordinary routine labor, by which people earn their daily bread, is a path to salvation. Similarly, CST teaches that work is a holy activity. It is not only the person who is sanctified by work but work itself is sanctified. Through work, the individual does not only enter into a relationship with her fellow humans but also with God. Work is a means of directing the person to God or Krishna, of worshipping and serving Him. It is not against our salvation nor should it hinder us from it.

In the same vein that *BG* strives for the integration of knowledge, action, and devotion, CST teaches that service to God does not only include prayers, church worship or devotional sacrifices. As fulfillment of God's plan, work is a way of glorifying God. Work well done in the spirit of charity is a form of service rendered to God. By doing one's work as an offering to God and doing it well, it acquires a supernatural value. Similarly, "An individual's actions should not be for personal fulfillment of any type, but rather in the service of God (Krishna). It is through everyday actions, inconsonance with *swadharma* that an individual acquires true knowledge of Krishna" (Chaturvedi 2010, 423). CST and *BG* teach that salvation through work is a path open to all because it is by means of everyday actions. Through faith in God and prayer for His grace, a believer undergoes internal transformation, so that even if she performs the same task, this task is performed with higher motives and level of awareness until one reaches the point when she acts for the highest good.

Both textual traditions call their adherents to dedicate their actions to God and to offer them to Him as heart-felt devotion. As embodied beings, experience is the most significant mode of our interpersonal encounter. A personal God becomes a fundamental necessity in this case. As known to many religious scholars, the concept of an incarnate God is not unique to Hinduism or Catholicism. It manifests a divine-human encounter mediated through historical experience. "God's descent into the world in human form is an extremely effective way of bridging the gap between God and Humans, a truth recognized by Christians as well as by Hindus" (Koller 2006, 185). It implies God's continued engagement with the world and His ultimate concern for humanity.

A number of texts have been written that draw parallels and contrasts between Krishna and Jesus (Largen 2011; Sheth 2002; Mohammed 1989; Kung 1986), and to pursue this topic further, is to go beyond the scope of this essay. To emphasize one point of comparison, Krishna is an avatar not because of his wealth, privilege, or power, but because of his extraordinary spiritual qualities. He is not a prince in *BG* but a humble charioteer. Jesus, on the other hand, is presented in the Gospel as a craftsman who worked at the carpenter's bench for some fifteen years of his life (Mark 6, 3). He took many examples from daily life of toil in his parables and chose his apostles from the working class. At a time when manual labor was despised and relegated to slaves, we find in Krishna and Jesus the exaltation of ordinary occupation. No type of decent work can be considered bad because none of which is beneath the dignity of Krishna or Jesus. But in contrast to *BG*, the cross is an indispensable and a unique element of a Catholic SW, for it "reveals a new good springing from work itself, from work understood in depth and in all its aspects and never apart from work" (*LE* 27). In Jesus, God became man, He became like us in all things, except sin, so that we can fully comprehend the full meaning of suffering that we encounter in our working lives. His entire ministry of preaching, healing, and discipleship were all fruits of his dedication and hard work. CST argues that the toil and pain that accompanies all types of work is not meaningless. "The Christian finds in human work a small part of the cross of Christ and accepts it in the same spirit of redemption in which Christ accepted his cross for us" (*LE* 27). By patiently and selflessly bearing the toil and hardship that accompany work, Catholics share lovingly in the suffering of Christ and become collaborators with His redemption for humanity.

Conclusion

Dialogue between *BG* and CST shows that work is viewed as a vocation, a divine participation that has both social and subjective dimensions, and a path to salvation. A Hindu-Catholic SW strive for work-worship integration and regard secular profession as a vocation/*dharma* that is based on the nature of the self as a substantial unit. Spirituality and action, as well as commitment to transcendental life and engagement in mundane tasks, are not mutually exclusive. We fulfill this vocation with full seriousness and commitment, not being too fixated on success, failures, or external rewards. Lastly, work is also a source of connection to our community and fellow humans. The task that lies ahead is for business leaders to develop a model of work organization that will respect and promote SW, so that spirituality becomes a dimension of corporate culture and an integral part of organizational functioning.

Endnotes

1. Although the term action (karma) in *BG* applies to all kinds of activities including their moral consequences as well as human thoughts, we are concerned here with action in a specific sense, i.e. professional work or paid employment, and it is in this sense that *BG* speaks highly of it (Nadkarmi 2013, 9). While this limits the extension of the term, it is not contrary to the comprehension of the term 'action' in the text, since the dialogue in *BG* begins with discussion of the action of Arjuna as a *kshatriya*, i.e. action in relation to his social function.
2. As referring to social responsibilities, *Dharma* is one temporal end just like *Artha* and *Kama*. In another sense, *dharma* refers to the totality of temporal values (including *Artha* and *Kama*) in contrast to *Moksha*. See Creel (1975, 164).

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Husserl and the Possibility of Solipsism

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Abstract:

The article intends to show that, contrary to what has been suggested in many scholarly debates, Husserl's phenomenology does not suppose a solipsistic approach. I demonstrate this by deeply analyzing some passages of *Ideas I* and the *Cartesian Meditations*. To give an account of the concept of Consciousness in Husserl is in part to discuss if the Husserlian *Ego* entails a pure individual and subjective perspective or if this is actually not the case. I conclude that the last option is more plausible. The outcome of the article poses compelling questions to the nature of Reality from an idealist standpoint.

Keywords: Solipsism, Idealism, Consciousness, Experience, Selfness, Perception, Trascendental Ego, Phenomenology, Husserl, Absolute Being

Introduction

Edmund Husserl (1859 – 1938) established a new and distinctive approach to reality in Western philosophy. His concerns about the existence of things as conceived by natural sciences (considering the first as existing with external independence, acritically) led him to postulate a different position, in which things only *claim to be,* in other words are "there" only thanks to the accountable situation of my experience of them appearing to me as being. Thus, stressing the fact that things, as we perceive, are not beyond our consciousness about themselves. This Husserlian solution has been interpreted by many as a Solipsistic approach. Although the concept of Solipsism is not totally established in consensual terms, we may take a classical approach of it in order to analyse the issue in Husserl's thought. I will use the observation made by Francis Herbert Bradley (1846 – 1924), who indicates that Solipsism supposes the fact that "I cannot transcend experience, and experience must be my experience. From this it follows that nothing beyond my self exists; for what is experience is its states" (Bradley 1902, 248). In general, this might be the solipsistic approach. Nothing can exist beyond my self being. However, this is obviously problematic. What is exactly encompassed within the self being is subject to debate, and it surely affects the possible solution we may take in regard to the world in general and its existence. Therefore, it seems primordial to understand the real meaning of the self according to Husserl, if we have the intention to unveil if his conception of it leads to Solipsism or not.

Throughout this essay, I will, in accordance with what has been said, discuss the issue of Solipsism in Husserl's thought. I will argue against the view that posits Husserl as entailing a solipsistic approach. After presenting that possible reading, I will try to demonstrate, by focusing on Husserl's texts, such as *Ideas I* and *Cartesian Meditations* that the aforementioned is implausible. I will also rely on comments about Husserl on the issue which also finds difficulties to accept the solipsitic view. The distinction between mental or internal objects and the external ones will be criticized as well, having in consideration it is in connection with the whole discussion about the condition of the self and the feasible kind of epistemological implications that may be drawn for the account of things.

Phenomenology and the solipsistic temptation

An unconsidered reading of Husserl could lead us to think about what the philosopher does when explaining the "inversion" in order to obtain what he considers a proper attitude in accordance with reality, is nothing but a turning to the general view of selfness, where all things (that may be called as external) depend on it. Indeed, Husserl considers that the given object "external" reality for us is nothing but the perceived. Thus, not the thing as naturally would be considered external and in itself, but the perception of it. Then, perception is not even enough as concept, since it presupposes there is something *out there* that would be apprehended through it. So, the notion actually is consciousness. Husserl writes:

> Reality is not in itself something absolute which becomes tied secondarily to something else; rather, in the absolute sense, it is nothing at all, it has no "absolute essence" whatever; it has the essentiality of something which, of necessity, is *only* intentional, *only* an object of consciousness, something presented [*Vorstelliges*] in the manner peculiar to consciousness, something apparent (as apparent). (Husserl 1983, 113)

So, reality is an "object of consciousness". If then, we understand consciousness according to Husserl in terms of selfness, it would not be difficult for anyone to regard the latter as no other thing than a mental state that "creates" the world. The world would be constituted by a performative action of consciousness, then apparently leaving no place to a given reality "outside" of this mental action. Taking the notion of self from a judgement like this, might fit very well with the definition of solipsism we indicated before. The problem, if we accept this way of reading Husserl, is that it can lead to think that finally what is real is just our mental willingness, oversimplifying the problem of the possible existence of things and making them mere subjective constructions. Moreover, it may lead to forget that the mental action actually might be only to direct the attention towards what means the *out there*.

Is this the view that Husserl intends in his phenomenological approach? I would definitely say it is not. But in order to show how this view fails to give an account of Husserl's thought, it may be necessary to focus on some particular aspects of it which may shed light on the issue.

The meaning of consciousness in Husserl's phenomenology

The question is then what is intended by Husserl when considering consciousness and the notion of selfness. If the right scientific attitude in Husserl terms, is to "parenthesize" the world, or in other words take it as a non natural and granted reality, and hence observe it as the experience of the subject in itself, the action should not be necessary understood as an absolute creation of the world, but as the acquaintance of what we experience as a phenomenon. In contrast to what Husserl seems to suggest in the last isolated quote, a more complex scenario is described by him thereafter:

> ...instead of naively *effecting* the acts pertaining to our Nature – constituting consciousness with their positing of something trascendent, and letting ourselves be induced, by motives implicit in them, to effect ever new positings of something trascendent – instead of that, we put all those positings "out of action", we do not "participate in them;" we direct our seizing and theoretically inquiring regard to *pure consciousness in its own absolute being*. That, then, is what is left as the sought - for "*phenomenological residuum*" though we have "excluded" the whole world with all physical things, living beings and humans, ourselves included. Strictly speaking, we have not lost anything but rather have gained the whole of absolute being which, rightly understood, contains within itself, "constitutes" within itself, all worldly trascendencies. (Husserl 1983, 113)

There are two fundamental implications in this explanation made by Husserl regarding consciousness and what it involves. Firstly, the philosopher establishes a radical view on the conception of our experience: if we focus only on what is our perceptive action in itself, we find out that all that is left is consciousness in its pure existence, which is finally the true acknowledgeable being, replacing what we considered as being in a common sense attitude in general. Secondly, this being that "is left" after the phenomenological reduction is not equivalent to the self being. Actually, the acceptance of the self being is also part of the abandoned natural attitude. The understanding of what is really left then is crucial, for it excludes the possibility of considering any kind of subjective mental essence as conforming the world, and so making solipsism even a more implausible view here. For this "absolute being" gained by reduction, paradoxically cannot be reduced to some element of the world (even if it may be regarded in general as a fundamental one, such as the mind), because it can also "look" towards it, although the mentioned element may "participate" in the action (for it is possible anyway to assert that consciousness is exercised by the mind as well).

Therefore, we are in front of the "absolute being", as Husserl says, and its absoluteness comes from the fact that everything, every element or being of the world is subjected to it, for it cannot be or "claim to be" without it.

Solipsism finds difficulties here to stand. How a being which excludes ourselves as its backbone can be regarded as reducing everything to mere selfness? It could be argued that although the self is excluded, the whole given world has the same fate, and if we can say that our experience is still there and that it nevertheless is "our" experience, there must be a kind of subjective condition still present. However, is this really the case? Is the Husserlian absolute being a one "attached" to an individual subject? My answer would be no, and the reasons here subsequently explained.

Consciousness beyond the self

Is the absolute consciousness something different to individual consciousness? What Husserl intends to say when he mentions things such as *self-experience*, or even more important, when he talks about the *trascendental ego*? It seems that depending on the interpretation one may have regarding this aspects of Husserl's thought, we may take the latter as solipsistic or not. For instance, Thomas Baldwin, in his article entitled *Phenomenology, Solipsism and the Egocentric Thought*, puts some restrains to consider it necessarily solipsistic, and even posits some doubts on the effectiveness of Husserl's "absolute being of consciousness", by saying that "The phenomenologist's parenthesizing of the natural world should lead him to parenthesize his thoughts as well, even though one who entertains these counterfactual speculations does not thereby contradict himself in doing so; the possibility of his thoughts is guaranteed by his actual existence within the natural world." (Baldwin and Bell 1988, 35) It is possible to ask, however, if Husserl actually regarded the absolute conscious being as something, again, fastened to, or residing in men. It may be the case that his intention when describing what actually is the trascendental ego was to liberate the phenomenological approach from common sense self perceptions, including all external natural world. Then, the possibility of the thoughts of the phenomenologist that parenthesizes, if they are something different than himself, but at the same time they do not take part in the natural world (in a different way as Baldwin would indicate in the aforementioned) would lead to the definite residuum, to what is really left: experience in itself. In his *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl writes about this particular issue:

> Just as the reduced Ego is not a piece of the world, so, conversely, neither the world nor any worldly object is a piece of my Ego, to be found in my conscious life as a really inherent part of it, as a complex of data of sensation or a complex of acts. This "*trascendence*" is part of the intrinsic sense of anything worldly, *despite* the fact that anything worldly necessarily acquires all the sense determining it, along with its existential status, exclusively from my experiencing, my objectivating, thinking, valuing, or doing, at particular times – notably the status of an evidently valid being is one it can acquire only from my own evidences, my grounding acts. If this "trascendence", which consists in being non-really included, is part of the intrinsic sense of the world, then, by way of contrast, the Ego himself, who bears within him the world as an accepted sense and who, in turn, is necessarily presupposed by this sense, is legitimately called *trascendental*, in the phenomenological sense. (Husserl 1982, 26)

If we accept that in the non phenomenological attitude, the self is part of the world (just like we would say that any person, with its own consciousness, is part of the world just as the objects in general are), then we are bound to say that Husserl is not accepting that view on the self, when we think about it in the phenomenological attitude. For Husserl clearly denies that the Ego takes part in some worldly state, and even more interestingly, he denies that any worldly object can be part of it. So the reduced Ego, the standing alone absolute consciousness, by which we experience all the worldly things is not a common sense individual self, nor something related to the subjective individuality. It seems that instead of this, Husserl is intending the existence of a different kind of "given" consciousness, related to experience in itself, which is not our psychological consciousness and is therefore not centred in the attitudes and perceptions a man aware of his selfness may have.

This radical aspect of the Husserlian approach may have not been understood totally by his critics, which would see in his intended pure consciousness the subjective essence still, and then accuse him of having a solipsistic point of view. An example is Merleau Ponty, since he considers that "Truth does not inhabit only the inner man" (Baldwin and Bell 1988, 36), and he supposes that natural inner man to be the same Husserl would mean with his trascendental Ego.

Pure consciousness as something *given*

I would then tend to think that what Husserl actually intended with the reduction to pure consciousness is not determined by some kind of subjective entity, but comes actually to be a given thing, that would make also viable to look at the world as something only possible thanks to it, thanks to the existence of this given pure consciousness. What is the essence or nature of this consciousness can lead certainly to discussion, and even more controversial might be the fact that its "essence" or "objective character" might lead to the contradiction of claiming that Husserl's intention of parenthesizing the world is done by a natural and objective thing. But the existence of this conscious residuum that can parenthesize the world and ourselves as subjects of it is the element that gives way to any possible trascendental phenomenology. If considered as a mental procedure, which gives way to the perception of objectiveness or worldly things, then we would not be making justice to a proper interpretation of Husserl's purposes. Dan Zahavi, in his article *Husserl's noema and the internalism-externalism debate,* by attacking proposers of this latter view, explains:

> Generally speaking, they involve what might be called a mentalistic misinterpretation of the phenomenological dimension. Rather than seeing the field of givenness, the phenomena, as something that questions the very subject-object split, as something that stresses the co-emergence of self and world, the phenomena are interpreted phenomenalistically, as part of the mental inventory. And finally, these criticisms slight all the places where Husserl explicitly denies that the true purpose of the epoché and the reduction is to doubt, neglect, abandon, or exclude reality from our research, but rather emphasizes that their aim is to suspend or neutralize a certain dogmatic attitude towards reality. (Zahavi 2004, 9)

What Zahavi suggests is to notice that Husserl proposes the phenomenological reduction not as an action of the mind towards the recognition of things, where the first has the power to bring the latter to existence, but as the acknowledgement of a truth about reality we would not achieve without it, namely to see the stream of experience as the thing to be analysed, instead of directly forgetting or not being aware of it and grant the content of experience a non questioned existence. Moreover, as this recognition leads to accepting that the only non dogmatic reality is the given stream of experience, which excludes the naturalization of things and ourselves as well, any solipsistic interpretation about the phenomenological attitude is implausible.

In addition, the possible debate on the distinction between internal and external objects becomes less determinant, since is clear that the phenomenological reduction brings the stream of experience as the main object to focus on, where all the objects we thought of as part of the world are the content of this stream, including our own self as well. This is not, however, a denial of the world and its objectivity, nor even the belief of the existence of it thanks to some internal extreme idealism that would entail the subject with the power of giving life to what appears.

Conclusion

Husserl's phenomenology is prone to be interpreted as solipsistic, thanks to a misunderstanding of what the trascendental Ego actually means, as well as the unclear and sometimes obscure character of the notion pure consciousness. We have seen that nevertheless, both concepts, if carefully analysed, do not necessarily lead to accepting a view where the world appears as a consequence of a capacity of perception within the self. Although Husserl makes references to a subjective point of view in many parts of *Ideas I* and the *Cartesian Meditations,* certain passages also show that what is really given as phenomena cannot be indicated as personal or individual, nor even totally mental. The trascendental Ego exists as the parenthesizing of the worldly experience is done, and this existence is not plausible to be explained if we focus in its possible subjective aspect, since it also encompasses any subjective entity "claiming to be". This way, it may not be feasible to encapsulate Husserl's thought in a kind of full-blown radical idealism centred in thinking entities only, and then his thought might not be in contradiction with the thesis elaborated by another non naive idealist such as Francis Bradley, who states: "You can not, starting from the given, construct a self which will swallow up and down every element from which it is distinguished." (Bradley 1902, 258)

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Digital and Historical Nomads

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Abstract:

Digital Nomads - a modern brand, conceptual innovation, symbolizes freedom without boundaries. Digital nomads are entirely different people. These are clearly distinct Western rationalists. In the West, the satiation with the technical achievements of culture occurred earlier, and there arose some sort of nostalgia about the natural motives. And this induced them to create some sort of illusion for themselves. This illusion exists because their way of thinking remains that of the contemporary people, nevertheless, this is some kind of a challenge. A challenge in itself, above all, at the level of personal development, and also a challenge against the society that imposes some sort of framework, making life very "tight". These are people who deny the established canons. These are quite interesting people, but these are people who relate to the term 'nomad' in an illusionary manner. They are interested not so much in internal, as much as merely external parameters. A nomad lives life not being tied to a geographical location. But to what extent, how deeply do they perceive the phenomenon of a nomadic way of thinking? The majority of digital nomads is simply people who want something new. There are only a few that get imbued "to the bones". Those who immerse themselves entirely, perhaps, experience a reassessment of their values. Even if they do not become real nomads, they let it in through their external existence and, accordingly, change. Over the course of the 21st century, this brand will become even stronger, because the challenges of globalization allow finding unusual solutions. The term 'nomad' stands for, on the one hand, one of the ways of surviving and preserving harmony with this world, and, on the other hand, it implies approaching the world in a slightly different perspective.

Keywords: Digital nomad, Globalization, Archetype, Traditional nomad, Central Asia, Lifestyle, Freedom, Dynamism, Spatiality, Symbol, Dialogue, Culture.

Purpose of the study - to relate the concept of "digital nomad" and "traditional nomad" to determine the similarities and differences. The main emphasis is on the analysis of historical nomadic culture of thinking as the archetype of nomadic culture.

The novelty of this article - it shows that the fundamental difference between digital and traditional (historical) nomads is in contrast to the way of thinking. Western rationalism of digital nomads and contextual thinking of traditional nomads - two different understanding of the meaning of life. This is the unifying element - the dynamism in the perception of the world and way of behavior in this world.

Introduction

As demonstrated by numerous studies and the emergence of the phenomenon known as 'digital nomadism', the phenomenon of nomadism has been undergoing a sort of renaissance in the present times. Why is it happening, and what are the similarities and differences between traditional and contemporary nomads, e.g. the location-independent workers who are referred to as digital nomads? At first glance, digital nomadism is a way of life, which implies movement free of any space constraints. However, the major focus should be directed towards the particular way of thinking; thus, a lifestyle is merely its projection. What is particular about the traditional nomadic consciousness shaped in the vastness of Central Asia, and contributed to the emergence of a particular way of life, which was opposite to the sedentary lifestyle? What is the essence of nomadism? And what is the relation between nomadism as a historical phenomenon, and digital nomads projecting the modern hypostasis of nomadism? The topicality of this question is apparent given the steady increase in the number of digital nomads and the unquenchable interest in the phenomenon of nomadism itself in an era of globalization. In this regard, archetypes of thought and culture are significant; they provide invaluable assistance in understanding the essence of the processes of identification in the present. In this sense, C. Jung was right, saying "if we cannot deny the archetypes or otherwise neutralize them, we are confronted, at every new stage in the differentiation of consciousness to which civilization attains, with the task of finding a new interpretation appropriate to this stage, in order to connect the life of the past that still exists in us with the life of the present, which threatens to slip away from it." (Jung 2002, 91) Comparison of traditional nomadic thought (the representatives of which were located in the history of Asia and the Middle East), and contemporary Western thought (in this context, the kind of people who have chosen the nomadic way of life) generates an original interpretation. The major question investigated is the following: how do the way of thinking and the way of life of the historical and modern digital nomads intertwine?

Traditional nomadic thought as conceptualized by historical nomads

The cosmic sensation in one's own 'oecumene' constituted the traditional paradigm of thinking pertaining to the Central Asian nomads. Due to the nomadic lifestyle, for traditional nomads, the idea of a journey inherently served as the basis for life. The journey was conceptualized as a conjunction between a human being and the Universe; meanwhile, Heaven and Earth served as major reference points for comprehension of life. The categories of Heaven and Earth are universal. However, in 'being', as understood by the ancient nomads, the sky personified the guardian of a human's destiny. At times, 'Tenir' (the Kyrgyz word for 'Heaven') was envisioned as a supreme deity; thus, enhancing nomads' contemplation. Contemplation process required rich imagination, filling in the gaps in the knowledge about existence. Human-nomad possessed a high and subtle level of sensitivity, thanks to which he felt oneness with the world, nature. Contemplation was key to understanding being, whereas micro-world (human being) and macro-world (the Universe) intertwined into each other at the level of imagination. The world was envisioned as infinite space, the immensity and boundlessness of which the human being attempted to perceive, and define one's own place within it. The need for change dominated nomad's consciousness, forasmuch as the constant movement from place to place were norms of existence and forms of world cognition. Thus, a human being could easily adapt to the new situations, embracing it as an extension of the uniform world. This is the reason why *dynamism* is approached here as an element of perception, which has eventually become the inherent trait of the nomadic world outlook. To a nomad, movement implies a way of thought, a lifestyle, and the major value of being, i.e. movement is substantial to the nomad's perception of the world. In this respect, due to the dynamic approach to the environment, *activism* constituted a life stance characteristic for a human-nomad. Nomad was not submitting one's own self to the world, or to the forces of nature; instead, s/he felt as an equal to them, because, indeed, s/he was a child, a creation, of this very nature, who lived in harmony with nature's rules. Thereby, when compared to the mentality of the sessile representatives, the elements of the traditional thinking as conceptualized by nomads pose significant difference.

The dynamic display of their outlook emanated from the intrinsic sense of freedom, which organically constituted the nomads' way of thinking. Nomads were free in their thoughts, aspirations, and actions; their activities were not confined to the limits of the pre-assigned behavior. To follow the logic suggesting that, from nomad's perspective, the world was immense space unfolding the freedom of existence, it would be sequential matter-of-course to suggest that the human-nomad derived freedom of action from freedom of space, thus becoming a subject of the world. The very mode of existence – permanent nomadism – determined the perception of freedom as a given condition of life; this way, freedom of thought reflected freedom of universe. In this lied the deep dialectical understanding of nomadic being, his/her own destiny, and relation to this world. This kind of understanding was inherent to nomads, renouncing whatever canons. Freedom as natural process of self-awareness gave birth to heroic consciousness in a nomad, a kind of militancy as the underlying character trait. The sedentary way of human existence objectively restricted by the frames of territorial and geographical space gave rise to a completely different mode of existence in this world, and fostered different attitude to the things taking place in it. Another manifestation of freedom could be seen in nomad's tolerance to 'otherness' as a result of awareness about the benevolence of the Universe, and deep understanding about that various members are supposed to coexist in it.

The nomad's sense of the world extended to a cosmic scope implied particular sensibility towards nature (*environment-oriented way of thinking*), when nature was envisioned in the role of life-giving initial force, and continuation of human Self. Nature and human being merged into one whole, thus forming a sort of natural harmony, in which a human personified a son of the Universe.

Nature's perception of the nomad was understood as spiritual; it was projecting the moral principles of human existence: the sky was associated with eternity; mountains – wisdom and mightiness; water – life itself, its source. The natural life cornerstones dominated the hierarchy of the moral values. In this sense, one may claim that the principles of nomadic life in Central Asia originally were *non-religious* per se; and for the knowledge of the essence of life, nomad did not try to resort in anything of extramundane character. Nomad adhered to the given reality: "There is explanation to everything in the world in the everyday consciousness of a nomad, and a prophet would be bursting through an open door in an attempt to enlighten him [the nomad] regarding the 'truth'". (Auezov 1993, 59)

The harmony of the nature-and-human relationships resulted in the respective system of cults: Earth and Water as the progenitors and source of life, and Fire as the guardian of the family hearth. The elements of the natural world constructed specific images, through the prism of which the dialogue with the world-Universe was taking place. Thus, nomadic thinking distinguished itself in its *concreteness*, because spatiality enabled localization of objects in space. In attempts to understand existence, the un-comprehended was intuitively replenished with the belief in the unity of the world. Thereby, the development of *intuitivism* contributed to contemplativeness and speculative character.

Contemplativeness was an expression of the *philosophic* way of thinking in nomads. Nomads did not develop their own conceptual philosophical tradition, as it occurred in the East and West; the sensuous-symbolical way of world perception constituted the nomadic mode of thinking, and it did not find its place in the philosophical treatises. Surpassed by written sources for centuries, the culture of oral tradition had been rapidly developing. This unique phenomenon was captured in the epic compositions as examples of artistic thinking. Epics played a similar role to nomads as myths to sessile peoples: they were a source of spiritual culture, a historical form of world outlook at early stages of development. The fusion of real and unreal was characteristic of epics, it functioned as a reflection of nomadic consciousness, which had *mythological* quality; epics offered an interpretation of a unified undifferentiated world. Epics expressed the integrity of consciousness, and memory served as a preservation criterion of the ancient nomadic culture. To quote Hegel's apt remark, "the genuinely epical event is not a single casual deed, and that consequently it is not a purely accidental happening which is related, but an action ramified into the whole of its age and national circumstances so that it can be brought before us only within an outspread world and demands the portrayal of this world in its entirety". (Hegel 1975, 1051)

The ancient nomads' model of life was based on the traditional understanding of the world, where space prevailed over time. Hence, *spatiality* was another characteristic feature of the nomadic thinking. The world of nomads "was a spatial world, in which a human lived, and upon which he depended, it was all-powerful and all-generous, as god, as the earthly embodiment of god". (Aitmatov 1972) The priority of the spatial cornerstones in the nomad's consciousness of world perception did not utterly deny the time criteria of being. Nomad's understanding of time was particular; it was cyclical, and thus it was contrasted against the linear understanding adopted by the sessile peoples. The cyclical perception of the world in time was determined by the natural cycles of development. Due to sensibility to the processes occurring in nature, a nomad projected these cycles onto one's own course of life. Thusly, time synthesized its hypostases, which was recognized as unity: past, present, and future coexisted in impersonal space at once. And this is an extremely important characteristic of nomadic thinking, projecting its originality in the relationship between the generations.

The unity of time modes found expression in the unique feature of nomadic consciousness - self-consciousness was generated in the attempts to comprehend the spirit of past eras inhabited by past generations. This was not a sort of succession, which was common in the Western or Eastern cultures, where each generation was associated with a particular stage of history. With regard to the Central Asian culture, continuity was understood as a coherent process of constructing-and-localizing one's own 'Self,' which was supposed to be in congruent relation with the traditions of past generations. This can be described as a sort of inner spiritual kinship, which was not fading away within the course of time; on the contrary, it was strengthened by its appeal to cultures for being always up-to-date, contemporary. The continuity of generations was determined by the level of self-consciousness in a nomad; his/her link to the historical traditions of Central Asia mattered. Nomad adhered to the norms of being as upheld by ancestors; thus, the traditional thinking in nomads played a supreme role in succession of the culture of nomadic thinking, in general.

Each generation of nomads, to a certain degree, expanded understanding of the underlying principles of existence that constituted nomadic world outlook. The ancestor cult provided symbolical and spiritual guidance to a nomad who wanted to comprehend the mysteries withhold within the cosmic world perception. This way, it was believed that the ancestors stood for a lively and imperishable symbol encompassing historicity of the nomadic life; the lack of knowledge in this field led to the tragedy in the succession of nomadic culture. Traditionally, nomad was ought to know about the seven generations of his ancestors, and knowing these things was a way to appreciate one's own existence, an indication of historical co-participation. The succession of generations was made apparent in the ethnic memory, and its distinctiveness should be explained. Commemoration of ancestors, was, metaphorically speaking, a thread connecting generations; it was regarded as an identity depth criterion applied to nomadic consciousness. In regard to ethnic memory, the following is important to keep in mind: the nomad's 'I' was inseparable from the procession of 'I's of the ancestors, which was a different case in sedentary cultures emphasizing time-criterion. Contrary to the vertical historical development, the historical domain of nomads could be better described as horizontal.

Another essential characteristic of Central Asian nomadic thinking was its *symbolism*. The genesis of this unique way of thinking has obtained a symbolical value to it. The nomadic lifestyle, implying constant movement, contributed to the establishment of a dialogue between East and West. "The penetration of the nations of charioteers and horsemen from Central Asia -which did, in fact, reach China, India and the West and introduced the horse to the ancient civilizations - had, so he [Alfred Weber] argues, analogous consequences in all three regions. The men of these equestrian peoples came to experience, thanks to the horse, the vastness of the world. They took over the ancient civilizations by conquest. In hazards and disasters they experienced the problematic character of existence, as master-peoples they developed an heroic-tragic consciousness that found expression in epic". (Jaspers 2014, 16) Thus, the center of Asia became the mainspring of the world contacts. This process contributed to the expansion of history, fostering the development of the Western and Eastern thinking; meanwhile, the Central Asian nomadic consciousness was being preserved as a symbol of eternal movement, the springhead of the interaction between sessile peoples.

The historical role of the nomadic consciousness preconditioned formation of an innate *tragedy*. The tragedy of the Central Asian culture reveals its distinct fate: although nomads pioneered the idea of a journey as a way of life when the cornerstones of being were laid and pushed forward the dialogue between East and West, nevertheless, the nomadic civilization itself remained for many centuries unseen and unexplored. This way, the criteria of this distinct mode of thought manifested in a symbolical sense; in this state of things unveils itself the tragedy of the nomadic culture of Central Asia, which, at the same time, constitutes its unique quality. This tragedy of the Central Asian cultural development was expressed, preserved and passed on in the epical heroic consciousness.

The symbolism also penetrated the world of human relations: the beginning of life was associated with the image of a particular animal. It was a manifestation of historical memory of the once undivided unity of a nomad with nature. This fundamental feature of the nomadic way of thinking received ambivalent interpretation in both, Eastern and Western cultures, which relied on the stereotypical patterns of thinking inherent to them. However, the relation between human and nature was less apparent, less direct in these culture-systems, and this explains why the animal symbols remained preserved in their heraldic cultures.

Nomadic culture implied a certain coexistence of humans and animals within the unified natural world. The symbolism inherent to nomadic thinking was also exemplified by ancestors (Arbaces), who had been serving as symbols of stability and continuity of generations for a long while. The instinct of self-preservation in nomads ordained construction of cultural traditions to preserve the distinctive 'container' of the ethnic memory, which gained symbolical significance within the course of time. This contributed to the preservation of the archetype of the nomadic consciousness passed on generations by the descendants of the Central Asian culture.

Another distinctive feature of the nomadic way of thinking in Central Asia that should be addressed here is *contextualism*, i.e. awareness of the context in which one's own self is being located. This kind of self-awareness was regarded as something that had been already predetermined by the way of existence – constant movement in the wild nature setting required unity of a human with fellow tribe members because one could hardly manage to withstand the hardships and adversities of nature being left on his/her own. In the age of antiquity, this feature played an overly positive role, thus promoting cohesion among nomads in the difficult moments of life. Feeling of belonging to the context of a tribe remained innate to nomadic consciousness for long period of time afterwards.

In light of demand and practical capacity, the aforementioned characteristics of nomadic thinking led to the possibility of creating a peculiar unaltered cultural model, which served as a basis for–and became an archetype of–a fundamentally different way of life and perception of life. Thus, nomadism in the history of mankind's origin and development is an essentially unique phenomenon, demonstrating specific characteristics.

Development Stages of Central Asia: from Nomadic to Sessile Lifestyle

Certain characteristics of the traditional nomadic thinking determined the emergence and development of a particular mentality among the representatives of Central Asia, which became a historic area of ancient nomads. When compared to the history of East and West, Central Asia with its unique history has undergone the periods of incoherence because the tradition of the nomadic culture has not been originally preserved. This suggests that the characteristics of the archetype of the Central Asian way of thinking have been preserved on a subconscious level. The same processes at work can be traced in the structures of a variety of other ethnic cultures in Central Asia, dating back to the ancient Turkic tribes inhabiting this area. At the core of the traditional world outlook is the archetypical way of thinking, which is essential to the existence of Central Asian culture. The nomadic ancestors made the psychic mindset salient, thus shaping the traditional mentality over historical time, which became a cornerstone of national character. Accordingly, the traditional mentality is fundamental to the formation of national consciousness. The cultural system underwent significant changes because of the transition to sessile lifestyle; the values constituting the nomadic culture were reconsidered, however, the most functional ones remained. The latter prevailed in the consciousness of the peoples who were highly aware of their unity with the nomadic archetype. This natural process of self-awareness within the new conditions of life led to the mutual enrichment of principles constituting the nomadic and settled world outlooks, and this contributed to *syncretism* in thinking.

The entry into the Soviet epoch of development led to a reorientation of the nomadic way of thinking, which had been eventually superseded by the fusion of the Eastern and some Western characteristics of consciousness. The traditional world outlook did not perish entirely, certain manifestations were preserved in the form of national traditions and customs; however, the major criterion constituting the nomadic outlook on the world was pushed to the level of the subconscious. The course of further development placed significant value on the principles constituting the sessile culture; those received obsolete status.

The next leap in the traditional cultural system occurred with the acquisition of sovereignty by the Central Asian republics. This process created a crisis in the nations' self-determination, accompanying the process of independent development up to the present time. The process of sovereignty raised the issue of the revival of the Central Asian cultural archetype. The Central Asia as a single territorial and geopolitical region manifested itself in the process of the republics' self-development. At the national level, there occurred the necessity in re-interpretation of the past socio-cultural experience. In contemporary scholarship, the emphasis is placed on studying the specifics of mentality. The surge of national consciousness contributed to the revival of the traditional cultural values. Simultaneously, another trend of development persisted: the process of globalization promoted the penetration and 'absolutization' of the universal values. In the context of this situation, national, regional and global interest become intertwined. The processes of modernization also have an impact on the cultural system and its expression in terms of values. In its turn, the public system reflects the contradictions of the so-called transitional period.

Accordingly, certain parameters of the nomadic mentality remain on a subconscious level today. They manifest themselves in the ability to adapt to changing conditions of life relatively easier, and this has to do with the previously mentioned dynamism of nomadic thought, coupled with the nomad's inclination to take an active role in the perception and the development of their new world. However, it should be noted that the modern descendants of nomads are no longer representatives of the classic nomadic way of thinking. The contemporary way of life was foreordained by the sessile way of existence together with the invasion of the global stereotypes and universal values; today, the lifestyle of the nomads' descendants negates the relevance of some of the features of the traditional nomadic thinking. In addition to that, the history itself repeatedly reaches the points when updates of the traditional system of thinking become a necessity. Affirmations about globalization entering the phase of post-globalization highlights the complexity of this development, and its contradictory nature. Along with the incitement of unification, globalization deepens the processes of identification. In such state of things, the archetypes of thinking forcefully come to the surface of consciousness, revealing their power and validity, and promising the possibility of a new 'push' towards a better understanding of one's own culture and being. Thus, nomadism, which represents one of the archetypes of thinking and culture, receives an opportunity of reinterpretation within the given cultural systems.

The particular aspect of nomadism contributing to its popularization today manifests itself in the phenomenon of digital nomadism, which has a lot to do with the endless migration sweeping the world as a way of human existence – the consequence of globalization.

Digital nomads in relation to the historical nomads

Digital nomads comprise a solely modern-day phenomenon, which has become of profound current interest and gained importance in Europe and the U.S., i.e. concentrated in the Western world. On the one hand, the very name "digital nomads" signifies technological determinism of this phenomenon, suggesting the high level of the current world civilization development. This phenomenon would be unimaginable without the advances in the digital technologies; hence, this is phenomenon of the world of reason. On the other hand, the combination of the Western way of thinking with conscious preference for nomadic way of existence in the modern times suggests an ambivalent interpretation of the term “digital nomads”.

Technological achievements of the human civilization allow the contemporaries to take advantage of freedom as a way of existence: when it comes to work disposal, the opportunity of remote work implies that an individual has more freedom to decide. Hence, in regard to space and time, the major criteria of being, the contemporary world appears in a slightly different perspective. The pace of time is fast; as a result, the time has become regarded as both, something given and luxury. Previously enclosed and framed, space became perceived as open. At the present time, the borders between states lost their significance thanks to the emergence of the Internet and the Internet-related technological developments. The concept of the virtual space gained significance because it contributed to the emergence of a particular world. This implied that time and space as the criteria of human existence enabled the possibility of a new approach to their understanding, perception, and function. In this regard, digital nomad projects an up-to-date vision of nomadism-phenomenon by adopting the metaphor which refers to freedom, i.e. it can be viewed as a contemporary brand, an innovative concept, a symbol applied to designate freedom without limits. This is a product of globalization, which can be approached as a universal value “packaged” as contemporary nomadism. And that was the first interpretation of the term “digital nomads”.

Along with this interpretation, there exists a second one, which penetrates deeper into the essence of nomadism. According to this interpretation, digital nomad is someone who chooses freedom not merely for the sake of flexible allocation of time, but also for a deeper purpose – the opportunity to perceive this world and one’s own place within it in a quite different light, i.e. nomadism as a way of thinking in addition to the way of life. In this sense, how does digital nomad relate to the classical nomad? To what extent does this metaphor correspond to the archetypical historical phenomenon?

Dynamism is the most acclaimed quality in the appropriated image of a nomad, interpreted as constant movement, roaming entity. Thus, mobility alters itself from the characteristic of a contemporary man into an inherent characteristic of the individual’s essence. The second characteristics of such kind of freedom without limits, the preference in favor of space that is non-oppressive, similar to time, towards the human being’s consciousness. Such understanding of freedom allows a comparative approach to a digital nomad, a contemporary representative of the technical and technological civilization, with the historical one respectively, i.e. the traditional nomad whose approach to the perception and understanding of the world is very distinctive.

However, parallels that can be drawn between the preferences of the traditional and contemporary nomads do not necessarily signify absolute approximation of the carriers sharing similar characteristics. What distinguishes the contemporary digital nomad from the traditional one? The lack of nomadic thinking integrity: despite their presence, certain nomadic characteristics, such as the nomadic way of thinking and way of life, in the contemporary representatives of the

Western world do not constitute the perception of nomadism as the philosophy of life. Why is integrity important? Because one can feel oneself a nomad only in a certain systematization of thought, i.e. when despite the understanding of freedom as the supreme values of being, a nomad retains such qualities of thinking as contemplativeness, intuitiveness, spatiality, symbolism etc. Such integrity of thinking is at the core of invariant model of behavior. In this case, all these qualities become natural and functional, rather than superficial.

To the most degree, digital nomads are representatives of the West pertaining Western mentality inherent to them, with a strongly pronounced rationalism. Most of them are quite rational people. I suggest that their rationality manifests itself in their deliberate search for a life stance for some kind of relief, escape from imposed stereotypes and standards. Their goal lies in the alteration of life quality; this means that certain burdens related to life organization are pushed into the background. Wherein, obtainment of one's own "Self" takes place not in the context of the accepted norms, but rather in spite of them. Speaking of the history of traditional nomads, such kind of rationalism was inappropriate to them; traditional nomads were more organic to the nature that "enveloped" them. Bearing this in mind, the contemporary Western nomads appear as adopting the idealized version of the metaphor of nomadism, which offers new rhythm and originality to the contemporary life.

In fact, a closer look at the comparisons drawn between the traditional nomadic and Western ways of thinking can serve as a point of departure for the analysis of the opposition of these parameters. The major characteristics of the Western way of thinking are: anthropocentrism (as opposed to the nomadic cosmocentrism), as a result of which technological thinking subduing nature (in opposition to the organic environmental susceptibility) comes to foreground; the prevalence of the timeline-oriented criteria of existence (as opposed to the spatiality-oriented mentality inherent to nomads), and the perception of time is linear (rather than cyclic as perceived by traditional nomads); theoretical thinking (as opposed to contemplation and intuition); egoism and pragmatism (as opposed to contextuality), rationality (as opposed to emotional irrationality); abstractedness (as opposed to concreteness); vertical continuity constituted by the vertical hierarchy of memories (as opposed to horizontal); the culture of rights as opposed to tribalism.

Dynamism with accompanying easiness in perception of changes taking place in the world is the only aspect uniting nomadic Central-Asian and Western ways of thinking. However, digital nomads' adoption of freedom of movement does not imply acceptation of a particular spiritual perception, enlightenment present in true nomads. Only a few people are able to embrace the values of this lifestyle fully, and comprehend over time the distinctiveness of its spirit, which "refills" them anew. Digital nomads are a product of globalization with its universal values and virtual space. Spatial limits of the real world get blurred in the context of technological progress; hence, the world becomes open space, accessible to everyone, and, as a consequence, desired. The world without borders implies freedom; however, the perception of such freedom might turn out to be an illusion of sort. In this sense, the contemporary nomads, as already explained, simply adopt the metaphor of nomadism, which serves the new purpose of discovering one's own "Self" in the context of the dynamically changing world. A comparison drawn between the ways of thinking of settled and nomadic civilizations suggests that the West (categorized as a traditionally sessile civilization type) does not offer natural conditions pertinent to nomadism. Thus, the conscious choice of the nomadic way of life in modern times does not imply the primordially natural perception of the world and life; contrary to the situation of historical nomads, it entails no harmonious coexistence of a human and nature. This seems to be the fundamental difference between digital and historical nomads. Despite this difference, the western individual's pursuit of adopting nomadic lifestyle as a way of existence–by putting one's own self into the state of being-in-between, and constant movement–shows that such an option is conceived as natural and organic in the era of globalization as a consequence of a high level of technological progress.

Conclusion

Determined by globalization with its destruction of common borders and its involvement into the construction of a "unified world," the openness of the contemporary world, implies understanding nomadism as the most up-to-date way of human existence, in general. This means that in the set of circumstances when the dominant sessile way of existence becomes deciphered through the lenses of the certain types of civilization and cultural systems, nomadism acquires the role of a unifying foundation for all cultures, states, and peoples. This is a human's response to the challenge of history and time, i.e. the indication of deeper understanding of nomadism as a way of life. In this case, nomadism is but one of the ways, on the one hand, to survive and preserve the harmony with this world; and on the other hand, this is an attempt to see the world in a slightly different perspective. In this regard, it should be noted that nomadism is destined to play a role in the particular periods of history.

History itself created this distinctive feature: when the East and West were undergoing the period of formation and were practically unknown to each other, nomads filled the roles of informants communicating to the West and East about each other's existence. Thus, nomads contributed to the formation of world history. At the end of the twentieth century, the socio-cultural boom took place because of the destruction of the enormous state, an empire; these conditions gave rise to chaos. In these circumstances, the concept of a nomad re-surfaced again, serving the purpose of some sort of bridge connecting different cultural worlds. That explains the "hype" around this term; no wonder it is being commercialized because we are living in the age of technological determinism: we want to package everything and lay out for sale to produce profit. Nevertheless, we should keep the uniqueness of this phenomenon in sight: nomadism did not perish within the course of history; on the contrary, it came to surface again with renewed vigor. And in this lies the huge potential, enormous power of nomadism as a phenomenon.

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Mental Image of the City

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Abstract:

The purpose of the article is to investigate the significance and mechanism of creating a mental image of the city. To solve the task, the semiotic approach was chosen. The city is considered as a multi-layered topological object. It is noted that, inherent to urban space, the paradigm of the commercial rationality has ceased to play a major role in the development of cities.

The article deals with the decoding of the city text in literary works in the key of the semiotic tradition. As two examples of creating a mental image of a city in the fiction literature of the early 2000s were considered, Pamuk's Istanbul: *Memories and the City* and Ackroyd's *London: The Biography*. Two different approaches to the formation of the image of the city, its cultural and historical features, are analyzed. The basis of the image is not only the object but also everyday practices that merge into the event of life.

The humanization of the city, the analysis of the existential experiences caused by the urban space, expand the instrumental management capabilities. We get an anthropological basis for determining the destination of the city, the representation of the image of the city, the development of event technologies.

Keywords: Urban space, Mental image, Humanization of the city, Urbanistic ideology, Semiotic, Rationality.

The main discovery of urban studies in the twentieth century is a city as a complex topological object, where spaces of different nature and etymology repeatedly overlap. In the works of A. Lefevre, M. de Serto, and U. Eco, the city appears as a system for the production of spaces. These authors proposed methods for describing the causal links between the mental image of the city, social practices and physical objects of the urban infrastructure. This research paradigm interprets the city as a plurality of spaces which is imprinted in the texts on the city. Multilayered things, places, and values form not only the visible architectonics of the city but also its mental image. Urban physical objects design a functional environment for the life of people and communities. At the same time, this ensemble of things and relationships form a special way of life with its own system of assessments, motivations and explanations (Artemenko 2017). City acquires humanistic characteristics, and its physical objects get the meanings that eventually dictate the logic of social relations and build the anthropological code of urban space. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to investigate the significance and mechanism of creating a mental image of the city.

Today, the idea of a new urbanism is regarded in connection with the trends in the development of civilization in the 21st century. The starting point of urban research was the rivalry of the ideologies of modernist and social urbanism. For modernist urbanism, the key properties of a modern metropolis are mobility and density. Hence the specificity of the development of the city with an emphasis on the construction of skyscrapers and hyper-saturation of urban space appears. Social urbanism (Garc 1995) or new urbanism (Lefevre 2002) makes investments in affordable housing, public transport systems and the development of local communities. In their pure form, these ideologies have completely exhausted themselves and, as a result, a third ideology, named by V. Wachstein, "Hipster Urbanism" (Vakhshtayn 2014), appeared. It combines the features of previous ideologies but changes of the perspective and the optics throughout city is observed. This ideology assumes investment in comfort but does not depart from the idea of the city as a structure that makes money. The city is perceived as a scene, a place of events where the representatives of the creative class form a new productive cluster (Landry 2000).

As can be seen from the nature of urbanist ideologies, the city became a hostage to the mass production and consumption. U. Eco noted that by creating the city, we cannot disobey the technological and economic demands of the market (Eco 1998, 301). The urban space is imagined as practical, highly functional and having commercial significance. The production of urban space is a kind of echo of the culture of mass consumption. For this approach, existential motives are only instrumental and secondary ones. In connection with this, G. Simmel noticed that in such a city "formal justice is combined with merciless cruelty" (Simmel 2002, 3). Perhaps, therefore, sentimental feelings do not fit into the rationalism of commercial urban planning. This cruelty is fully demonstrated by the dynamics of urban space. It is similar to the modernization of the production facility, which is ruthless in relation to machines, walls and people. Commercial expediency creates dehumanized objects and dehumanized relationships.

While in the early 20th century, the consequences of the dehumanization of the city were marked by G. Simmel as "increased nervousness", at the late 20th century, J. Baudrillard speaks of hatred which becomes not a personal feeling but grows into "objective and causeless rage born in the urban desert". The dehumanized city turns into a dump of material, human and structural garbage. In this case, as J. Baudrillard points out, this happens if you want to create an ideal city. Paradoxically, the desire to transform the space of a city produces a desert around where spaces, like humans, are wastes (Baudrillard 1997). A terrible feature of a big city discloses itself: it is a leveling of a person, its absorption by a socio-technical mechanism. We see a steady trend of dehumanization of urban space which is a transformation of the city into an environment not for life. But at the same time, while modern urban studies connect the development of cities with the development of human potential, the city should be understood as a space of human existence, where things have a humanitarian meaning (Artemenko 2015). This trend manifested itself in fiction about the city of the early 2000s, for example, in books of O. Pamuk *Istanbul: Memories and the City* (2003) and P. Ackroyd *London: The Biography* (2000). These works represent different approaches to the perception of the city, but they open the theme of a city as an anthropogenic space. J. Ortega y Gasset argued that the presence of human in the world deprives the thing of its self-sufficiency. And since a thing, a body creates space, the presence of a person gives to it a humanistic meaning. A person in this environment becomes a producer of cultural languages that organize space into a text.

Modern researchers see in the urban space the visualization of sociality, communication in the public environment (Fisher 2009) and ways to label cultural and social frames (Goffman 2004). Methodologically and thematically, these problems are intertwined with the direction of the sociology of technology and its discovery of the active nature of physical environment (Lator 2015; Knorr Cetina, 2006). In the 2000s, the Manchester School of Sociology effectively applied the concepts of the actor-network theory, research of science and technology in the urban sociology (Guy 2007; Yaneva 2005), which allowed a new appreciation of the relationship between human and the city.

In his work *Objects and Spaces*, J. Law formulated the idea of the object as a network of relations (Law 2006, 230). This gives us a new idea of the causality of the social processes. And it is with this assertion that the understanding of the city comes not as mutual exclusion, but as a mutual complement of the material and social system, language and structure, mental image and social ties. All these components constitute a holistic complex of a city as an object, where a change in the ensemble of its components in any sphere leads to a change in the entire the object. Therefore, for us, the city is a derivative of stable sets and networks of relations.

This approach removes the problem of the causal primacy of descriptive language or physical space. They do not compete, they are not equivalent, but are mutually disposed and mutually interdependent, just like infrastructure objects, groups, interests, practices and other elements of the city description.

If the infrastructure objects of the city form the physical space, then the "mental city" forms the existential acceptance of social space. The image of a city which is created in the representations of its inhabitants, guests, and neighbors, is the basis for its humanitarian appeal which often is not reduced only to the life conveniences. G. Simmel paid attention to this phenomenon at the beginning of the 20th century, noting that the deepest problems of modern life stem from the individual's aspirations to protect his independence and identity from violence by society, the historical tradition and the external culture and technology of life (Simmel 2002, 1).

Criticizing approaches to the study of urban space, M. de Serto notes that urban studies prefer anonymous and everyday phenomena, focusing on details representing the whole (Certeau

2013, 61). As a result, we get a mechanically assembled design, where the parts seem not to be organic and functional elements of the ensemble, but a lot of physical objects randomly assembled in one "spatial box". In the same time, the production of space initially assumes the plurality of perspectives and perspectives of each of the objects, and this is insisted by one more creator of the theory of space production, A. Lefebvre. He notes that any thing can get into any "set" of locus content, and so any part of the content can take on anything at all (Lefebvre 2015, 173).

Of course, we remember the plans for the development of the city, which are created within the framework of technical or commercial rationality. But the material object is overgrown with humanitarian meanings. There are many examples where objects of urban space lost their original humanistic significance. In this case, a city acquired a frightening image. Let us recall how after three centuries of the rule of Christianity, the inhabitants of Constantinople forgot the assignment of statues adorning the city, and urban folklore from the 8th century created the image of these statues as dangerous, sinister objects. If the burning of pagan books and the destruction of statues in Constantinople under Justinian I was carried out meaningfully with an understanding of what is being destroyed, in times of the Dark Ages such actions were caused by mystical fear, based on the forgotten meaning of artifacts.

A similar situation can be traced in the description of Istanbul in the 17th century made by Evliya Chelebi. Surprisingly, not only the archaic history of the city takes on a mythical form, but also the closer historical time of Mehmed II (1432-1481) turned urban folklore into a legend where real historical events can be traced quite arbitrarily. Their material evidence is perceived as amulets or talismans of the urban community. This was not a feature of Istanbul alone. P. Ackroyd gives an example of London's history of so-called the stone of Brutus. But in the created image of the city, it is important to discover not a distortion of facts, but a story in which the space of objects turns into a space of meanings. We are interested in creating an image of the city which contains only clear, acceptable and mastered phenomena.

The architectural text of the city was constantly "re-read" by its inhabitants. As a result, a new space of a city is produced. P. Ackroyd is right saying that there are always a lot of temporary spaces in the city at the same time (Ackroyd 2009, 17), but O. Pamuk, who affirms the simultaneity of living spaces, is just as right. Stories about the city give us an opportunity to assess the gap between the original image and its secondary production in a new cultural and social environment. The gap is paramount in creating a mental image. It is thanks to it that a recombination of objects occurs and the emergence of a new space of the city appears.

This process is reflected in the novel by O. Pamuk, *Istanbul: Memories and the City*. We trace this gap, literally from the first chapter, where another Orhan appears. The author admits the plurality of spaces of the described city. And they are self-sufficient and complete images. Gauthier, Flaubert, Melling, as well as Ahmet Rasim, Yahya Kemal, and Reshat Kochu presented their space of Istanbul, but in ideal, not a mimetic way. This is what creates the tension of Pamuk's text because the author feels a break with these spaces. Even if the objects depicted are still accessible to physical contemplation, then their understanding. This is presented, for example, in the fourth chapter of the novel, which presents pictures of the collapsing Istanbul palaces. Pamuk stresses that the stories of their inhabitants were perceived as evidence of a different historical reality. These are objects that, in the minds of the author's contemporaries, received the same significance as pagan statues for Christians or Byzantine ruins for the Ottomans. The children of the Atatürk Republic created a new mythology of this urban space.

However, according to another scheme, a mental image is created in P. Akroyd's work *London. Biography*. Here the author achieves the monolithic experience of the city, finding continuity even in the poverty quarters. Considering London of the past and using for this the description of the authors from the past, Ackroyd seeks to create the same perception of the city from the reader of either Defoe, Engels, Dickens or Orwell. He insists that it is the same city: "London is eternal, for it contains everything" (Ackroyd 2015, 436). But does this include a person? Ackroyd's London is at first like the body of a young man, but then the image transforms into a kind of bodily formation that does not resemble a human body. This strange spatial formation absorbs a person ("oven", "abscess", "furnace"). Distance is possible only in time which compresses material traces into layers of walls, streets, garbage heaps. There is no "lost" London because it is eternal. Ackroyd's mental image of London is depersonalized: "London is any city that ever was and will be" (Ackroyd 2015, 436). This space is human-made but not anthropomorphic itself. Despite the fact that the book is called *London. Biography*, the author expresses doubt that this is a living object (Ackroyd 2009, 436). This frightening depersonalization of urban space in Ackroyd is expressed in epithets "severe", "ruthless", "terrible", "frightening". This place disfigures people, turning them into violent, bloodthirsty and ruthless crowds (Ackroyd 2009, 36). But at the same time, it generates the euphoria of impersonality. "Elements of novelty and change are whimsically intermixed, merging with joyful excitement from the fact that you are one of an incalculable multitude. You can become anyone." (Ackroyd 2009, 436). The city becomes an actor, changing the person I am, giving the opportunity to "be born again". This is the humanism of Ackroyd's city. The city is an integral structure that gives the chance to be a different person. This is a historical structure, but "the remains of the past now exist as part of the present" (Ackroyd 2009, 438) and therefore, there is no conflict in their perception.

The space of the city accessible for living and the recombined space of the story about the city are completely different. And we see the process that M. de Certeau calls "intellectual synthesis", the result of which takes the form of not the discourse but the decision itself, the act and the way the case is "grasped" (Certeau 2013, 51). Through this grasp, "invisible space production" is carried out. So, in the eleventh chapter entitled "Four lonely writers", O. Pamuk notices in his description of the city that he can't do without the images of the city of other writers. But his Istanbul is different and does not look like the Istanbul of Melling or Flaubert. (Unlike P. Ackroyd, for whom the descriptions of his predecessors are identical to his representations). These are the different grasp and different spaces. They are appropriated ("my own Istanbul"), and this "my own", according to M. de Serto, is the victory of the place over the time (Certeau 2013, 50). In the creation of the space of Istanbul, O. Pamuk, in chapter 34, ascertains the gap between "my" and "their" city. The purity and authenticity of "their" Istanbul are possible as a mental image. But for us, it's a strange city. The foreshortening, ensemble, context create the anthropogenic space of the city. The sadness of the ruins, picturesque on the outskirts and the view of the European - all this will be a representation of the unique urban space, a "victory of the place over time", as it is an individually grasped or produced space.

What happens to the space of the city, when it is re-read by the new author-reader? In fact, we see the process of re-assembling of the city, fixing various ways of social marking the breaks of spaces (temporary, symbolic, functional). And together with this, there appears a living space of the city, giving an impression on the same uniqueness. O. Pamuk defines city beauty as "accidental", which can be seen in the violation of the beauty of a well-thought-out, the classical one. But the most important thing is the discovery of the heterogeneity of this space. In M. de Certeau's opinion, the reader introduces inside the author's text his own techniques of enjoyment and methods of appropriation (Certeau 2013, 53). In this way, with the advent of the reader, an element of chance appears, which reveals a new beauty of the city space.

O. Pamuk in the 27th chapter ("Picturesque on the outskirts") tells about the desire of the Istanbul people to understand themselves, to find a common and unifying image of their city. We are interested in the practice of creating this image as a multi-layered space. We see a declaration of distanceage – "aliens from Europeanized Beyoglu" create the image of an ideal quarter. The urban landscape of the outskirts inspires them for the birth of the city image, as their daily practices are located in the environment of another Istanbul. At the same time, drawings and engravings of Europeans from the 18th and 19th centuries became the tool for creating this idealized image. That is, the layering of the space of a new city is perceived as a palimpsest. This creates an idea of the inadmissibility of simultaneous co-occurrence of these spaces. So, in the reflection of the city appeared "The Lost Istanbul", by Ara Guler, and the experience of the lost Istanbul of O. Pamuk with his old American cars, porters, cemeteries etc. But this is "Istanbul's own", where time wins the place. It is the same appropriated space that is carried out beyond the limits of everyday practice. This is why the conflict between "I" and the city becomes obvious for O. Pamuk.

Material objects of the appropriated space of the city generate images. In this situation, the background and the environment have an active nature; they are the actants representing the *mental* city. Shops, pasha palaces, wooden houses, walls, ruins, and streets - all these are the objects not just making up the environment or the background of life in the city, but the tracks that build the tracks of man's interaction with the world, his everyday practices, which O. Pamuk calls "our world". The subject world of the city is the circumstances that turn us from the viewer into a participant. This is the essence of the environment, when physical objects organize the interaction of people, set them direction and significance. The description of Istanbul made by O. Pamuk shows us how urban space and social practices create a unique object where practices and objects are defined as projections of each other. The experience of a childhood home splashes out onto the street. Irrevocability of bright childhood experiences, associated with things, photos, smells, domestic habits, grow into the experience of a city or even a civilization that has gone down in history. Ottoman mansions destroyed or turned into schools, hospitals or district administrations form a new layer of the city's living. This is no longer a thing of childhood, but a larger object - the sadness of a lost culture and a non-existent empire. We see a humanized Istanbul. The displacement of burned mansions by high-rise buildings is not considered as following the commercial rationalism of urban space. This, according to O. Pamuk, the desire to get rid of things soaked with bitter memory and escape from unbearable memories.

The change in urban space is perceived as an act of one's own movement, its continuation through another thing. While the use of a thing passes without effort and resistance, then we do not feel the external border of contact with others. The border becomes transparent, dissolves with the thing that is used. Transparency creates the impression of taking space and going beyond your own physical limits. This is how O. Pamuk's black and white Istanbul appears, sadness, pictures of Istanbul. All this is collected in a single appropriated space “MY CITY”, where anguish flows from city to person and back, and their mutual doom is felt.

Surprisingly, in P. Ackroyd's book, there is no “my city” combination. In this biography, the description of life is clearly distanced. This is not “my life”, but just the medium of “my life”. There is no such conflict between the I and the city as it is given by O. Pamuk. “London is any city that ever was and will be”, i.e. space outside of time which does not live in person. The humanism of London is not in its anthropomorphic nature, but in that it allows one to change the form of the person himself, turning him into a part of the crowd or creating conditions for changing his face or to be reborn.

In any case, the works of P. Ackroyd and O. Pamuk deserve special attention as examples of creating a mental image of the modern city. They are united by the idea of humanizing the city. The city is the space of human life. For one writer, these are memories, for another - condition for changing one's own self. The city of O. Pamuk lies outside of time because he lived and his space is appropriated. The city of P. Ackroyd is also timeless because it is the time itself that is appropriated by a person. But in any case, the presence of a person as a reference point is required. We see the opposite side of the reality of the world. The thing presupposes the practical meaning of “for what”. And the city as a space created by things acquires this meaning through the presence of man. Even for P. Ackroyd, “burning” of London - this is the hope to find himself.

Both P. Ackroyd and O. Pamuk have a historically formed integral image of the city, expressed by its cultural and historical peculiarities. The basis of this image are objects that are not just visually perceived, but are “lived through”. They are involved in the everyday practice which is turned into an event. And this event has its temporal projections, both in general history and in personal experience. We see how the mental image of a city is expressed in an abstract concept. For O. Pamuk - this is *hüzün* - sadness, melancholia. For P. Ackroyd this is severity. But the images of these authors demonstrate the removal from the sociological or economic models of the description of the city. The mental image of the city implicitly roots a man. The urban space is humanized, allowing the individual to retain his individuality. At the same time, the city becomes a means of creating a spatial and temporal totality of human presence.

The mental image is the basis for constructing the future reality of the city. That's why modern urban studies pay attention to the visual, emotional and associative mechanisms that form the individualized image of the city. A generalization of the set of such images leads to the creation of an image. Even if we return to the idea of the city as an economic structure, its image becomes a part of the economic toolkit of city management and planning. This is one of the key positions of the struggle for human resources. The humanization of the city, the analysis of the existential experiences caused by the urban space expand the instrumental management capabilities. We get an anthropological basis for determining the mission of the city, the representation of the image of the city and the development of event technologies.

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Learning to Map Compassion: A Project Rooted in the Humanities

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Abstract:

To understand the nature of compassion, I trace an arc from the Christian Scriptures, which are "saturated" with compassion, to the "eclipse" of compassion in modern political philosophy in Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke. Rather than stopping at that point, however, the dialogue recommences with a comparative approach to three figures. (1) In Kant's view, deeds of compassion ought to be guided by rational moral principles. Why? Because principles are much more reliable than feelings. (2) Rousseau's *Emile*, however, gives a privileged place to feelings of compassion for others. (3) In the film, *La Reine Margot*, we catch a glimpse of how compassion for others might be learned, when Marguerite of Valois experiences a crisis of conscience and rescues Henry of Navarre from the soldiers sent to kill him. (4) A concluding section asks about the contribution the visual arts to "mapping compassion," and what an ethics of compassion might look like at the micro, meso, and macro levels.

Keywords: Ethics of compassion, Refugees, Exodus, Flight into Egypt, Rousseau

A Biblical Model of Compassion (I): *The Book of Exodus*

The central event in the memory of the Hebrew people is the *Exodus* from Egypt. (Ferder and Heagle 2009, 52-56) The Hebrews were being treated in a barbaric way by Pharaoh and his slave drivers. They were forced against their will to labor for their masters, and there was no reason for them to think that their lives – if we can *call* that "living" – would ever be any different. However, at a key moment in the third chapter of *Exodus*, the direction of the story is radically changed. The Lord says: "I have *seen* the misery of my people; I have *heard* their cry on account of their task-masters. And I have *come down* to deliver them from the Egyptians."

The Lord's message to Pharaoh is astonishing: "Let My people go!" However, Pharaoh's reaction to the message is entirely predictable: "Who is this god that I should listen to him?" So, God leads His people out of Egypt with signs and wonders, "with a mighty arm and an outstretched hand." (Hoffmeier 1986, 378-387) That is how the *Exodus* became the prism through which the people of Israel interpret their history. Throughout the centuries, when they celebrate Passover and re-enact that fateful sequence of events, they continue to reflect on what God did for them and what that experience means for the way they should treat others. (Assmann 2016, 187-201)

We might even say that *Exodus* 3 provides a paradigm for human acts of compassion. First, compassion involves seeing, rather than averting one's gaze: God *saw* how the Hebrews were being mistreated by the Egyptians. Secondly, compassion involves listening, rather than turning a deaf ear to someone: God *heard* the cry of His people. And then thirdly, true compassion leads to action, rather than doing nothing: God *came down* to deliver them from their oppressors, to break the yoke of bondage. So, compassion involves knowing, feeling, and doing. First, we become aware of another person's distress (cognitive level), then we feel emotionally moved by what we see (affective level) and thirdly, we decide to take action to restore justice (volitional level). (Ryan 2010, 157-174)

A Biblical Model of Compassion (II): The New Testament

The narratives of the *New Testament* place the teaching, feeding, and healing, ministries of Jesus in a context of compassion. (Navone 2002, 242-247) In *Matthew* 15, after the crowds have come out to hear his teaching, Jesus summons his disciples and says to them: "I feel compassion for the people, because they have remained with Me now three days and have nothing to eat; and I do not want to send them away hungry." So, he multiplies the loaves for them and the disciples distribute the food. In *Matthew* 25:31-46, what is it that counts most? Deeds of compassion for those who are hungry, sick, or imprisoned.

When St. Thomas discusses the virtue of mercy (*Summa Theologica*, II-II.30), he draws upon two seemingly opposed traditions. (1) Aristotle says in his *Rhetoric* that it is not in the natural way of things for us to feel pity for those who suffer because of their own wicked actions. We are much more likely to feel pity for those who suffer through no fault of their own. (2) On the other hand, *Matthew* 9:36 says that Jesus felt compassion for the crowds: "At the sight of the crowds, his heart was moved with compassion for them, for they were troubled and abandoned, like sheep without a shepherd." It is likely that the people in the crowd were troubled and vexed by their own sins. By a strict Aristotelian interpretation, the people in the crowd might not be deserving of pity. That is not how Jesus sees them, however. (Keaty 2005, 181-198) Jesus heals the sick, feeds the hungry, forgives their sins, and teaches them in the way they should go. And then his disciples are given the very same tasks: "Go. Preach, saying: The kingdom of heaven is at hand. Heal the sick, raise the dead, cleanse the lepers, cast out devils..." (*Matthew* 10:8).

St. Thomas also describes the Christian as *homo viator*, a wayfarer or pilgrim journeying through this world to the heavenly city. (Elliott 2014, 101-121) All along this journey, we are being invited to accept the gift of deeper friendship with Jesus, to be welcomed as honored guests at his feast. At the same time, we are vulnerable to the temptations of "worldliness" - an excessive attachment to wealth, status, honors, prestige, and power. These are forms of exclusion that work against the friendship with God that is described in the gospels. (Porter 1989, 197-213) The *New Testament* refers to this problem as "hardness of heart," and the gospels challenge us to transform the hardened hearts of the world, beginning with our own.

The Eclipse of Compassion in Modern Political Thought

According to Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527), however, a ruler can become more effective by breaking free from religious considerations and leaving them behind. In *The Prince,* he seeks a thoroughly empirical and secular foundation for governing the *polis*. Machiavelli's Prince will not be subject to the restraints imposed by Christian Scripture, nor will he be afraid of God's judgment. (Maddox 2002, 539-562) Rather, he will base his decisions on what he has learned from the examples set by the ruthless leaders of ancient Rome, for above all else, politics is about power. If you do not have power at this moment, how will you obtain it? Once you hold the reins of power in your hands, how will you maintain your grip? What means are you willing to use to reach those ends that you find most desirable? Rather than requiring the Prince to shape his actions according to the objective standards of virtue, the equation is reversed by Machiavelli: whatever actions happen to contribute to the Prince's political success, these are praised as virtuous. The moral standards by which his deeds might have been judged in the past have either disappeared, or they may be safely ignored.

Machiavelli's political thought is especially vexing for anyone who has a desire to show *true* compassion to others in the public realm. In Chapter 16 of *The Prince*, Machiavelli argues that genuine compassion for others would only scatter the resources of the Prince and blunt his sense of purpose, making him more vulnerable to his enemies. There is a good reason, however, for the Prince to make a show of liberality so that he will be *perceived* as generous by his subjects. He may very well find it necessary to ensure the continued cooperation of his countrymen by making promises that he will look after their needs, but it would be most prudent for him to keep those promises by paying for them with someone *else's* money rather his own. (Orwin 1978, 1217-1228) That is one reason why Machiavelli's Prince is so ready to send his military forces to invade other countries and conquer them. He very much wants to keep the flow of riches moving in the "right" direction, into his own republic.

The prospects for international expressions of friendship, compassion, and generosity are even bleaker when we consider the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (1588 –1679). Hobbes wrote *Leviathan* in the midst of The English Civil War. *Leviathan's* most basic assumption is that the best way to keep a society from ever again descending into that kind of disastrous bloodshed is by strengthening the hand of the Sovereign against all forms of dissent. Otherwise, human life is at risk of becoming little more than *bellum omnium contra omnes* - a war of all against all.

> In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. (Hobbes 2009, 66)

Since Hobbes could see how much of the conflict sprang from religious disagreement, he argued that such disagreements could be prevented by making the Sovereign head of both Church and State. (Pabel 1993, 335-349) Hobbes sets up a strictly binary distinction between the friends and the enemies of the state. A person is either "with us" or "against us." Within our borders, whatever the Sovereign says becomes Law. Outside of our borders, anarchy reigns, and if the people in another country are starving or suffering from disease, that is their own misfortune and need not concern us. Successful states are those that strike the "posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another." (Hobbes 2009, 66)

In the philosophy of John Locke (1632-1704), there are several trajectories that are especially relevant to the question of "a politics of compassion." Locke was acquainted with a number of refugees who had been forced to flee their home countries on account of religious persecution. He had considerable compassion for their plight, and this concern played a significant role in his commitment to religious toleration. That is one of the reasons why Locke urged that the scope of the government's power needs to be proscribed, limited. Governments should not be allowed to favor one religion over another, nor should they have any interest in persecuting anyone for their religious convictions. We should also note, however, that for most of Locke's followers, religious "convictions" are construed as being entirely *private*, so that the government may feel it has little reason to pay attention to the prophetic voice of a group of believers. (Perry 1992, 289-323; Calhoun 1992, 289-323) This can make it very difficult for a church to be an effective advocate for public expressions of compassion.

Another important theme emerges in Locke's *Second Treatise of Government*, where he writes that "men are naturally more desirous of accumulating more property than they need," and that this is "morally unobjectionable as long as nothing goes to waste." (Macpherson 1980, xvii-xviii) In economics, just as in religious matters, Locke is very keen on limiting the role of government. The government has no duty to perform other than to protect life, liberty, and private property. If we follow Locke down this path far enough, there will never be any space for a public discussion about altruism, nor is it likely that we will show compassion for anyone outside of our own families or our close circle of friends.

> Riches do not consist in having more gold and silver, but in having more in proportion than the rest of the world, or than our neighbours, whereby we are enabled to procure to ourselves a greater plenty of the conveniences of life, than comes within reach of neighbouring kingdoms and states, who, sharing the gold and silver of the world in a less proportion, want the means of plenty and power, and so are poorer. (Locke 1824, 13)

Locke sees nothing remarkable in our desire to have more "conveniences," even while many others in the world do not have the necessities of life. And if anyone should raise the question, "When will enough be enough?" the answer is, "Never." (Scott 2013, 487-505)

In the second chapter of the *Book of Ecclesiastes* there is a perfect portrait of Locke's acquisitive individual. Perhaps we are meant to imagine that it is King Solomon.

> I accomplished great works. I built houses for myself, and planted myself vineyards. I made for myself royal gardens and parks, and I planted in them all sorts of fruit trees. I made for myself pools of water to irrigate the forests of growing trees. I even bought male and female slaves; even some were born to me in my house. I had also great possessions of herds and flocks more than any who had been in Jerusalem before me. I also gathered for myself silver and gold and treasures of kings and provinces. I obtained singers, both men and women, and the delights of the sons of men, and many concubines…

The list of things he has been able to buy - *for himself* - is quite impressive, but he is more frustrated and lonely now than when he first began to spend his money on these projects. Nowhere in *Ecclesiastes* is there any indication that he would have been willing to share these good things with anyone else in the world. (Sacks 2014, 30-47)

Kant's Principles, Rousseau's Feelings, *Queen Margot's* Actions

We noted that in the texts of the *New Testament*, there is a special relationship between *feelings* of compassion and *actions* of compassion. For Immanuel Kant, however, the connection between moral emotions and moral action is more problematic. In *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant asks us to reconsider how…

> …we should understand those passages of Scripture which command us to love our neighbor and even our enemy, for love as an inclination cannot be commanded. But beneficence from duty, when no inclination implies it and even when it is opposed by a natural and unconquerable aversion, is practical love, not pathological love. It resides in the will and not in propensities of feeling; in particular principles of action and not in tender sympathy; and it alone can be commanded. (Kant 1959, 14-17; see also Radcliffe 1994, 50-71)

For Kant, feelings of compassion are unreliable, and it makes more sense to focus on a reasoned approach to discern our *duty* to perform acts of compassion. The rational principles that apply to helping others are more important than our inclinations or emotions. (Green 1992, 261-280)

For Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), however, compassion is better understood as a natural impulse to help others. It is rooted, he says, in the repugnance we feel when witnessing the suffering of others. In Rousseau's book, *Emile*, he outlines a "curriculum" that builds on this natural impulse. (White 2008, 35-48) Emile has been carefully shielded from the corrosive effects of society for most of his young life, but gradually he will be allowed to see suffering. The wise educator will be careful not overwhelm a young person with too many scenes of suffering. There is no need to go from hospital to hospital just to gaze on those who are in pain. (Rousseau 2009, 136)

Too much exposure might have the wrong effect, and harden a young person's heart toward the suffering of others. All that is needed is for Emile to see enough so that he begins to reflect – What if I were the one feeling what that person feels now?

In Book V, Emile and his teacher are received hospitably into the humble home of Sophie and her parents. When they are eating together, Sophie's father tells his guests how difficult life was and the great loneliness he felt before he met his wife. Emile has already heard from a neighbor that since they were married, the little family has become a great blessing to the district. Emile's heart has been prepared for just such a transformational moment. (Loder 1982) He finds himself touched by the story of this man's life, and he senses, too, that a deep bond is forming between him and Sophie. It is the kind of mutual affection that leads Emile to help others. From this point on, we find him engaged in all kinds of activity with his new neighbors. He helps the local farmers discover new methods in agriculture. When a poor man is being harassed by a rich person, he comes to the defense of the weaker one. He visits the sick and consoles a mother who has lost a child. He acts as mediator in a dispute between two friends so that they are reconciled with each other. If a neighbor's roof needs to be rethatched, he makes sure that the work is paid for. If he learns that someone has lost a cow or a horse, he provides a replacement without thinking twice. (Rousseau 2009, 275)

Rousseau's description of Emile's compassion for others is so vivid that we have to remind ourselves that he is only a fictional character. His resources – the money and the time he devotes to others - appear to be unlimited. The neighbors he encounters eagerly listen to his words and readily follow his advice. His efforts to help them always come to fruition and his own emotions are always calm and reasonable. Any political figure who deals with real people as they sometimes are - demanding, angry, frustrated, stubborn, suspicious, desperate - would no doubt be tempted to trade his or her own constituency for the good people of Emile's district. (Ost 2004, 229-244) Yet, in spite of all the naiveté, the many flaws, and the inadequacies we can find in Rousseau's account, there is something that is intuitively right about the goal he sets for Emile's development: an education in compassion. (Marks 2007, 727-739) What point would there be in an education that encouraged young people to think only of themselves and never consider the needs of others? (Rashedi, Plante, and Callister 2015, 131-139)

We can catch another glimpse of what an education in compassion might look like by following the transformation of Marguerite of Valois in the film *La Reine Margot*.[1] The historical setting for this film is The St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre, which took place over several days in Paris, in August 1572. Tension between Catholics and Protestant had been mounting for roughly forty years, and already there had been several wars between the two sides. Catherine de Medici hoped to improve the prospects for peace by arranging for her daughter Margarot to marry Henry, the Protestant Prince of Navarre. Many Protestant leaders had come to Paris in anticipation of the wedding, which they regarded with cautious optimism. Most of the Catholics in Paris, however, regarded it as an alliance that jeopardized both the peace of their earthly city and their spiritual safety. Catholic kings had always taken an oath to protect France and the Catholic faith, and Catherine's bid at a compromise threatened to undo the fabric of society as they knew it.

As for the character of Margot, before the wedding, she is portrayed as a shallow person, interested mainly in fashionable clothes, drunken parties, and meaningless sexual encounters. Her only thought is to continue with that kind of life, answering to no one but herself. As the wedding draws near, she realizes that she cannot escape the plans her family has made for her, but she makes it clear that she has no love for Henry, nor does she have any intention of having a family life with him.

After the ceremony, however, word spreads through the city that Admiral Coligny and other prominent leaders of the Protestants have been assassinated. A wave of violence sweeps through the streets of Paris. Armed and violent men are pursuing Henry, and somehow he finds himself at the door of Margot's bedchamber. Margot realizes that she must make an immediate decision. Will she take this opportunity to rid herself of Henry, or will she try to save him? If she does not open her door to him, she will join the ranks of the killers. With no time to spare, she decides to admit Henry into her rooms, and she hides him there, protecting him from those who seek his life. In that very moment, her character is transformed. (Humbert 2002, 223-235) When the sun rises the next day, she goes out into the streets, looking for survivors of the massacre. When she finds them, she tends to their wounds and speaks kindly to them. Though she may be surrounded by violence and hate, she chooses the way of compassion. There is a very clear difference, we might even say an "instructive difference," between the way of violence and the path that Margot chooses.

Compassion for Refugees and Migrants: A Paradigmatic Example

In 1952, when Europe was still trying to decide what to do with millions of refugees in the aftermath of World War II, Pius XII drew special attention to the Church's duty to help them in *Exsul Familia Nazarethana*: (Guerra 2015, 403-427)

> The émigré Holy Family of Nazareth, fleeing into Egypt, is the archetype of every refugee family. Jesus, Mary and Joseph, living in exile in Egypt to escape the fury of an evil king, are, for all times and all places, the models and protectors of every migrant, alien and refugee of whatever kind who, whether compelled by fear of persecution or by want, is forced to leave his native land, his beloved parents and relatives, his close friends, and to seek a foreign soil.

"The Flight into Egypt" is a rich tradition in the visual arts. Jacopo Bassano painted several versions of The Holy Family fleeing from the violence of Herod and his soldiers. (Brown 2011, 193-219) Giovanni Domenico Tiepolo created twenty-four variations on this theme. Taken together they have the quality of a documentary showing the difficult path of refugees across time and space. (Ives 1971, 195-203)

But as Sebastião Salgado says of his humanitarian photographs, “If the person looking at my pictures only feels compassion, I will believe that I have failed completely. I want people to understand that we can have a solution.” (Salgado 2001)

It is not uncommon for lawmakers to pass measures that would make it more difficult to help refugees and migrant workers. (Fonseca 2009, 291-316) In 2004, John Paul II asked the Catholic Church to renew its commitment to this ministry, and emphasized the urgency of working for “family unification, education of children, housing, work, associations, promotion of civil rights and migrants’ various ways of participation in their host society.” (*Erga Migrantes Caritas Christi,* No. 43) John Paul II also emphasized the importance of compassion and solidarity. When the Nazis occupied Poland in World War II, he witnessed their politics of hatred, exclusion, and mass murder. After that war ended, the Soviets seized power in Poland, and he experienced firsthand the oppressive regimes of the left and their use of violence and fear. Having lived under both forms of totalitarianism, John Paul II consistently worked for a very different kind of society, which he described as a “civilization of love” and a “culture of life.” “Man's need for truth and love,” says John Paul, “opens him both to God and to creatures...to other people, to life 'in communion' and in particular to marriage and the family.” (*Letter to Families*, No. 8)

John Paul II felt keenly that “the civilization of love” needed to be defended in the public square. In *Sollicitudo Socialis*, he said:

> Solidarity is not a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the misfortunes of so many people, both near and far. On the contrary, it is a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good; that is to say to the good of all and of each individual, because we are all really responsible for all. This determination is based on the solid conviction that what is hindering full development is that desire for profit and that thirst for power... These attitudes and "structures of sin" are only conquered - presupposing the help of divine grace - by a diametrically opposed attitude: a commitment to the good of one's neighbor with the readiness, in the gospel sense, to "lose oneself" for the sake of the other instead of exploiting him, and to "serve him" instead of oppressing him for one's own advantage. (*Sollicitudo Socialis*, No. 38)

For his part, Pope Francis has continued to teach Christians about the need to connect feelings of compassion and deeds of effective solidarity. Pope Francis visited the Castelnuovo di Porto refugee center near Rome on March 24, 2016, on Maundy Thursday. Remembering how Jesus had washed the feet of his disciples, Pope Francis washed and kissed the feet of Muslim, Christian and Hindu refugees. (Carr-Lemke and Glatzer 2018, 267-284)

If we want to inquire further about “where” this kind of compassion can be shown, we might follow a model that works of three levels, the micro-level, the meso-level, and the macro- level. (1) At the micro-level is where I ask myself: In my face-to-face encounters with people, am I prepared to show compassion to those who need it? To my family, friends, and neighbors, and those who are alone? Have I made a commitment to feeding the hungry and sheltering the homeless? (2)

At the meso-level, the level of advocacy, do I support and speak out for mediating institutions that contribute to the common good, and not only to the good of those who look like me? Who speaks my language? Who lives in my part of the city? (3) At the macro level, am I seeking a politics in which the poor are no longer recipients of someone else's benevolence, but equal participants in the quest for justice and mutual respect? (Jaspal, Carriere and Moghaddam 2016, 265-276)

It may be that "too many words" about compassion turn it into something morally bland. "Enough talk already!" And yet, we all know the sting that lingers with us when we have been treated *without* compassion by a medical professional, by a teacher, or by a religious leader. Just as common are those experiences – we have not yet forgotten them all! – in which we ourselves failed to respond generously to a person in need, even though it was in our power to do so. Psalm 95 encourages us and says that we do not have to be overcome by these failures: "If today you hear His Voice, harden not your hearts."

Endnotes

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Listen, Remember, Be

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Abstract:

Among the dilemmas of education, there is also searching for frames of reference – to the sources of values, transfer of heritage, formation of identity. This article constitutes an attempt of reaching for seemingly out-of-date but still present texts, the works which created essential foundations for the contemporary culture. The author, by referring to the selected excerpts from the Old and New Testaments, attempts to show the extent of their topicality and "usefulness" in searching for answers of the contemporary education.

Keywords: Identity, Tradition, Social heritage, Memory, Education.

Shema Yisrael ... Listen, Israel ...

These words come from the beginning of a special kind of prayer in the Jewish tradition, a prayer regarded as the most important one. More than that. Some interpreters (Krajewski 2004, 217) point out that this is a characteristically canonical text in the Torah. Characteristically, as is often emphasized, from the point of view of this tradition it is difficult to identify a particular, canonical fragment. The whole of the Torah is, in reality, such a text. *Listen, Israel* - recited at least twice a day, as part of the morning and evening prayers. It is also recited just before going to bed. It is written in the *Book of Deuteronomy*: "May these words that I command you remain in your heart. You will teach them to your children; they will talk about them at home, on a journey, going to sleep and rising from sleep ..." (*Deut*. 6: 6–7). The order of recitation is not accidental. In the tradition of the Torah, the day begins at dusk and lasts through the night, the morning, until the following dusk.

Referring to Abraham J. Heschel, Stanislaw Krajewski emphasizes the special property of the tradition of the Jewish faith. Specifically, "the Jewish faith is to a large extent a memory. A memory of revelation". (Krajewski 2004, 224) In fact, in this record, one can find a clear directive to remember, but also to communicate. Put differently, there is a directive to preserve and transmit one's heritage but also an awareness of the essence of this heritage. Remember at home, remember while traveling, remember before going to sleep, remember when, after waking up, when you tend to your duties. Keep them inside, in your heart, in your memory. Memory which, to echo Heschel, is "the soul's witness against the variability of the mind" (Heschel 2001, 136), hence the important message of cultivating memory and heritage. Then, there is the special instruction: you will instill this in your children - instruction, summons, command, appearing time and again on the pages of the Torah––to pass something to your children, your successors. Let us recall Abraham's dramatic cry: "what good is this reward if I have no one to whom to bequeath it?" (*Genesis,* 15:2)

Among the pages of a book written thousands of years ago, we find an obvious message of the idea of a universal education, from early childhood, until late adulthood. In the stories of Abraham, Isaac, and David we find many such appeals. In Moses's farewell address, too. That, which today has taken on the form of the various conceptions of a lifelong education, continuing education, "lifelong learning", the idea of children's and adults' universal education. (Krajewski 2004, 224) However, I want to go back to what opened this reflection. The words that begin this prayer, *Listen, Israel*, and the following verses: "The Lord is our God; the Lord only (Shema Yisrael, Adonai Elohim, Adonai Echad)". (*Deut*. 6: 4)

There is a story associated with this prayer.[1] During the Second World War, many Jews all over Europe, wanting to save their children from a certain death at the hands of the Nazis, gave them up into the hands of foreigners. It was an obvious parental "instinct." Although, in part and characteristically, a will of the nation's survival…What good is this reward if I have no one to whom to bequeath it? (*Genesis* 15:2)

The testimonies of these events remain in the memories of many. Their natural expression can be found, for example, in the collections of Yad Vashem. Many among the Jewish children, often very young ones, were sent to monastic orphanages, run primarily by Catholic orders. This included children saved by the lay people, who gave them up to avoid danger, or for other reasons. Orphans too found refuge there.

After the war, some Jewish organizations made efforts to find Jewish children in orphanages. One of the organizers of these activities was Rabbi Josef Kahaneman (Yosef Shlomo Kahaneman Zatsl). As the story goes, also commemorated in Yaakov Shwekey's moving song, the task of finding Jewish children was not an easy one. Their entire childhood disappeared in a period of dread; often, in order to save them, their caregivers baptized them and instilled in them the foundations of Christianity. All this so their true origins would not be revealed. The children did not know their own language; oftentimes, they did not even have their real names. Instead of Schmul or Izchak, one found Janek or Roman. Even the real surnames provided no proof: Miller sounds German, Machowicz Russian, Świerski Polish. There were no documents because they were destroyed for the good of the children. How to recognize them? According to this peculiar legend, Josef Kahaneman and his associates asked the orphanage directors to observe the children as they were going to sleep.

In the evening, they entered the large rooms filled with rows of beds, on which laid the children on the verge of slumber, many of whom have resided in the orphanage since the beginning of the war. They walked slowly through the room, reciting the words *Shema Yisrael, Adonai Elohim, Adonai Echad*. And then, many of the children began to recall, through the tears and in their "native" languages (Polish, English, Russian), their mothers and fathers.

Saving the Jewish children from death, the nuns, and even earlier their adopted Christian parents, imparted to them the knowledge of the Holy Trinity, of the Gospels. But in no way did the words of a prayer that their real Jewish mothers whispered to them before bed escape these children's memories, hidden somewhere, perhaps even in the subconscious, words remembered since childhood ... In the language of their national and religious tradition. The sad fact is that this beautiful story contained among certain (fortunately few) Jewish groups[2] a note of sarcasm, even accusations against the Christian clergy, accusations of conversion or indoctrination. Yet, no one doubts that this Christian upbringing of the Jewish orphans was necessary to save them during the war.

This, however, leads me to a certain reflection. The social group, the human group, can survive only with biological and cultural continuity. Of course, in the former case, continuity is assured through processes of procreation. But one cannot fail to notice that saving the children was not just a parental instinct. It was also group behavior. On the other hand, cultural continuity can be maintained, among other things, thanks to upbringing. Its constituent element was also the transmission of tradition, complete with a command. Also, through the evening prayer. A prayer that, after all, regardless of place or country of origin, was passed down in the language of tradition, in Hebrew. Language, therefore, plays an important role in preserving and transmitting heritage, but also in the context of foreign cultural influences. Learn foreign languages, otherwise, you'll be nothing. These words are spoken to children even today. Do they not mean sometimes: why do I need a native tongue if its knowledge does not let me be somebody? The canon of school readings stripped of the classics of national, Polish literature.

I am aware of the risk of juxtaposing the Holocaust of the Second World War with the peculiar storm, tsunami even, of popular culture, of various concepts, worldviews, or ideologies; postmodernism, gender, political correctness, and similar mirages and fantasies, including the influence of foreign cultures and traditions. The contemporary world of the white man who lives in increasing fear of Islamization. However, it is hard for me to resist the impression that these processes have a certain common denominator. Destruction, interruption of cultural continuity. When tradition is not rooted deeply enough ...

I can bring myself to understand the adults, parents who often for good reason, but sometimes under the pretext of fashion or career prospects, consciously open themselves or lease their children out to civilization. However, is it not worth asking a question when, after some time, the storm passes: what words will be used by the grownups to restore to future generations their own traditions? In the pursuit of building a future career, drawing on the discoveries of modern science that a child can and should learn and develop intellectual properties even in the fetal period. Yes, it is true. It is possible to cite many research results on this subject, to reach for concepts that are often still unproven, neuro-cognitive. For this purpose, we can even harness modern genetics and strive toward realizing the fantasy of cloning. But...Which words are taken from the evening ritual, which words that are remembered from tradition will awaken the memory of future generations?

This is not a question specific to the evening prayer. This question concerns the memory of tradition, the memory of one's roots. Which words from our hearts, from our souls, will we bestow on our daughters, our sons? Which words will they talk about at home, on a trip, going to sleep and waking up? Even when I am the least religious? Perhaps then the memory of the beginning, the memory of a past time, is crucial. Isn't this the reason why the special call is repeated in such a special way: "Remember"? Especially things and events that "should be remembered."

"So that all the days of your life you may remember the time of your departure from Egypt." (Deut., 16: 3) This verse refers to a difficult experience, but above all, it underscores an extremely important moment, an important breakthrough. Yes, you were a slave, you were in a difficult position, you were entangled in a series of difficult and painful moments. But here you can - you should - believe that it is possible that in one day you will escape from slavery, a time when this experience will become merely a thing of the past. Merely? No, because in your memory you ought to keep the facts of your release, the fact of leaving. This fact happened a long time ago, yet it endures, its consequences existing in the present. (Krajewski 2004, 259)

An exodus is, after all, a kind of archetype of regaining, or rather obtaining, freedom, despite an enormous resistance by earthly powers. Egypt was undoubtedly a world power, a mighty supremacy. How many trials, marked by the plagues, did Moses undertake to convince, to persuade the pharaoh? Terrible and severe trials, yet ultimately ineffective, such was the pharaoh's power, so great was the addiction embedded in captivity. Thus, the memory of leaving is the memory of regaining freedom. At the same time, in our modern pronouncement, this exodus from Egypt can also signify the possibility of coming to terms with limitations, blockages, including psychological ones, limiting our view of the world, restricting our perception. "Remember the day of the exodus" is also a call to free oneself from these restrictions. Contained in it might also be this call: Yes, it is possible. You were a slave, and yet you regained your freedom.

However, do not try to soothe your "conscience." It is easy, all too easy for the eyes of imagination to enclose in the word "slave" a muddied, oppressed figure, in order not to see the other side. We often find on these pages mentions of Israelites who, while in Egypt, were living in the lap of luxury and enjoying many honors but forgetting about their roots and traditions. You regained your freedom - thus, you also escaped from the glitz, the supposed stability, the abundance that has pushed you away from your values, from your roots. You were a slave, yet you regained your freedom. This is also a reference to the future, because, although it has not been said explicitly, it was, after all, not just a way out of Egypt. It was a way "out," but also a way "toward."

The memory of the beginning, the memory of the past - the treasury of tradition. Where am I in relation to it? Is there a place for rarities - treasures of intimacy, the greatest and most lasting foundation of my identity, my most deeply protected experiences? So profoundly strong, so deeply experienced. "Only be careful, and watch yourself closely so that you do not forget the things your eyes have seen or let them fade from your heart as long as you live. Teach them to your children and to your children's children." (*Deut*. 4: 9)

In our lives, in the life of each one of us, of great importance is not only memory but also the ability to forget - sometimes naturally, other times intentionally. It is understandable that if something ceases to matter to us, if something is "unnecessary" or unobtainable, it becomes forgotten. Yet, sometimes we forget on purpose, in a way described by Heidegger as an escape of a being prior to its proper existence. (Heidegger 1994, 371) We suppress, we eject from our memory something that is - or sometimes seems to be - uncomfortable to us, something that torments and worries us. Sometimes forgetfulness seems to be an enormous grace, a gift through which we can - or so it seems to us - regain our strength to be able to be, to continue to be. At other times, however, this intentional forgetting may lead to a degradation, a distortion of ourselves. Intentional forgetting: the desire to erase from our life certain events that we define or perceive - whether rightly or not - as inconvenient. Our memory becomes unreliable then. We can whitewash certain events in sentimental memory. Then those memories that have imprisoned us in patterns of behavior take on a sense of stability. As it sometimes happens, wrongly so.

Has not our age become an epoch of degraded memory? (Petrykowski 2003, 136) Are we not long overdue, therefore, to restore the meaning and proper importance of many crucial concepts: love, responsibility, honesty? We have devalued these, as well as many others, manipulating their meaning at will. One more thing: do these imperatives to remember not turn our attention to what, after all, is no longer revelatory? It is high time to reflect on the pedagogy of taming the experience of the past - of tradition - through the present, for the sake of the future.

It is becoming increasingly clear that there is a regression, almost complete elimination, of the influence of past experience on the entire balance of experience that is evident in contemporary generations. The past plays a less and less important role in shaping the image of the present, the form of life, and thus its participation in creating the image of a future world is smaller, almost negligible.

Do we not also, in bringing up our youth, face a new pedagogy of constructing new principles for a current, "correct" life, bypassing references to tradition as a source, as essential material? Does this not lead to the dominance of the principle of "living in the moment," of eliminating the need for perspective? Where targeted, forward-looking activities are reduced in favor of reactionary ones? Perhaps it is nevertheless worth it to take a moment to reflect on the rapid progress of civilization.

Memory and the command to remember, the word "Remember," is one of the most common invocations in Jewish religion. (Krajewski 2004, 244) And it is precisely from this tradition that Jesus of Nazareth emerged. "Remember" - recorded in the famous verses of the *Book of Deuteronomy* and the *Book of Exodus*. It is not in reference to one's own experience that this command is uttered, but to a shared memory meant to constitute a particular foundation that underlies the formation of the community. In this sense, the tradition of remembering concerns not only one's roots in the past, but certain community obligations in the present, which are a unique and vital bedrock for the future.

How often does one find in the *Torah* or in the *Old Testament* references to Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, David, or Solomon? This is a special kind of symbolism of tradition, which is simultaneously an ongoing living source. Yet, we also find these appeals in the *New Testament*. If I were to confine myself to the *Torah*, I would consider it legitimate to say that this beginning is the essence of Jewish identity. But it was this text that gave rise to Jesus of Nazareth. The tradition which created the foundations of contemporary white man's culture is rooted in the Christian tradition, which itself grows out of the Judaic tradition.

In the Jewish tradition, memory is not an end unto itself. It is a particular means of shaping the present. As A. J. Heschel writes, "the wealth of the soul is contained in its memory ...When we wish to understand ourselves, to discover what is most precious in our lives, we examine our memory. Memory is the soul's witness to the variability of the mind." (Heschel 2001, 136) Memory in tradition has one more dimension - the dimension of the future. In Jewish liturgy, (Krajewski 2004, 248) the sense of personal experience, so clearly defined during the Seder, is not just empty rhetoric. In their time, each participant ought to feel as if they were just about to leave Egypt. And yet, captivity is not a modern condition. Here, after all, the issue does not concern certain ritual reproductions, but the feeling of identifying with the beginning. This particular spiritual reality is important in the context of the future. As found in one of the Midrashim, when Israel was about to receive the *Torah*, God demanded a guarantee that it would be respected. Mere promises and references to ancestors did not help. God only agreed when, instead of Abraham, Isaac, or Jacob, the Israelites offered their own children as guarantors. "Our children shall be the guarantors. Future generations." (Krajewski 2004, 248) And one more context: during the Passover, Jews above all should remember not only the escape from Egypt, but the goal - the Promised Land. It happened in the past, but it has a dimension of the future, because it is associated with a long journey to a destination that was promised, but difficult to reach.

How eloquent was Stefan Czarnowski when he wrote that "the present does not surrender its rights in the most traditionalist group. We are constantly changing our attitudes toward antiquity, still working on its transformation, on its becoming present. For antiquity endures solely as the present, while the present is a transformed, an updated antiquity and a nascent future." (Czarnowski 1948, 197)

Contemporary humanity seems to live simultaneously in a number of different times. On the one hand, thanks to memory we exist in the past; in the present, we experience the actuality of events taking place, thanks to an unceasing modification of "collective" memory. Finally, we live in the future, thanks to an ongoing perspective filled with visions and projections.

Time: omnipresent and integrally associated with place and space, with the whole of human life, both in the dimensions of the individual and of the species. Societies and their cultures, as well as individuals, differ not only in their conception of space, but also of time. This temporal caesura

- past, present, and future. The past and the present are known to us; the future might cause anxiety and remains unrecognizable. Time cannot be undone - this time machine, allowing one to go back in time or to discover the unknown, is a reflection of our longing for the passage of time, for the past, as well as our fear of the future. Meanwhile, the present "is the reality that we experience, the point of our existence, with its own appropriate mixture of joy and sadness. The future, on the contrary, is a vision." (Tuan 1987, 246) Isn't it justified, this anxiety caused by a noticeable abatement in the present of the past - of tradition - in the shaping of the present and the future?

Hence, should we not direct our thoughts especially toward the question of how we convey the past (tradition) to future generations? Is that not the result of this domination of faith in the power of knowledge and intellectual effort? It happened in the past, but it has a dimension of the future, because it is associated with the long journey toward a promised, yet hard to reach, destination.

We can find so many interesting interpretations of the parable of Jesus and the Samaritan woman. (Jn. 4: 5–42) I do not want to explain or clarify anything. I merely want to write about what is important to me in this story; or, better, what I find so. For I read it as an important message for the part of the "world" that we might call intercultural education, as well as a profound message for shaping the attitudes of tolerance and love. Jesus of Nazareth was a Jew; this is beyond doubt. He was a Jew no matter who his father was, because his mother was a Jew, and that alone is enough to say that the necessary and sufficient condition was satisfied.

For a variety of reasons, we can determine that, in that part of the world, he belonged to a certain tradition and culture, which, using our contemporary terms, we would call a dominant one. Jews in a distinctive manner "despised" the Samaritans, considered them apostates, although ... Exactly: the Samaritans worshiped the same God, God of Israel, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, Jesus. They were, however, a religious - and, in a certain sense, ethnic - minority.

And here is a Jew - no matter that he is a special Jew - who shows no hesitation in conveying to a "stranger" - the Samaritan woman - what he considers to be good, important, valuable. He does not just ask her for water, but communicates to her - and, through her, to her people - the Word. Everyone is therefore worthy of "receiving" the word. He does not disrespect her, he does not treat her with an air of superiority, but gives her something that he thinks is valuable. He asks her for water, letting her know that he does not fear her, does not worry about deception, albeit she is of an alien, "hostile" tribe. He shows her trust. "You, too, can help me quench my thirst."

If we were to look through "others' eyes," how many of us - self-satisfied with our "racial," religious, traditional, cultural superiority - would ask a stranger for water? How many of us would share a part of ourselves? With others? With strangers?

I will remain for a moment with one dimension of our perception of Jesus of Nazareth. He was a teacher, a Jew. Let us call him - as did the Samaritan woman - a prophet, a man. He wanted to share his "knowledge," which, according to tradition, was "given" to him by the God of Israel, with a complete stranger. And he did not hesitate, despite knowing that he was in a foreign, inhospitable land inhabited by the Samaritans.

I wrote elsewhere about the parable of Jonah, who fled his God-entrusted mission among the Ninevites. (Petrykowski 2009, 195-200) Indeed, Jonah went to great lengths not to meet the inhabitants of Nineveh. He was scared for his life, although he was filled with "knowledge" given to him by God. Not only out of fear was he anxious to reveal it.

Do we not find, in Jesus's encounter at Sychar, a message that everyone is worthy of sharing what we find valuable? In the case of this encounter, I find something deeper still. Here, the Samaritan woman, upon meeting a Jew, does not hesitate to draw his attention to two important matters. First, she tells him: it is you, the Jews, who despise us. Not the other way around. Moreover, she very clearly emphasizes their related provenance: "our father Jacob, who gave us this well and drank from it himself, as did his sons" (*Jn*. 4: 12) Jacob, the brother of Esau, son of Isaac, grandson of Abraham, Jesus's ancestor.

In the case of Jesus, this takes on a special significance: do we not read on the first pages of the *Gospel of Matthew* that Jesus's lineage is also derived from Jacob, his father Isaac, and grandfather Abraham? Of course! We are the descendants of the same Abraham. And we worship the same God, although you Jews claim that he ought to be worshipped on the hill in Jerusalem, whereas we worship him on Mount Gerazi. This is what the Samaritan woman tells him.

Perhaps it would be useful to describe this thread in more details, for there was a time when the Samaritans went to the temple in Jerusalem. So it was until the time of Babylonian captivity, more specifically, the return from it. Not having a sufficient historical background, I will not describe it more closely; you can find it, for example, in Josef Flavius. (Flawiusz 2001) One thing is certain: the same forefather Abraham and the same God.

Do you remember Ishmael and Isaac, both from the same father and worshipping the same God? In a sense, what connects Ishmael with Isaac also connects the Samaritan woman with Jesus. What makes her, a Samaritan, worse than Jesus? Nothing more than a different religion and culture?

And finally, perhaps the most dramatic and the most intimate context. The Samaritan woman is specifically excluded – "this happened around the sixth hour of the day", hence at a time when no one else was at the well. At this hour, only someone who either does not want to or cannot come with others would then fetch the water. It is not difficult to deduce that since she is from the same tribe, the woman is excluded for non-ethnic reasons. Custom. Yes, of course, we learn that she had several husbands or partners. The current one is not even her husband, hence, according to custom or law, she is not in a socially acceptable relationship. She is not a leper or a cripple. Yet, she is unwelcome. And we also learn that Jesus of Nazareth knows this. Certainly, theologians have long found justification for this, indicating that Jesus is a divine being and hence knows everything. The Samaritan woman sees in this a sign that Jesus is a prophet.

Atheists will likely sneer. If we accept that Jesus of Nazareth was only a Teacher and only a human, then how could he have known that she was an excluded woman? Of course, based on the time, at which she was the only one who came to the well for water. Thus, Jesus knows the customs of another tribe, of another tradition.

More: he tells her that she has had several husbands. No, not men, but husbands. She was thus previously in unions that the law regarded as marriages. She was not, as some interpreters would have it, a "dissolute" woman. In many cultures, particularly among the Jews, but also in many other traditions (sometimes even today), upon getting married women changed the way they dressed, how they covered their heads, their hairstyles, perhaps even wore special signs (a wedding ring? an armlet?). If Jesus, as the non-Christians want, was not a prophet, if he was not a God, then he showed an extraordinary gift of recognizing cultural codes, specific signs that would have allowed him to say: you have been married several times. Jesus does not condemn this woman for having been married many times. He simply states the fact: I understand the codes of your culture and the signs of your tradition. I do not judge you. But I can be and am open to your particular situation.

We hear the same, after all, when he states that the woman's current partner is "not your husband". (*Jn*. 4: 18) Maybe this is why you come at this hour? Maybe your water jug is a vessel that is used by two people, and it contains the signs of another relationship? We do not know how he knew. We do know, however, that he can "read" the signs of another culture, of a different tradition, a different custom.

And while talking to the Samaritan woman, he makes it clear: I know who you are, I know what these signs mean, the things that you have with you. We could multiply the examples and presumptions, such as Jesus's psychological abilities. There is, however, a more important matter. You are from a different culture, I am on your land, by a well linked to your tradition, I understand the sings that you reveal to me. And yet, I want to talk to you, I have something invaluable to tell you. Everyone is worthy of it. Do we not, in some sense, find here a trace of Moses? Moses, serving the pharaoh. Moses, the criminal. Moses, verbally handicapped.

This special, in my opinion, attitude of openness, tolerance, and readiness to learn about a foreign culture. Jesus does not say: you are wrongdoers, you are unfaithful, strangers, worse even. He says instead: I want to tell you something, no matter who you are. And I do it willingly; I will come into your house, I will spend time with you. Because, although you are different, you are not worse, less worthy. Yes, this is the message that I find in this story.

There is still another side to this story. In the majority of interpretations, I read that Jesus came to Samaria, in the vicinity of Sychar. Then the Samaritan woman arrived at the well and ... But what if we read this story completely differently? Here is a woman - although in this scenario I would prefer to avoid any particular gender determination because in our colloquial, stereotypical thinking this creates a risk of simplification. I would rather this be simply a person. Here is a person in constant search for love. One relationship, another, a third... none of the marriages lasted. Perhaps it is not necessarily about relationships, marriage... Perhaps this includes friends, colleagues, maybe even a job that we frequently have to change.

I honestly do not know why this woman had several husbands. I read simplified interpretations that she was unable to truly love, that her relationships were limited to corporeality. Yet, perhaps it was not she, but her partners, husbands, who were shallow, Peter Pans, from one flower to another. And what if it was they who abandoned, wounded, this woman yearning for love? Not taking into account the fact that she will be rejected, socially excluded?

Maybe it was not he or she who abandoned the job as if they did not want to work at all. Maybe it was the employers who were dishonest, who did not fairly reward hard work? Maybe... so many reasons for and possibilities of being wounded ...

Maybe it was from being exhausted by these aches and bruises that she decided to stay with another man, another person, informally. Perhaps all she had left was a "junk" deal, a job without a formal agreement, which would at least provide her with some peace, some modest sense of security. Only to avoid being lonely? Being homeless? Unemployed?

Having accepted her fate, she fulfills her burdensome duties: she goes alone to fetch water from the well, "at the sixth hour of the day", unlike any "decent" person. And she meets a man, Jesus, whom she did not know, who not only does not ridicule her but asks for a drink. Asks her for anything at all.

Note that she immediately recognizes that he is not a member of her tribe. Based on his outfit? His manner of speaking? How could she have known that a Jew would stop in the despised Samaria? Somehow, she knew: "you are a Jew". And even though she knows that this man is a stranger, an enemy, she talks to him. She accepts him in her land. In her home. She is open and honest, perhaps hungry for love - she feels that he does not just want the water, does not want her body. He wants to give her something. Hope? Faith? And she feels it.

"Living water" - in the local tradition this concept meant spring water, water most desired in those conditions. It was also a symbol of life, a new life given by God. A life filled with love. The living water that is in me: I give you love. Does not love manifest itself, above all, in giving? And here this stranger gives me, a condemned and wounded Samaritan woman, love, living water.

And I too deserve love. And despite my circumstances, I have a chance for love, for... Is there not something of this Samaritan woman in all of us? At all times, at a place like this well: not a temple, after all, although an important place nonetheless. A permanent meeting point. A place of Hope? A place that lets you quench your Thirst? There are "things" that cannot be found anywhere in the world, but there are also places where you can find such "things."

Is this not also a certain expression of hope? No matter when you arrive, no matter who you are, no matter how badly you are wounded: there is a well where you can meet another person, a person who does not hesitate, who wants to give you love. Give you a new quality of life. "Living water."

There is a well in Samaria, not on the holy hill in Jerusalem... There is every place, everywhere, hostile and friendly, far and near ... There are "things" that cannot be found anywhere in the world, but there are also places where you can find such "things."

It was no accident that this woman was there; she was there every day. It was Jesus who found her by accident. Was it a coincidence? Do you remember how Joseph was searching for his brothers in Shechem? And by chance, he happened to meet a man who heard where his brothers went? Was that a coincidence? And if Joseph did not meet this man, what fate would have befallen Israel? The Samaritan woman met Jesus by chance. Was it really by chance? In an unremarkable place. And she learned: I give you love. Was Jesus the Messenger? There is a well near Sychar… Am I the Samaritan woman? Are you the Messenger? Or maybe you? Are you the Samaritan woman? And I… am I the Messenger?

Endnotes

1. See http://frumlife.blogspot.com/2010/12/shema-yisroela-legend-and-song.html; also http://betweenjerusalemandtelaviv.blogspot.com/2011/05/song-for-yom-hashoah.html
2. Cf. http://frumlife.blogspot.com/2010/12/shema-yisroela-legend-and-song.html

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"Weak Thought" in the Face of Religious Violence: Perplexing Dimensions of Modernity and Globalization

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Abstract:

Modern comprehension of religion and violence, particularly modern attitudes toward religious violence, is the main topic of this paper. Mainstream secularization theory states that religion triggers conflict, tension, oppression, violence, and even war. As a continuation of this theory, the "myth of religious violence" assumes that religion is intrinsically connected with terror. These two narratives provide no sufficient proof for their claim about the irrelevance of religion; nonetheless, these narratives are expressions of the human agent's struggle in his/her search for meaning. Referring to Gianni Vattimo's idea of weak thought (*pensiero debole*), this writing proposes a narrative that treats religious and spiritual dimensions of human identity as essential for human life, as a source of remarkable consolation and hope in enduring the terror of violence, and as an opening to the new transcendental dimension of the ultimate meaning of human life.

Keywords: Weak thought, Religious violence, Modern identity, Secularization theory.

Introduction

The place of religion in a democratic society and the inevitable presence of violence are probably the two most puzzling issues of any liberal and secularized Western society. The way we relate to religion and violence shapes not only our society but also the process of making our own identity. Charles Taylor describes the process of making our identity as a dynamic and ongoing search for a meaningful life, in which the understanding of our own agency is "closely connected to our understanding of our moral and spiritual predicament, and of our moral existence" (Taylor 1994, 185). By definition, this search explores religious and spiritual dimensions of human existence which present areas wherein the human agent, as a spiritual being, confronts the darkest elements of his/her existence, including suffering, violence, and death.

Our comprehension of religion and violence in general, and in particular our attitude toward religious violence, is the main argument of this writing. The key question is where we place religious violence in our construction of modern identity. Our argument opposes the narrative that violence has spiritual roots and that it exists as something ontologically bound to human existence. We will start with the mainstream secularization theory that has been inclined toward neglect and dismissal of religion from the public sphere because religion triggers conflict, tension, oppression, violence, and even war (chapter one). A continuation of this theory presents the "myth of religious violence", based on the assumption that religion is intrinsically connected with terror (chapter two). Despite their apparent persuasiveness, these two narratives provide no sufficient proof for their claim about the irrelevance of religion and leave us with an ambiguous comprehension of violence; nonetheless, they are expressions of the human agent's struggle in his/her search for meaning (chapter three). By analyzing the limits and insights of Gianni Vattimo's idea of *weak thought* (*pensiero debole*), I argue for a narrative that challenges the human agent living in modernity to treat religious and spiritual dimensions as something essential to his/her human life, and not as something existing at his/her arbitrary disposal. Modernity needs to rediscover spirituality as a source of remarkable consolation and hope, empowering us to endure the terror of violence, and opening us to a new and transcendental comprehension of the ultimate meaning of our lives.

Neglect and Dismissal of Religion from the Public Sphere in the Mainstream Secularization Narrative

Recalling some unpleasant events from history, the advocates of the mainstream secularization theory argue that religious issues trigger conflict, tension, oppression, and even war.[1] The founders of the modern social sciences, from Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill, and Auguste Comte, to Émile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Sigmund Freud, predicted the institutional differentiation of the religious and secular spheres, as well as the privatization of religion, followed by its marginalization and decline. Additionally, modern science would soon provide satisfactory answers to unknown questions, and democracy would discover adequate grounds for a peaceful life. For this reason, religion should be kept apart from the public sphere, or even done away with entirely. The peak of this assumption presents the conviction that "God is dead," a slogan repeated many times in modernity referencing Nietzsche. In short, religion should be replaced with exclusive humanism, which places the human agent at the center of the whole universe, able to reorganize all of reality in a better way without reference to any religious or spiritual dimension.

In opposition to such a conclusion, Charles Taylor in his book, *A Secular Age,* critically analyzes and develops mainstream secularization theory, claiming that secularization, which is deeply rooted in modern Western societies, can be understood only through a historical perspective of the pre-modern period. Many changes have taken place in the last 500 years in the areas of art, literature, human and natural sciences, politics, and society. There is a degree of agreement that there has been some decline of religious belief and practices: religion has gradually withdrawn from the public sphere; modernity with its modern technology makes it difficult for us to believe or relate to any kind of magical and enchanted world; urbanization, industrialization, and the development of class society has had a negative effect on previously existing religious forms. All these features present sufficient evidence for mainstream secularization theorists that religious belief and practices are disappearing in modernity.

In Taylor's reflection, these theories appear plausible only to people with a certain view of religion and the meaning of secularization (Taylor 2007, 434). The theories presuppose that religious belief and action can only function for a distinct goal or purpose, such as bearing the misery, suffering, and despair of the human condition. Once we control our human condition, society, and nature, religion should lose its functional connection to these goals and purposes, and consequently disappear. As a way out of such misunderstanding of religion, Taylor distinguishes between two different ways of understanding the process of secularization and different facets of secularity.

(1) The term secularization designates different phenomena: the decline of religious belief and practices; the withdrawal of religion from the public sphere due to social fragmentation, disappearance of community, rationalization, urbanization, and the rise of modernity; the repression and reduction of the influence of religion; and the disenchantment or distancing from a magical world. It is a fact that all these changes are taking place in modernity. It would be erroneous, however, to conclude that religion is disappearing due to these changes. In Taylor's reflection, we can trace in the last 500 years of our Western history many changes and new ways of understanding Church institutions, expressions of faith, ways of placing religion in society, and other phenomena related to religion, faith, and spirituality. New forms and practices of religious and non-religious life have continuously been replacing those proving disruptive and unviable. So we cannot deduce that religion has constantly been present and functioning in the exact same way in different periods of history; changes are part of this process of replacement. Consequently, the process of secularization in modernity presents nothing new and extraordinary: changes in the social, political, economic, religious, and spiritual spheres form a part of our history as well as a part of the transformation of religious practices.

(2) Although mainstream secularization theory argues that belief and religious practices are declining and falling off in modernity, Taylor disagrees with this position. In modernity, we are at the end of a move from a society in which belief in God is unchallenged and unproblematic, to a society in which belief in God is once again understood to be one option among many, and frequently not the easiest one to embrace. Taylor characterizes this move as the change that "takes us from a society in which it was virtually impossible not to believe in God, to one in which faith, even for the staunchest believer, is one human possibility among others" (Taylor 2007, 3). Certain experiences that were previously more or less occluded or left aside are returning now to the forefront as new possibilities. Taylor describes this phenomenon of an increasingly expanding number of options and alternatives in the field of religion in terms of the *nova effect*, what he defines as "spawning an ever-widening variety of moral/spiritual options, across the span of the thinkable and perhaps even beyond" (Taylor 2007, 299).

Taylor argues that there are different sources from which the *nova effect* originates. One of them is the human agent's belief in the creation of a new order of freedom and mutual benefit, based on the agent's reason, modern technology and new discoveries in material nature, which are constantly reinforcing the sense of power in the agent. The second possible source is the sense of flatness and emptiness that the modern human agent experiences in his/her life within the immanent frame, in which s/he lays aside the transcendent. The sense of the fragility of meaning, the search for an overarching significance, the perceived flatness of the agent's attempts to solemnize the crucial passages of human life, and the emptiness of the ordinary, become more and more evident. People do not necessarily seek the cure for these malaises through a return to transcendence or in the traditional forms of religion; their search for meaning might take place through a different reading of the same immanence. They may find meaning in Nature, in the wisdom of the old, in bearing and loving children, in living a more natural life, or in the elaboration of more demanding standards of justice and solidarity.

In other words, secularization in Taylor's reflection represents much more than the retreat of religion from the public sphere. We should rather talk about the forces, unease, and spiritual dissatisfaction underlying so many of the changes of the last 500 years, and ask ourselves where the modern human agent in modernity hopes to find his/her fulfillment, fullness of life, and flourishing, which means having a fuller, richer, deeper, more worthy and admirable life. What moves the human agent in modernity towards his/her transformation, wholeness of life, or harmony? The crucial question for modernity is whether people recognize in their search for fullness something beyond their lives (Taylor 2007, 16-17). Does their search for fullness include a good that is transcendent, i.e. independent of human flourishing?

Taylor distinguishes between two different understandings of human flourishing, and both of them are hard to justify. The first one claims that the power to reach fullness lies within the human agent, who feels capable of facing meaninglessness, the hostility of the universe, the violence of human actions, and of finding a set of rules likely to bring him/her to the fullness s/he seeks. In short, s/he wants to be the kind of person for whom this life is fully satisfying. On the other hand, the believer believes that human fullness requires reference to God or something beyond his/her life. The fullness of life will come to him/her, most likely through another being capable of living and giving. In short, s/he feels the need to be opened, transformed, brought out of the self, and receptive to a power that transcends him/herself (Taylor 2007, 7-8).

Whichever way to human fulfillment one embraces, s/he will face a similar dilemma: is the fullness of life based on immanence or transcendence, and is the search for fullness inclusive or exclusive? Instead of searching for a dogmatic definition and accurate description of human flourishing, Taylor proposes some general guidelines for how to reach this fullness and flourishing (Taylor 2007, 609-612). Our search for fullness should not be reduced to the requirements of the disciplined, disengaged rational agent, who is willing to sacrifice his/her spontaneity, creativity, and feelings. Fullness of life should be based on the integration of all human forces, drives, and desires into something that allows us a more harmonious and whole life. The rational, emotional, sensual, creative, and spontaneous aspects of bodily existence have to find their place in this concept of harmony and wholeness. All aspects of human life, including violence, sex, and suffering, have to find their place in this harmony. In other words, every aspect of human life should be integrated, especially the highest spiritual, religious, and moral aspirations (Platovnjak 2015, 8-10).

In the words of David M. Jones, secularization as a significant achievement of Western modernity has failed to silence the quest for meaning or the urge to find alternative ways of satisfying this existential human need (Jones 2014, 7). Taylor's reflection offers us an insightful framework for where and how to place religion in our modern society. By referring to religion as an inevitable factor of our social and personal life, we can start dealing with the dilemma of religious violence.

The Secularized Myth of Religious Violence

As shown in the previous chapter, the mainstream secularization narrative struggles to incorporate religion and the innermost dimensions of an agent's existence as an essential part of the agent's search for meaning and fulfillment. Even though this narrative has almost completely lost its intellectual appeal, nowadays an updated version of this narrative challenges intellectuals in the form of "the myth of religious violence" and the conviction that religion is a transhistorical and transcultural concept inclined to violence (Cavanaugh 2009, 3-4).

Like any other myth, even the myth of religious violence does not provide a sufficient rigor of logic or evidence for its claim. Additionally, the message of this myth remains unquestioned because modern society constantly creates new categories through which it conforms to the myth, on the one hand, and on the other, what society presents as real gradually takes on the color of myth. So, it becomes "very difficult to think outside the paradigm that the myth establishes and reflects because myth and reality become mutually reinforcing" (Cavanaugh 2009, 6). No wonder this myth has become so powerful and widespread, especially after September 11, 2001.

The anatomy of this myth is based on a strong conventional wisdom of secularized Western societies that religion is absolutist, divisive, not sufficiently rational, and consequently dangerous. This myth assumes that religion includes a transhistorical and transcultural feature of human life, which has a peculiarly dangerous inclination to promote violence, including killing and dying in the name of religion. For this reason, religion should be distinct from "secular" features, such as politics and economics; the modern and liberal nation-state, as it has developed in the West, with its rational and peace-making interventions, feels the need to control and eventually remove the irrational, absolutist, divisive, and fanatical impulses of religion from political life.

Cavanaugh's reflection does not negate the fact that ideologies and practices - including Islam, Christianity, and other religions - can promote violence under certain conditions. Similarly, new religious movements and violence are often closely intermingled (Lewis 2011). Nonetheless, this myth of religious violence is incoherent and problematic when it states that religions, such as Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Judaism, are necessarily more inclined toward violence than ideologies and institutions that are identified as secular: violent use of nationalism, capitalism with its invisible hand of the market, liberalism, Marxist utopias, and others. So-called secular institutions and ideologies can be as absolutist, irrational, and divisive as those called religious. The history of the past century proves that its secular ideologies have caused far greater suffering in the modern world than religious ones. If this is the case, why should religious institutions be considered more inclined to violence than those that are non-religious? People do violence on behalf of those things, either religious or non-religious, which they take seriously enough to do violence for.

At this point, Charlene P. E. Burns' reflection about the origin of religious violence can be very insightful. When someone claims that religion causes violence, s/he is making a mistake in logical thinking, because s/he is treating religion, an abstract concept, as though it were a concrete entity, having agency in its own right. By speaking this way, s/he makes a scapegoat of an abstraction, which allows him/her to distance him/herself from the issue and reduce his/her sense of personal responsibility (Burns 2008, 6-7). Following this interpretation, the myth of religious violence creates in the modern human agent new space for peace, indifference, and intellectual satisfaction.

How come the violence labeled "religious" is considered virulent and reprehensible in liberal Western societies, while the violence labeled "secular" hardly counts as violence at all. Secular violence seems to be inherently peacemaking, necessary, and sometimes praiseworthy, especially when we are dealing with the inherent violence of religion. Equal attention should be given to both secular and religious violence because in both cases we are talking about the same phenomenon: violence. The distinction between secular and religious violence is unhelpful, misleading, and mystifying.

Just as the myth of religious violence does not pass a critical examination, neither does the concept of religion as something existing beyond history and manifesting itself in all cultures. Religion is not something that exists beyond human nature or outside of human history; it is always embedded in a certain historical context, or in a given configuration of power and authority. For this reason, it is presumptuous to have an all-inclusive or descriptive definition of religion. Scholars and non-scholars in different times and different places refer to different meanings with the term "religion". For example, Émile Durkheim claims that religion is at its core a social phenomenon or an eminently collective thing formed by beliefs and practices relating to the realm of the sacred (Durkheim 1915 37; 43-4). Clifford Geertz defines religion as a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful and stable moods and motivation in men and formulates conceptions of a general order of existence (Geertz 1979, 79-80). Max Weber states that religion is "the relationship of me to supernatural forces which takes the forms of prayer, sacrifice, and worship" (Weber 1963, 28). A more complete definition of religion also includes sacred texts, leaders, religious buildings and places, land, money, religious tradition, and much more. In addition, Gregg introduces a distinction between religions in theory and in practice. Religion, such as Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, exists in theory, but in practice, these religions do not exist as singular units; there is much diversity within each religion across time and space. Religions in practice are changing over time according to historical contexts, responding to political, social, and cultural circumstances, which makes them different across time and space (Gregg 2014, 14).

With all these and other attempts to define religion, Cavanaugh - referring to Charles Kimball - rightly concludes that there is no essence of religion such that we all know it when we see it. "What counts as religion and what does not in any given context is contestable and depends on who has the power and authority to define religion in any given time and place" (Cavanaugh 2009, 59). The category of religion is a construct, powerfully present in the ideology of the West since the rise of modernity, both in Western cultures and in the colonization of non-Western cultures. Religion is "a term that constructs and is constructed by different kinds of political configurations" (Cavanaugh 2009, 58).

In other words, the very definition of religion is part of the history of Western power, which has with its so-called empirical observations and neutrality come to the conclusion that religion causes violence. Cavanaugh concludes at the end of his book *The Myth of Religious Violence* that the same definition of religion, and consequently the myth of religious violence, is already an expression of Western power, which legitimatizes certain kinds of political and social practices and delegitimizes others. This myth was created as a promotional tool of Western secular forms of governance, which believed that for the creation of a peaceful and prosperous world, the dangerous impulses of religion should be separated from politics. This myth fosters the idea that Western secular social orders are inherently peaceful and rational. Consequently, the idea of Western peacefulness justifies secular violence against religious actors, whose irrational violence must be met with rational violence. By marginalizing religious discourses and practices, the secular and liberal states hope to reinforce adherence to a secular social order, which Gregg calls "earthly salvation" (Gregg 2014, 17). Individuals, societies, and nations, as well as animals and the environment, are in a state of decline and need to be restored to a particular order and a state of harmony and justice. In view of this restoration, justification of certain means, including violence, seems to be acceptable. In reaction to such threats, religiously motivated violence and violent interpretations of a faith arise; "religiously motivated violence is often a reaction to radical changes to society and political order, drastic changes that compel religious groups to take defensive action" (Gregg 2014, 4).

In short, the myth of religious violence has become a very useful tool in authorizing certain types of power by marginalizing certain religious practices, and by reinforcing and justifying "our" attitudes and policies against "theirs". We are talking about a widespread phenomenon in Western traditions, also well known in other non-Western traditions, as Nicholas F. Gier shows in his *The Origins of Religious Violence: An Asian Perspective.* History and our modern times present us with a myriad of examples of religiously motivated violence: the Crusades, Hindu-Muslim riots, Buddhist violence in Sri Lanka, battles over Jerusalem, the current declaration of jihad against the West, and so on. What the motivation behind all these examples of religious violence could be is our next question.

Plurality of Interpretations based on Vattimo's Weak Thought

The narrative of mainstream secularization theory, as presented in Taylor's writing, overlaps in many aspects with the myth of religious violence, analyzed in Cavanaugh's reflection. Both narratives are based on a very specific and narrow definition of religion, reducing religion to something private, irrational, ancient, impractical, linked to violence, and as such unable to find its place in modern liberal society. In agreement with the main thesis of Harrold J. Ellens' reflection about the destructive power of religion, this article supports the thesis that these two narratives adopt an apocalyptic worldview based on the ancient principle of dualism, in which good and evil are pitted against one another and given transcendental and cosmic dimensions. The main psychosocial and political problem of modern and post-modern culture, in Ellens' view, arises from, or maybe returns to, the ancient apocalyptic worldview based on the split between good and evil, or God and evil. This ultimate dualism became the model for explaining the meaning of everything, from the unconscious level of the Western person to the sociopolitical dimensions of Western culture. "It becomes the primal archetype of our understanding, reflecting a schizoid misunderstanding of the real way things are" (Ellens 2004, 3). In this perspective, Hannah Arendt claims that totalitarian ideologies of the past century attribute *sacred status* to an earthly political concept: the race, the nation, the proletariat, the planet itself, and the like. This sacralization provides the space for an apocalyptic clash between the decadent past about to perish, a present that reveals the opportunity for radical change, and the potential to realize an ideal future (Arendt 1951, 472-9).

Consequently, the human agent in modernity feels the call to be actively engaged in the battle between good and evil. Ignoring and pushing away the religious dimensions as something less relevant and too old-fashioned for modernity, together with the belief that evil exists ontologically and can be controlled and finally eradicated, are two expressions of the cosmological worldview based on dualism. The present time reveals an opportunity for radical changes and engagement that can easily justify the inclusion of violence, terror, and wars. Mainstream secularization theory and the myth of violence are expressions of hope for the human agent living in modernity, believing that active participation in the cosmological tension between good and evil will result in the realization of an ideal future. Individual involvement in this tension is very appealing and spiritually rewarding; the human agent feels responsible for his own future, willing to win the war for God and the good. The always victorious heroes in action movies, popular literature, money-making music, and radical TV programs can be taken as expressions of this fight. The eternal combat also reflects itself in political policy, international relations, social values, as well as in the heart of each individual. When such cosmological interpretation about the fight between good and evil acquires a cultural and social function, it produces enormous potential for violence both at the individual and social levels (Ellens 2004, 6).

The return of the cosmological worldview based on dualism might seem a surprise, considering the fact that Western societies are historically rooted in two thousand years of

Christianity, which is a worldview that opposes and denies dualism. What opened the door and created new space for the re-emergence of ancient dualism? It would not be an exaggeration to assume that a cosmology based on dualism was never completely eradicated in the last two millennia of Western history. Whenever human thought deviates from, or even completely denies, the idea of an absolutist principle or a monotheistic vision, this reopens space for dualism. Similarly, when the human agent believes in an unbridgeable gap between immanence and transcendence, s/he stops looking for the Absolute. Or when the human agent is not able to accept his/her own finitude, even the space for the infinite remains concealed, and consequently, the agent gives up his search for the Absolute. All this creates new space for alternative, i.e. non-monotheistic, cosmological interpretations.

Gianni Vattimo's philosophical reflection, based on the idea of "weak thought" (*pensiero debole*), presents an interesting paradigm for our investigation about the reasons for the rebirth of dualism in modernity. Vattimo argues that the philosophy of the 19th and 20th century, especially the philosophical writings of Nietzsche and Heidegger, involved the denial of stable structures of Being, to which thought must adapt itself in order to find itself upon stable structures. By reducing or denying something stable, we open the door to radical transformation and deconstruction of Western values. Such transformation and deconstruction are possible when we step aside from interpretations based on a single ideological principle. This is the key idea in Vattimo's book *The Adventure of Difference*, published in Italy in 1980, in which he argues in favor of Nietzsche's "eternal return" and Heidegger's "overcoming of metaphysics," two key factors allowing us to think differently. Once we are able to think differently, which means not reducing everything to one single principle, we can accept Vattimo's description of Nietzsche's Superman as "liberated for differences and the multiplicity of experiences" (Vattimo 1993, 3). This Superman is also able to accept the disintegration of unity, and consequently any definitiveness or dialectical harmonization. With this perspective, Vattimo continues, we should read Heidegger's *Being and Time* as a philosophy of decline, "a philosophy which sees what is constitutive of Being not as the fact of its prevailing, but as the fact of its disappearing" (Vattimo 1993, 5). If this is the case, then the metaphysical tradition appears to be a tradition of violent thinking, constantly trying to unify and govern with sovereign and generalizing categories, so typical of pre-modern and modern philosophy. On the other hand, Vattimo states, post-modern philosophy recognizes the Being not as a unitary principle, but as an event which is constantly exposed to our interpretation. For this reason, Vattimo prefers to talk in terms of not ontology but hermeneutics: the Being can be only interpreted, and what we consider to be objective truth and facts are only the results of our interpretations. Consequently Vattimo claims at the very beginning of his book *A Farewell to Truth* that "everything is turning into a game of interpretations – not disinterested, not necessarily false, but (and this is the point) oriented toward projects, expectations, and value choices at odds with one another" (Vattimo 2011, XXV). In this hermeneutical framework, Vattimo places his idea of weak thought, i.e. a worldview in which the question of "truth" has become a game of interpretation, a philosophy without a global and metaphysical vision and without a guiding principle or an Absolute.

By connecting Vattimo's idea of "weak thought" with the assumption that religion does not deserve a legitimate place in modernity, our reflection gains new dimensions. In modernity, even religion has become a matter of interpretation, conditioned by the historical events taking place in given spatiotemporal frameworks. Religion seems to be at to the mercy of the interpreter's intentions, projects, and desires. If the interpreter's plans are to combat evil and create earthly salvation, then the myth of religious violence finds its perfect justification. If religion is considered the source of continual conflicts and limitations of the human agent's activity, then mainstream secularization theory has right to suggest limitation of religious presence from the public sphere.

Rediscovery of Religion in the Globalized World

As illustrative as mainstream secularization theory, the myth of religious violence, and philosophy based on weak thought might be, they provide weak grounds for their claim about the irrelevance or inadequacy of religion in modernity, as well as for the ontological connection between religion and violence. As long as we consider religion as something external and instrumental at our disposal, not essentially linked to the human existence, our understanding of religion will always remain one-sided, partial, and subordinated to the logic of human efficiency, growth, and benefits of the strong. In this perspective, the myth of religious violence and mainstream secularization theory easily find their legitimate interpretation of the rule of religion as something that is hindering and blocking the human agent's efforts for a peaceful social coexistence.

While the claim about the irrelevance and inadequacy of religion gains preferential attention within Western liberal societies, the rest of the non-Western world hesitates to accept as the best possible principle of any social organization both the claim about the irrelevance of religion and Western ideologies about democracy, grounded on separation of religion from the public sphere. If Western societies are really as democratic as they claim to be, then they should be more tolerant and democratic toward non-Western social and political structures, which are often based on religious principles.

Would a discussion based on religious dogmas or certain absolute principles present a better path toward peaceful coexistence and more efficient confrontation of violence? It is not my intention to undermine the importance of a dogmatic approach in our reflection; nonetheless, I believe that religious dogmas, as a starting point, would present more obstacles than it would remove. At the same time, I disagree with Vattimo's claim that there is no truth and that everything is a matter of interpretation. If we adopt this claim of Vattimo uncritically, we will finish with the position of relativism, grounded on the idea of the absence of any absolute principle and the agent's inability to grasp something absolute.

Referring to Vattimo's book *After Christianity,* I suggest a different way for how to reintroduce a discussion about the place of religion in our time, as well as a new interpretation of the connection between religion and violence. When reflecting on the place of Christianity in the post-modern world imbued with the process of globalization, Vattimo argues in favor of an ultimate foundation that would be valid for all, above and beyond any cultural differences. "The universal validity of an assertion can be constructed by building consensus in dialogue, though without claiming any right in the name of an absolute truth. Dialogical consensus may be reached by acknowledging that we share a heritage of cultural, historical, and technological-scientific acquisitions" (Vattimo 2002, 5). Vattimo goes on to claim that philosophy in post-modernity has recognized that it cannot grasp with certainty the ultimate foundation. If this is the case, then God cannot be upheld as an ultimate foundation, as the absolute metaphysical structure of the real, as was the case with modern rationalists and absolutist metaphysics. It follows that even philosophical atheism with its refutation of religious experience is no longer necessary because it does not provide sufficient grounds for the search for the ultimate foundation. So, we are free again, Vattimo concludes, to hear the words of Scripture and to read the biblical notion of creation, namely with the contingency and historicity of our existence; "we can think of Being only as event, and of truth not as the reflection of reality's eternal structure but rather as a historical message that must be heard and to which we are called to respond" (Vattimo 2002, 6).

Vattimo's reflection on the place of Christianity in post-modernity offers us a useful paradigm for our reflection. In our search for an ultimate foundation that would be valid for all, Western post-modern philosophy needs to humbly recognize and accept other non-Western philosophical reflections as equal partners in search of wisdom, peaceful coexistence, and meaningful life. In a similar way, dialogue and search for consensus should become the guiding principles for monotheistic religions based on Abraham, either when they talk among themselves or with other non-monotheistic religions. The search for consensus should not be framed with a particular dogmatic question or religious principle, but in Vattimo's words by "a historical message that must be heard and to which we are called to respond." There is a call for a world united beyond cultural, religious, and historical differences. Are we willing to hear this call? Our answer should not be that type of nihilism that is anchored in its own inability to know something absolute, and therefore, denying the absolute. Post-modern nihilism allows us to open our reflection beyond traditional metaphysics toward the unexplored horizons of the absolute that will reassure us of a foundation in the uncertainty of the changeable world. Our answer to the call will be also an expression of our freedom and responsibility. Consequently, the present crisis will also become an opportunity for a renewal of Western democracy (Jones 2014, 199).

Human agency in the globalized world, as well as post-modern philosophy, needs to go beyond the categories of thinking in terms of "what use do things have for us?" If this is the starting point of our discussion, then any discussion about religion will always remain one-sided, instrumental, and at the mercy of the interpretation of the strong. The real question is an existential question, "for what purpose do we exist?" In other words, the nihilist mindset of modernity challenges us to find something solid under our feet.

Religion has to do with life itself, not with some viewpoints of its utility. For this reason, religion and the question of violence cannot be treated from the outside as something purely rational and scientifically objective, like how we can study natural sciences. When facing violence or innocent suffering, for example, a religious answer from the outside might be helpful, but its reach will remain restricted if it is not integrated into the individual or collective spiritual quest for meaning in life. When facing the limits of our life, religion reminds us that the ultimate meaning of our life is transcendental, beyond our simple existence in this changing world. The ultimate test of our spiritual and religious authenticity is our facing of the challenges that go beyond human capacities, such as, for example, the burial of an innocent child (Ellens 2004, 2-3). In this perspective, our challenge remains the question of whether our spiritual and religious quest and search for meaning enable us to live in the world of human pathos, pain, suffering, vulnerability, violence, wars, killing, and destruction, so that we can stay hopeful and empowered at the tomb of the innocent child.

In every crucial moment of existence, the modern human agent finds himself facing a dilemma: either to put his faith and hope in an ontological evil and participate in a transcendental cosmic conflict between good and evil, or to be actively engaged in a community of weak, inadequate, ignorant, sick humans trying to find their way to meaning in the world. A religious quest might be a very helpful path to explore.

When talking about the myth of religious violence, we have a similar dilemma: shall we put our hope and search for meaning in this myth, or shall we challenge its validity and go to the heart of this myth? An active engagement, in this case, requires from us alternative interpretations of historical and contemporary events, or "interpretations that do not describe the religion as under attack or that do not call for violence as a necessary means of defending religion" (Gregg 2014, 150). Mark Juergensmeyer is even more explicit in this regard when he argues for a redirection of the mythology by redefining the message of the myth. A different interpretation of the sacred texts, religious doctrine, and the heritage of tradition will provide us with abundant examples of non-violent interpretations (Juergensmeyer 2000, 163). The reduction of religious violence is a long-lasting project, including the informing and educating of laity, the active role of states and of charismatic leadership, the recognition of symbols of religion and collaboration between secular and religious institutions, and meaningful dialog between religions in conflict; these are only a few possible ideas (Selengut 2003, 232-9). Appleby R. Scott, in his book *The Ambivalence of the Sacred*, challenges the gifted religious leaders to see religion as an opportunity for a promotion of religious peace-building (Appleby 2000, 281). Lloyd Steffen phrases our dilemma in moral terms: How do I choose to be religious? The moral point of this question recommends to individuals that they decide to be religious in a way that they affirm life and do not support violence, injury or destruction of life (Steffen 2007, 276).

Conclusion

Within the framework of globalization, religion has made its reappearance in a dramatic fashion, in a variety of forms: from denying its constitutive role in human existence and abusing its empowering presence for achievement of non-religious goals, to a silent presence, creating meaning for the majority of humankind and providing a foundation for a new universal moral order. On the global level, it should not be acceptable to claim that there are only two possible solutions for how to integrate religion into our social and political life: either denial and diminishing of religion, or a theocratic vision, based on some one-sided interpretations of certain religious principles. Religions should be seen as a plausible opportunity to advance the cause of peace and stability, or as a powerful medicine. Religious peace-building is already taking shape in and across local communities plagued by violence, even though this process remains inchoate and fragile, uncoordinated and in need of a greater number of trained practitioners (Appleby 2000, 7).

It is true that violence, including religious violence, will never completely disappear from our world; nonetheless, its appealing force can be diminished with alternative paths, starting with the eradication of violence from our hearts and minds. Subsequently, even our fear and discomfort in the face of alien otherness (humans, religions, traditions, transcendence) will gradually dissolve.

Endnotes

1. Very illustrative in this regard is Peter Berger's comment: "I do not want to be a crude empiricist, but it seems to me you could start making body counts. In this century, the godless have a slight moral edge, but if you take all of history, I am not sure." In Adam B. Seligman, *Modest Claims: Dialogues and Essays on Tolerance and Tradition.* Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dam University Press, 2006. p. 61.

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A Concept of Contemplation in Kant’s Aesthetics and Its Criticism in Contemporary Aesthetics

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Abstract:

The author critically deals, first, with a concept of contemplation in Kant's aesthetics, through an analysis of aesthetic and teleological judgments of nature. She argues that Kant was closer to a constitutive idea of nature (of its objective purposiveness) than to a regulative one, but he tried to avoid a danger of affirming it dogmatically. He also succeeded to overcome a narrow Enlightenment’s intention to dominate nature. The very concept of contemplation assumes that, at least in the aesthetic and teleological field, Kant did not intend to interfere with nature, but only to contemplate it for its own sake. When we try to rethink his aesthetics of nature, we are more aware of historical aspects of human relationship towards nature, so there is no danger to relapse into immediacy from which Hegel warned us.

In the second part of the paper, the author examines a critique of Kant’s concept of contemplation and disinterestedness in the aesthetics of engagement (Arnold Berleant) and in the everyday aesthetics (Katya Mandoki). She argues that they address their critique to Kant from an empirical perspective, while Kant tried to explain the conditions under which we could feel and make our (aesthetic) judgments from an epistemological, cognitive basis. Pleasure and displeasure are the general ways of feeling which do not exclude any other particular feelings. On the contrary, all feelings may participate in the aesthetic judgement. It is true that Kant did not expose the body, but he neither did exclude it; contemplation is not disembodied but oriented to the subjective and empirical experience. It is rooted in our faculties (understanding, imagination, perception, sensation). Thus, contemplation inevitably includes a context or situation of the subject who judges a natural object from the aesthetic point of view. It is not enough to say that we are engaged in aesthetic experience: first, philosophy has to understand and to explain, as Kant did, how our cognition comes to it.

Contemplation is a pure and disinterested judgement, due to the playful activity of our faculties - the understanding and the imagination, as a ground of subjective, empirical aesthetic experience. Thus, they are the condition of possibility of perception, (dis)pleasure (a basis of all feelings) and of bodily self-awareness, too, without thereby denying the object’s affection of the subject.

Keywords*:* Aesthetics, Kant, Contemplation, Cognition, Nature, Aesthetics of engagement, Everyday aesthetics.

I.

In my paper I would like, first, to discuss Kant's understanding of the concept of contemplation in his aesthetics, in *Critique of Judgement*, especially in *Analytic of the Beautiful*. A notion of contemplation is used for the first time in paragraph §5, in which Kant explains: "The judgement of taste is simply contemplative, i.e., it is a judgement which is indifferent as to the existence of an object, and only decides how its character stands with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. But not even is this contemplation itself directed to concepts; for the judgement of taste is not a cognitive judgement (neither a theoretical one nor a practical, and hence, also, is not grounded on concepts, nor yet intentionally directed to them" (Kant 2007, §5, 41).

Contemplation means an act of regarding with calm or an act of considering with attention an object for which a subject judges to be beautiful. Kant treated the concept of beautiful from the point of view of the spectator who contemplates objects of nature and not from the point of view of the artist who creates his works of art. When a subject contemplates an object, he reflects on his own relation to the object and is not interested in its objectives qualities, but in his subjective feelings of pleasure or displeasure. The beautiful is a subjective judgment of taste. The satisfaction that determines the judgment of taste must be without any interest, in order to guarantee its purity. "Everyone must allow that a judgement on the beautiful which is tinged with the slightest interest, is very partial and not a pure judgement of taste" (Kant, §2, 37). For this reason, the aesthetic satisfaction must not be connected to the agreeable or the good because they are combined with interest. If an object is agreeable for a subject, it means that its sensation excites a desire for it. That kind of "satisfaction presupposes not the mere judgment about it, hence we do not say of the agreeable that it *pleases*, but it *gratifies*" (Kant, §2, 38). Contemplation is a process of aesthetic perception and reflection of an object of nature and a source of the pure judgment of taste, without any interest. In the judgment of taste, we don't want to find out how an object pleases our senses in sensation, "but rather how we judge it on the basis of mere contemplation (intuition or reflection)" (Kant, §2, 36).

A notion of contemplation derives from a Latin word *contemplatio*, which was a translation of the ancient Greek term for *theory*. I would like to emphasize that in *Critique of Judgement* Kant, on the contrary, assumes that aesthetic contemplation must not arise from concepts. He declares that an aesthetic judgment is not a cognitive judgment; it only depends on subjective feelings of pleasure or displeasure. What kind of subjectivity do we speak about? A delight of taste in the beautiful is the one and only disinterested and free delight: "For, since the delight is not based on any inclination of the subject (or on any other deliberate interest), but the judging subject feels himself completely free in respect of the liking which he accords to the object, he can find as reason for his delight no personal conditions to which his own subjective self might alone be party" (Kant 2007, §6, 43). Kant's concept of subjectivity in the aesthetic judgement does not allow any possibility of subject's uniqueness, intimacy, and privacy, on the contrary, every subject must regard his delight "as resting on what he may also presuppose in every other person" (Kant 2007, §6, 43).

Even though Kant admits to aesthetic judgment being subjective and particular, he wants to get it closer to the ideal of universality and, therefore, the subject must judge such examples that he could "believe that he has reason for demanding similar delight from everyone. Accordingly he will speak of the beautiful as if beauty were a feature of the object and the judgement were logical (forming a cognition of the object by concepts of it); although it is only aesthetic, and contains merely a reference of the representation of the object to the subject; - because it still bears this resemblance to the logical judgement, that it may be presupposed to be valid for everyone. But this universality cannot spring from concepts. For from concepts there is no transition to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure" (Kant 2007, §6, 43). The ideal of universality in aesthetic judgment can only be subjective. Nevertheless, "the result is that the judgement of taste… must involve a claim to validity for all men" (Kant 2007, §6, 43).

But how can a man know which arguments are valid or not? Kant would like to convince us that "The judgement of taste rests on *a priori* grounds" (Kant, §12, 53). But he is aware that it is absolutely impossible "to determine *a priori* the connection of the feeling of a pleasure or displeasure", for that would be a causal relation" (Kant, §12, 53). "This pleasure is also in no way practical, neither resembling that from the pathological ground of agreeableness nor that from the intellectual ground of the represented good" (Kant, §12, 53). The only possible solution is to find such a pleasure in aesthetic judgement that "is merely contemplative and does not bring about an interest in the object; (…) The consciousness of mere formal purposiveness in the play of the cognitive faculties of the subject attending a representation whereby an object is given, is the pleasure itself…" (Kant, §12, 53). The relationship between cognitive faculties in the aesthetic judgment, imagination and understanding, is spontaneous, playful and harmonious, and it regards only a form of an object.

Despite the playfulness of the subject's faculties, Kant emphasizes his main activity as a calm contemplation of an object: "We *dwell* on the contemplation of the beautiful because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself, (…) the mind all the while remaining passive" (Kant, §12, 54). However, we can still speak about "the active engagement of the cognitive powers", but "without ulterior aim" (Kant, §12, 54). Kant must have wanted to emphasize that the subject in his aesthetic relationship towards nature doesn't have the intention of discovering and determining the objects, but rather wants to contemplate himself in his relation to nature. The aesthetic judgment is pure and formal, as long as it comes from the pure form of the object, resulting in a harmonious play between the imagination and the understanding; this play isn't primarily empiric, but rather transcendental, although directed towards empiric objects. The imagination and the understanding are in a specific relation to each other in the field of aesthetic judgment: not in a constitutive relation, but in a regulative one, and since it applies to all subjects, they can exchange judgments on the beautiful.

In this way, Kant creates conditions for the existence of some kind of intersubjectivity and empathy, which he calls *the community sense*. Aesthetic judgment must possess the subjective principle, which determines what pleases and what does not through sensation and not through concept, although in a widely accepted manner. "Such a principle, however, could only be regarded as *common sense*. This differs essentially from common understanding, which is also sometimes called common sense (*sensus communis*): for the judgement of the latter is not one by feeling, but always one by concepts, though usually only in the shape of obscurely represented principles" (Kant, §20, 68). Through the community sense we co-create the ideal of beauty: it is based on empathy, on communication and finding consensus by all the subjects contemplating the objects in nature, judging them as beautiful.[1]

Kant also attests a calm pleasure when contemplating the beautiful forms in a contrast comparison with judging a sublime in nature, when we feel very excited and agitated by its formless spectacles. The beautiful manifests a harmony of imagination and understanding while the sublime expresses a conflict of imagination and reason. "The mind feels itself *set in motion* in the representation of the sublime in nature; whereas in the aesthetic judgement upon what is beautiful therein it is in *restful* contemplation" (Kant, §27, 88). That's why Kant doesn't use the concept of contemplation in *Analytic of Sublime*.[3]

However, in the second part of *Critique of Judgement*, in *Critique of the Teleological Judgement*, Kant comes closer to the speculative use of the concept of contemplation. In § 67, he argues that from the teleological point of view "we may look upon" the beauty of nature as an objective purposiveness of nature, as if natural beauty is "an accordance of nature with the free play of our cognitive faculties engaged in grasping and judging its appearance". Nevertheless, it is our teleological judgment forming this idea. It is also the reason why "we may love it, just as we view it with respect because of its immensity, and feel ourselves ennobled by such contemplation" (Kant, §67, 208). This manner of contemplation refines us, makes us better in a cultural sense. However, Kant's argumentation remains at the level of "as if nature" had created so many beautiful forms "with the precise purpose in its mind" (Kant, §67, 208).

In contrast to *Critique of Teleological Judgement*, where Kant assumed that the correspondence of nature with our (cognitive) forces might be a good argument for objective purposiveness, in *Critique of Aesthetic Judgement*, the same argument was a proof of subjective purposiveness. He even rejects emotional causes as pathological ones. In *Analytic of the Beautiful*, he thinks beauty is the result of an accordance of the object with the free play of our cognitive forces (imagination and understanding) and its form as a subjective, formal purposiveness without purpose.[2] Beauty is not an objective attribute to the object, to its form, but rather displays a subjective relation of the subject towards it, something that affects us and provokes pleasure, thus inducing the subject to judge the object as being beautiful. From the point of view of his contemplation, the form of the object is purposeful only for the subject's taste that is subjective. The objective purposiveness of objects and nature respectively is out of the question as far as aesthetic judgment goes. It takes no notice of what the purpose of the existence of natural beauty is: does it exist merely to evoke pleasure or is it as a purpose in no significant relationship with us.

On the contrary, considering teleological judgment, the question of objective purposiveness appears obviously there.

But with this additional explanation we are no closer to treating natural beauty as a proof of nature's objective purposiveness; by claiming it has a purpose for the subjective pleasure it evokes in us, we affirm that it is just about the subjective purposiveness of beauty, as a specific relationship with nature. It seems that Kant had decided to judge nature as *Ding an sich*, the essence of which lies primarily within the inability to reveal it or to say anything certain about it. The modality of his statement that we *may* look upon natural beauty as a manifestation of objective purposiveness of nature is in opposition to the unconditional essence of objective purposiveness. Beside that Kant also uses metaphorical language, through which he personifies nature by writing "that it has been disposed to promote our culture by exhibiting so many beautiful forms" (Kant, §67, 208). Furthermore, he surprises us with the approach he rejected in *Analytic of the Beautiful* as emotional and thus inappropriate for a pure aesthetic judgment, by saying that nature dispensed beauty and charms in such abundance, that for this we may love it and view it with respect. Mentioning the term respect brings us closer to Kant's moral arguments in his *Critique of Practical Reason*, while at the beginning of *Critique of Judgement* he rejects the possibility of relating a pure aesthetic judgment to the term of good. What does it mean that such contemplation makes us better? From teleological point of view contemplating nature helps us on our path to culture, i.e., through aesthetic cultivation, we become better and more beautiful on a spiritual level. This brings Kant much closer to understanding beauty as a symbol of good.

Kant also emphasizes his position in §86 (*Ethico-theology)*, proposing an objective purposiveness of the world, otherwise contemplation would be senseless: it is not appropriate to say that the world has got its sense, value and purpose only through human's contemplation; on the contrary, contemplation has got its proper value and sense, because the world is sensible by itself.

> Without man, in other words, the whole of creation would be a mere wilderness, a thing in vain, and have no final end. Yet it is not man's cognitive faculty, that is, theoretical reason, that forms the point of reference which alone gives its worth to the existence of all else in the world—as if the meaning of his presence in the world was that there might be someone in it that could make it an object of *contemplation.* For if this contemplation of the world brought to light nothing but things without a final end, the existence of the world could not acquire a worth from the fact of its being known. A final end of the world must be presupposed as that in relation to which the contemplation of the world may itself possess a worth. Neither is it in relation to the feeling of pleasure or the sum of such feelings that we can think that there is a given final end of creation, that is to say, it is not by well-being, not by enjoyment, whether bodily or mental, not, in a word, by happiness, that we value that absolute worth. For the fact that man, when he does exist, makes happiness his own final purpose, affords us no conception of any reason why he should exist at all, or of any worth he himself possesses, for which his existence should be made agreeable to him. Hence man must already be presupposed to be the final end of creation, in order that we may have a rational ground to explain

> why nature, when regarded as an absolute whole according to principles of ends, must be in accord with the conditions of his happiness. (Kant, §86, 271)

At which point could we doubt Kant's thesis? Firstly, when he claims all creation would be empty desert without people, senseless and purposeless. If we follow Kant's theory of *Ding an sich*, this statement cannot be made, since we can't know, what it in itself really is, which means we can't know what would be, has it not been for us, humans. On the phenomenal level though, it is us who give purpose to the world, by discovering and valuing it in a certain way. It is obvious that Kant did not refer to humans when searching for something/somebody that gives them the final purpose.

It is possible to say that the world has sense in itself, mostly when speaking of the universe and nature, both of which would follow physical laws with or without us. But nature and universe in itself are not yet the world; this becomes a meaningful value only after we have invested it into nature and social relationships. In addition, when Kant says that it is not man's existence and cognitive ability (theoretical reason) what give value to the existence of everything else in the world, this particular thesis seems problematic, especially considering the fact that inside the phenomenal world evaluation and discovering are all that the subject is able to do.

Kant establishes that the pure contemplation of the world doesn't ensure seeing the world in the light of its final purpose. He doesn't dwell on the fact that subject's contemplation could have an immanent purpose and not an exterior, transcendent one. So, it is no coincidence that the quote discussed here would find its place in the chapter entitled *Ethico-theology*. In my opinion, contemplation keeps its vital importance despite leaving the question of the final purpose open or even dismissing it entirely: the purposiveness of the world, as well as the potential lack of it, has a sense in its own, which is something worth thinking about. This statement brings us closer to Kant's aesthetic vision of the subjective purposiveness without the objective purpose.

II.

In his work, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity: from Kant to Nietzsche*, Andrew Bowie assumes that philosophical claim for disinterestedness at the turn of 18th to 19th century was perhaps an echo of the growing tendency of the age towards usefulness and effectiveness.

> Philosophical aesthetics of the time responds to the modern process of rationalisation by providing a reminder that there are other ways of seeing nature and human activity, apart from the instrumental views offered by the sciences and commerce. The central new idea is that the beauty of nature need not have an ulterior function and can be its own purpose. (...) Not surprisingly, in the light of the contemporary ecological crisis, the questions raised by aesthetics have come to seem more and more significant today. (Bowie 2003, 4-5)

We can admit that Kant's arguments in favour of contemplation as disinterested aesthetic judgment demonstrate his intention to protect the autonomy of aesthetic judgment. However, he exposed them from the rationalistic perspective, not (yet) in the way of social and economic theory. Bowie also emphasizes

> that the pleasure occasioned by the aesthetic object derives precisely from its allowing our cognitive faculties to *play* in a manner that does not entail determination by concepts, thus suggesting that the *ground* of cognition is an activity which, like play, can take place for its own sake. (Bowie 2003, 30).

However, Kant insisted, in the name of *sensus communis*, on searching for agreement of others for our subjective, particular pleasure, but in a rational form, through a judgement. This agreement is possible then not only on the base of pleasure, but rational judgement, too. Kant pointed up himself that contemplation of beauty was a judgement, not only a pleasure. The pleasure has to be disinterested also with the aim to facilitate the search of agreement, while an interest would disable it.

Regarding Kant's aim to link the harmony manifest in the aesthetic apprehension of natural objects with the idea of natural teleology, Bowie finds out that Kant

> remains ambiguous whether such a link is merely a regulative idea or could actually be constitutive, tending more to the former conception. Such a strong conception of natural teleology may be hard to defend, but what interests Kant in this question will not simply go away, even if one rejects teleology out of hand as inappropriate for the explanation of natural products. (Bowie 2003, 32)

Andrew Bowie continues with saying that a tendency in the Enlightenment was to dominate nature, no matter what nature could "think" of this. In Western history, attention to natural beauty for its own sake generally arises at the moment when nature ceases to be perceived as predominantly a threat to human survival. The aesthetic concern with beauty in nature persists in modern, technologically developed society, too. It seems that a certain development stage is necessary in order to be able to appreciate nature as a pure object of contemplation. This goes with "the secularisation of nature, which had previously been seen in terms of its manifestation of the magnificence of God" (Bowie 2003, 33). Nevertheless, Bowie presumes that modern science will not succeed in breaking up completely with the mythical and the theological elements in our relationship to nature. He still recognizes some mythical ways of thinking in ecological movements.

Bowie also evokes a difference between Kant's and Hegel's position: Hegel insists, against Kant, that beauty in works of art has a higher status than natural beauty. His intention is also to undermine any kind of reliance on immediacy. Hegel, therefore, denies that there could be an immediate pleasurable contemplation of the natural world – natural beauty appears only as a reflection of beauty, belonging to the human spirit. Before the modern period, the beauty of landscapes was generally not a central focus of pictorial art and served either as mere background or as a source of symbols of God's creation. The idea that nature can be beautiful on itself emerges just in the middle of the 18th century in Europe. "The appreciation of wild nature for its own sake is indeed predominantly a modern phenomenon, and landscape painting first emerges in a major way in a country, Holland, which is itself largely a result of human control of nature" (Bowie 2003, 167). Bowie considers as dangerous a position that the natural beauty could emerge only at a certain stage of human development (when a man was able to control nature). He considers that it affirms only human relationship to nature and thus opens the door to a dogmatic conception, such as suggested in Kant's teleology of nature where beautiful forms seem to be created in order to please us. "However, the wholesale exclusion of what can be learned from the appreciation of natural beauty leads to an even more questionable impoverishment of thought that itself has evident public, political effects", concludes Bowie (2003, 167).

As I explained before, in my opinion, Kant's position is closer to a constitutive idea of nature than to a regulative one, but he tried to avoid the danger of affirming it dogmatically. He also succeeded to overcome a narrow Enlightenment's effort to dominate nature. The very concept of contemplation assumes that in the aesthetic and teleological field, at least, we are no longer supposed to impinge on nature, to transform it, but only to contemplate it as it is on itself. Even though contemplation manifests a passive attitude, we feel engaged in aesthetic judgement. This could have some positive moral consequences: by simply contemplating nature we let it be as it is, without falling into dogmatic (mythical or teleological) treatise of nature. It does not mean to relapse in immediacy from which Hegel warned us while we are aware of all aspects of our historical relationship towards nature.

Emily Brady also analyses in her book *The Sublime in Modern Philosophy* the connection between religious ideas and a metaphysical demonstration of God through nature. She argues that God's Epiphany relied on the notion of sublimity, not of beauty. Shaftesbury, for example, who wrote his aesthetics of nature after an expedition across the Alps in 1686, had been fascinated when contemplating the sublimity of "all Nature's wonders, served to excite and perfect the idea of their author" and to demonstrate man's fragility. Addison also emphasized the contemplation of God's greatness. Later, in the 18th century, these religious references left place to the sublimity of nature itself, examined in more secular aesthetics. "Also within theological discussions of the time a strong reverence for nature emerges, (...) making way for the nature worship of Romanticism" (Brady 2013, 38-39). I think that Kant was probably in between the teleological reverence for nature and its admiration for its own sake. Unlike his predecessors (with the exception of Edmund Burke), he strongly differentiated between the beautiful in nature, contemplated restfully, and the sublime provoking both exaltation and anxiety of the spirit.

In a book *Environment and Philosophy*, Pratt Vernon and Jane Howarth, together with Emily Brady, expose a critique of Kant's aesthetics of nature in contemporary aesthetics, for example in aesthetics of engagement of A. Berleant, who was as inspired, as opposed to phenomenology and pragmatism. They explain his thesis that in *Critique of Judgement* nature was appreciated as an object from the perspective of a disembodied, contemplative appreciator. In one important respect, though, the phenomenological approach harks back to Kant, in that it emphasises the immediacy of perception and feeling in the aesthetic response. But disinterestedness, which in part facilitates the unmediated nature of the aesthetic response for Kant, has no place in this approach. Instead, this approach assumes fullness of participation. (Vernon, Howarth, Brady 2000, 150)

They present Berleant's own aesthetic approach to nature and environment:

> Perceiving environment from within, as it were, looking not *at* it, but *in* it, nature becomes something quite different; it is transformed into a realm in which we live as participants, not observers... The aesthetic mark of all such times is not disinterested contemplation but total engagement, a sensory immersion in the natural world that reaches the still uncommon experience of unity. (Vernon, Howarth, Brady 2000, 150)

They consider that "Berleant's aesthetics of engagement values activity rather than passivity, involvement rather than distancing. (...) In the move away from a traditional or modernist aesthetic, engagement is accompanied by attention to the context or situation of the appreciator" (Vernon, Howarth, Brady 2000, 150). Here is no place for a notion of subject, but for an individual appreciator who does not only judges but feels all "emotions, values, beliefs and memories" which "become as important as the object of aesthetic attention" (Vernon, Howarth, Brady 2000, 150). Also, nature has ceased to be an abstract concept and thereby transformed into the natural environment we participate in. Before Kant's theory emphasized only a feeling of delight or enjoyment, pleasure or displeasure, but this position is too narrow for an aesthetics of engagement demanding a fully emotional participation in the natural environment.

Arnold Berleant himself emphasizes in his work *Art and Engagement* that "experience is the central term in aesthetics, and all that we can say about art and the aesthetic is in some way an elaboration of this notion." However, he would like to "escape the prevalent tendency to regard it as a purely subjective event, a tendency that emerges in phenomenology as strongly as in traditional empiricism." Berleant points out that traditional aesthetics belonged to "dualistic division between person and world. Yet this dualistic tradition of separating consciousness from an external world, so deeply ingrained in modern thought, cannot be assumed as given" (Berleant 1991, 14).

Very critical towards Kant's aesthetic of nature is also Katya Mandoki in her work *Everyday Aesthetics*. She argues that by applying categories like "the autonomy of art" and "distanced contemplation", mainstream aesthetics separates the aesthetics from ordinary life and art from reality, often with strongly religious hues. She also returns to the history of aesthetics, finding out that the idea of aesthetic disinterest had already appeared in Shaftesbury and Hume as a reaction against 'bourgeois' egotism and coarse instrumentality. It was consolidated then precisely with Kant's *Critique of Judgement*. Kant, as Shaftesbury and Hume, instituted the concept of "disinterest" to prevent "tarnishing" the judgment of beauty with worldly preoccupations and to differentiate aesthetic delight (as disinterested) from the delight in the good or the agreeable (considered as interested). It is necessary to recognize, however, continues K. Mandoky, that if the concept of "disinterested delight" would hold, it should encompass as well the delight in the good, and in the agreeable. In other words, it is possible to feel "disinterested delight" not only in beauty but also in an agreeable conversation or a kind deed.

> Additionally, one must admit, no matter how shameful, that there can be "disinterested delight" in evil when it is enjoyed for its own sake alone, since human beings are capable of disinterest in the Kantian sense not only with regard to beauty but also to ugliness and depravity. We can't take the easy way out of dismissing these real cases on the ground that they are immoral. We are aestheticians, not moralists, and it is our duty to understand them, even if morally repugnant, or rather precisely because of it. In any case, it is not so easy to differentiate objects that provide disinterested delight from those of interested delight, as Kant pretended. (Mandoki 2007, 17-18)

As Emily Brady, Katya Mandoki also favorites the position of Arnold Berleant and his use of term engagement or focused attention as an alternative to the theory of disinterestedness.

Andrew Bowie outlines strong circumstances and reasons for the emergence of Kant's aesthetics of nature, not only from philosophical but also from historical and social perspectives. However, he does not neglect the importance of cognition in Kant's explanation of the way we contemplate the beautiful. Contemplation is not an immediate pleasure but mediated by judgment. But it has no historical insight, as distinct from later Hegel's position. I think that aesthetics of engagement and everyday aesthetics do not formulate their criticism of Kant's theory by following properly his theory of the meaning of cognition, even in aesthetics. Kant tried to understand and to explain the conditions under which it is possible to feel pleasure and displeasure, to contemplate natural objects and to make our (aesthetic) judgments. Pleasure and displeasure are the general ways of feeling which do not exclude any other particular feelings. On the contrary, all the feelings may participate in the aesthetic judgment. It is true that Kant did not expose the body, but he neither did exclude it; contemplation is not disembodied, because the subject cannot sensate, perceive, feel and contemplate without his body, and is thus oriented to the subjective and empirical experience. It is rooted in our faculties (understanding, imagination). Contemplation inevitably includes a context or situation of the subject who judges a natural object from the aesthetic point of view. It is not enough to say that we are engaged in aesthetic experience: first, philosophy has to think, as Kant did, how our cognition comes to it.

Endnotes

1. Éliane Escoubas, French philosopher, assumes, that Kant's contemplative aesthetics is only aesthetics of the beautiful, especially in nature, not in art. For that reason, it is not sufficient to explain artistic creation. A contemplator is a man of taste, while a creator is a genius (Escoubas 2003, 86). Genius is original, because he doesn't create by the rules, determined in advance, and he is exemplary, because his artworks must be an exemplar for others. If genius doesn't know the rules, he is not able to explain how he came to his art works. That's why we still need a

contemplator who will judge them, concludes Escoubas. I would like to add that since Romanticism philosophers and artists were no longer satisfied with contemplative aesthetics. Friedrich Nietzsche wanted to develop his aesthetics from the perspective of genius himself, from a perspective of creation and no more that of contemplation.

2. "Beauty is the form of purposiveness in an object, so far as this is perceived in it apart from the representation of an end " (Kant 2007, §17, 66).
3. Even though contemplation is connected with calmness, restfulness and serenity, while sublime provokes anxiety, displeasure and delight, too, we can doubt whether it is appropriate to treat contemplation and sublime so strictly apart? For example, paintings of Caspar David Friedrich provoke a deep contemplation, because they are beautiful by form but sublime by metaphysical content (the smallness of man in front of nature, the endless horizons of the sky and the sea, longing for transcendence, fear of death, passing, ruination, and so on). From this point of view, Kant's limitation of contemplation to the *Analytic of Beautiful* seems too narrow.

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Seeking Community in a Divided World

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Abstract:

Seeking Community in a Divided World seeks a common moral vision amongst values diversity. It recognizes the value confusion and conflicts burdening our lives but asks for dialogical conversation based on such principles, as human integrity and dignity, decency, fairness, responsibility, and equality. These common, but uncommon values are a framework for building moral communities. We acknowledge that our lives are a web of relationships and that ethical bonds are needed for building strong moral communities, nations, and the protection of the environment. Although this article provides no absolutes, it is tasked with presenting a moral ecology of persons grounded in moral human relationships. The time has come for a renewed conversation about the values that sustain a free people.

Keywords: American exceptionalism, Beliefs, Bill of Rights, Common good, Community, Core values, Deep ecology, Democracy, Ethics, Ethnocentrism, Open society, Pluralism, Shared morality, Values.

Seeking a Common Moral Vision

"As with all other commons, the moral commons require constant vigilance to maintain. Aristotle sounded that warning. 'That which is common to the greatest number,' he wrote, 'has the least care bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an individual. For besides other considerations, everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another to fulfill'." (Rushworth M. Kidder 2009)

Practical, there is both good and evil in the world. By good is meant behaviors that enhance human well-being and by evil, behaviors that do not. This is not a theoretical conclusion only, but one based on experience. Thus, it is of little consequence to debate one moral theory over another or argue over the sources of either good or evil. What is needed is a dedicated effort for bringing together those who espouse good in a mutual seeking of a common or shared morality. Obviously, we are all ethnocentric[1] (Hester and Killian 1975) and view the world from our nicely furrowed beliefs and lifestyles, but our innate ethnocentrism is no argument for neglecting this task or for building fences around our values. Fences not only keep others out, they also keep us in, enslaved to a narrow provincialism blocking all efforts for dialogical discussion.

Most humans share a common, but uncommon, moral vision. As history shows, we value freedom and equality, respect and integrity; importantly we value fair-treatment and responsibility. From third world countries to the most affluent, these values are prized. In December 1948 and within the ephemeral glow of WWII, these values were embodied in a Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly. Articulating the values in this declaration was perhaps a pragmatic assessment coming from the worldwide devastation that had passed, yet, ethicists – secular and religious – remain divided on their foundation, a division revealed historically in the feminist and civil rights movements of the 1960s and more recently, in the treatment of immigrants coming into this country. Philosophically, this debate continues chiefly among those espousing a secular basis for ethics (pragmatists) and those (the religious) finding ethics based on the authority of an ancient faith, although both leading to similar conclusions. (Rorty 1999, 148-167) In order to move ahead with moral national and world repair, in our seeking necessitates we put away such insignificant arguing and fully comprehend the world around us, including the consequences of our actions, both secular and religious.

Notably, our beliefs and assumptions are revealed in the language we use and in the language we choose. This is an intuitive, normative insight revealed in the culture wars (See Hunter 1990; Wuthnow 1989) of the late 20th century. Of course, religious controversy is nothing new in America. Perhaps, this is the price we pay for living in an open, democratic society. As the faith-based initiatives of the Bush administration were rolled out, Albert J. Raboteau[2] (2005) noted that American democracy offers religion an opportunity and American pluralism provides it with a challenge: to respect the differences found in others and to show tolerance and understanding for their ideas and values. Ideally, seeking values-unity in a divided world rejects flagrant values relativism, understanding that there is something within our moral principles common to all. Pluralism challenges Americans to experience its religious values and with tolerance, to respect the secular values embodied in the US Constitution and the freedoms it exemplifies. Here, hopefully, common ground in ethics will be found.

For example, the three major Biblical faiths that dominate the American religious scene – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam – have an underlying ethic that, when exposed to critical inquiry, have within their creeds common moral ideals also accentuated by secular ethicists. (Hester 2003, 27-53; 77-98) Regrettably, since 9/11/01, the divide between East and West has widened with many Evangelical Christians pushing to "reclaim America for God." Religious intolerance reveals a moral deficit and a source of unending conflict dividing the religious, as well as the religious and secularists. With these claims garnering the headlines, in the 21st century many secular ethicists have once again begun to rail against Evangelical Christianity with the force of logic and scientific certitude. (See Wright 1995; Dawkins 2006; Harris 2011)

A shared morality[3] calls for no absolutes but strongly recommends giving consideration to human rights, dignity, and integrity with diminished emphasis on faith or the lack thereof. Our values are revealed in our actions and without personal integrity and decency, respectability and civility, there seems to be no morality at all. In their teacher sourcebook, "Learning to Live Together in Peace and Harmony" UNESCO-APNIEVE said,

> Learning to live together in peace and harmony is a dynamic, holistic and lifelong process through which mutual respect, understanding, caring and sharing, compassion, social' responsibility, solidarity, acceptance and tolerance of diversity among individuals and groups (ethnic, social, cultural, religious, national and regional) are internalized and practiced together to solve problems and to work towards a just and free, peaceful and democratic society. This process begins with the development of inner peace in the minds and hearts of individuals engaged in the search for truth, knowledge and understanding of each other's cultures, and the appreciation of shared common values to achieve a better future. Learning to live together in peace and harmony requires that quality of relationships at all levels is committed to peace, human rights, democracy and social justice in an ecologically sustainable environment.[4]

We live in a democratic nation that influences the political and economic welfare of many other nations. Thus, understanding personal and national values is both common sense and necessary. Without this understanding, ethical behaviors will be lost in a cultural pluralism that has no moral foundation. Awareness is perhaps the first step we take this understanding. Also, when we voluntarily use our beliefs and values in the public forum to support our views, the behaviors they recommend require public scrutiny and reconsideration.[5] (See Dacey 2008) As gun violence has today seeped into our society, becoming an unusual norm, accepted by many "as just the way things are," maybe it is time to revisit the 2nd Amendment of the Constitution and give it serious reconsideration. Given over 200 years have passed since their writing, our Bill of Rights could possibly require reshaping as the 21st and 18th centuries are vastly different.

Perhaps we naively assume that America remains an open society, but the 2016 political debates revealed an inherent close-mindedness and ethical ethnocentrism closing many doors to reason and dialectical conversation. Ideally, in an open society, when personal values are exposed publically, they are released to the assessment of others. This is the scaffolding upon which objectivity and impartiality are built. We should not forget the importance of a free press. A free press opens society to an impartial forum for individual expression, but when compromised, instills values confusion making moral appraisal difficult. We are daily faced with extending our moral applications to include cultural, gender, ethnic, and religious diversity acknowledging their importance in the makeup of a democratic culture. A shared morality is needed with the implied consequences of a decrease in violence in the world, living in peace and harmony with one another, examining the conditions of our physical environment, and above all else, openly re-thinking the values we have inherited from past generations. A live-and-let-live attitude – taking our rights and freedoms for granted – is unable to sustain a moral democracy. More is required of us and this doesn't mean we should just observe and blame others, but take a careful assessment of our own attitudes and cherished values as well, identifying those that promote community and civility and discarding those that do not. As Arthur Schopenhauer reminded, "The nature of the eye is to look not at itself but at other things; and therefore to observe and blame faults in another is a very suitable way of becoming conscious of one's own. We require a looking-glass for the due dressing or our morals." (Schopenhauer 1995, 70)

Understandably, all societies have core values they call the "common good." But, in promoting civility, we are faced with acknowledging the core values of others. This will be difficult and dangerous as self-evaluation is more often than not a biased unearthing of the values lying at the core of our lives. As James Christian (1986, 88ff; 174ff) warns us, "We never see the real world. We see only fragments of life, never the whole." We are often blinded by present circumstances; the past invariably sneaks in coloring what we say, the decisions we make, and the dreams we share. Removing the chinks, shards, and often unrecognized biases preventing us from uniting with others in peace and with security is a pressing need. Thus, comprehending the moral depth of democracy necessitates our acknowledging, seeking community in a divided world, a moral activity involving us all.

Taking in the values, traditions, and cultures of others and learning from them is a daily task. For democracy to survive as a moral ideal, we must seek out and articulate the shared values that support our diversity, pluralism, and democratic standards. This is, of course, a moral ideal of utmost importance and represents a 21st-century crisis. It's a bridge-building attitude that doesn't divide and separate, seeks ways to keep families together, doesn't lump all people, particularly immigrants, into the same negative and unlawful categories, and is able to bring nations together in harmony rather than with violence and war. It seeks ways of holding on to immigrants, especially, giving them the opportunities our nation provides. We want them to learn from us, to enjoy, and live in the peace and the opportunities democracy brings. This, I believe, is being faithful to our core values—life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

It goes without saying that our conversations with others will be meaningful to the extent they are infused with dignity and mutual respect. When they (whoever they are) join the conversation with the same attitudes, we are optimistic that a shared ethical vision can be found; this is our social hope. Richard Rorty expressed this when he wrote, "Hope—the ability to believe that the future will be unspecifiably different from, and unspecifiably freer than, the past—is the condition of growth." (Rorty 1999, 120) There are many who tend to ignore the recognized facts and common values enabling moral growth. Encased in their own narcissism, they barely see beyond their own needs and wants. This is disabling to those seeking a wider, more inclusive ethic. To have a common vision in no way negates individuality or particular viewpoints. A common vision is able to bring unity to our perceived diversity, seeking areas where agreement is possible. Even the hate-mongers demonstrating in Charlottesville, Virginia in 2017 drew on their shared democratic rights to support their protesting. But, "What matters," says Rorty "is the ability to experience overpowering hope, or faith, or love (or, sometimes rage)." (Rorty 1999, 161) Hopefully, we can all agree on this.

Thus, included within our common vision will be the franchised and disenfranchised, the powerful and those who lack political and economic power. Without apologizing, we should avoid coercing values into a preconceived shape unsupported by reason, yet heralded by our ethnocentric propensities, hidden values, or suspect information. Facts, especially, are not always what they appear to be and bear the weight of personal interpretation. Also, we should avoid radical individualism espousing a personal "morality" only. What is needed is a sensible pluralism that recognizes the integrity and dignity of a shared humanity. The word "humanity" includes a host of moral indicators, including care, dignity, and benevolence. To many, this may seem a rather liberal and disconcerting idea, but we should give it some thought. We are the heirs of a democratic experience and are still learning how people with differences can live together with some degree of comity.

Civility, Engaging the Moral Community

"Indeed, community is built and maintained through value-connections and personal relationships the loss of which, whatever the compensations gained economically or elsewhere, is a genuine loss and threatens [its] fabric." - Richard N. Goodwin[6]

As we seek community in a divided world, we understand that community is built on relationships. A moral community is thus inclusive, emphasizing human rights and dignity for all people, respectful of diversity, the environment, and consequence-sensitive. This doesn't mean that morality is simply about ends only, about consequences and results, and it doesn't deny the consequences of our behavior as morally important. From a moral point of view, both the intentions and consequences of behavior are significant.

Our seeking will be a dialogue among differences, but in time we learn that our lives are largely built on a scaffolding of relationships. Understanding this takes many years, as most of us learn this lesson late in life. Relationships - good and bad - create the web of our lives. Finding purpose in our web is difficult, for much that happens to us is either incidental or accidental. Purpose is intentional and when we discover our moral purpose, we are able to maneuver through life in more productive ways. By the way we conduct our lives, it is important we find our moral center, consistently articulating and living it daily.

Human relationship-building can be an *untidy business* but it is within the arena of human attachments where we find more about whom we are and the importance of dignity, equality, and fairness. As emotions intensify, we should perhaps underscore the commonsensical suggestion of J.S. Mill[7] (1979) who urged that good things are to be promoted and bad things minimized and that the appropriateness of our actions depends on the extent to which they succeed in bringing this about. Mill noted that an open society with an inclusive education for its youth, based on a culture of conversation and respect, cannot survive the toleration of intolerance, intimidation, and violence. The change we wish to see in the world must begin with each of us.

This untidiness is often revealed in our actions and the reasons for our actions, as we find ends and means are always and constantly related; sometimes in conflict. Even in times of war the violation of the rights of prisoners, especially by a nation espousing human rights, draws our condemnation. Also, an important signal of the moral veracity of a nation is how it treats "the least among us." The "least" includes the poor and disenfranchised, children, the elderly, the handicapped, and immigrants and, above all, those who are called "Dreamers". Casting America as a democratic and moral nation we can ask, "What measures can be taken to enhance our moral character and what activities block our moral veracity?" Our personal and shared values will constitute the ground floor of this dialogue.

Morally deviant behavior is a fact of life, a fact indicating our moral compass may point in many directions, revealing the relativity of values. Brian Orchard (2008) believes we all have moral capacity and this capacity is tempered by time, place, and circumstance; thus, he believes that morality and moral values just may be relative with no hope of finding any common ground; yet, given our moral capacity, we hope that we can. This may sound idealistic, but we believe it remains both a pragmatic and normative necessity in an otherwise morally confused and disjointed world. It was John Rawls (2001, 151) who expressed hope for an overlapping consensus of all major political and religious ideologies for a reasonable moral pluralism supported by public reason. Rawls defined "reason" as that which people with different ideas and beliefs could agree upon and that we would be able to endorse by asking whether this (whatever action is being debated) is something that we can live with, given the difficulties of judgment, the pluralities of society, and its resulting political culture. But saying this doesn't make it so; diligence and commitment are required.

We may have our doubts, but these should be relieved and our hope strengthened by the involvement of our youth with their demonstrations and discussions of gun control and general violence in our society. This is uplifting and signals a change in American politics from political expediency to that of moral reconsideration, even moral recovery. To the degree that societies are "open" is the degree to which their citizens are willing to talk and negotiate what it means to be a morally-based culture. "Openness" doesn't imply moral fence-sitting or a willing acceptance of all values, or particular values espousing violence and hate – values that are an antithesis to democracy. In accepting any value or of all values, we generally become a "valueless" society. Openness challenges our critical understanding and welcomes dialogue and discussion, a genuine seeking of shared values. (See Bloom 1997) Implied is a critical reassessment of personal values and, in general, the values definitive of American national life. A willingness to reassess is possibly the only hope we have for some kind of moral objectivity.

In 2008, John Ragozzine (2008) expressed his views about moral education, He wrote,

> As our nation emerges from several decades of determinedly values-neutral education; efforts to weave ethics and integrity into the fabric of education still meet skepticism. The arguments against it are as varied as they are trite. Aren't we already doing this? Isn't all ethics relative anyway? Are you

saying my child is unethical? Are you trying to impose your values on my family? Whose values are you trying to teach, anyway?

Ragozzine concludes,

> Ours is an age of inordinate moral confusion. Every day's headlines report big-picture dilemmas with no clear solution: international terrorism, regional warfare, global warming, energy shortages, corporate scandals, nuclear proliferation, and endemic corruption. At a more granular level, this bewilderment appears in a litany of national and local ethical lapses, where values are subverted, integrity is abandoned, and moral courage is given short shrift. ...little wonder, then, that parents are searching for schools where character matters, where values are in focus, and where moral reasoning and ethical behavior are central to the educational culture. Parents often find those qualities in the nation's private schools, so many of which are deliberately trying to achieve a culture of responsibility, respect, honesty, fairness. A central aspect of the appeal of private education—a key reason that parents willingly pay for an alternative to what, in North America, is available free in every community—lies in the commitment of private education to developing students of character.

Obviously, a significant part of education is to help students achieve moral clarity. To accomplish this task, we must place personal values in a larger context of a shared morality with the goal of developing more civil families, institutions, and communities. This goal is what some call a narrow, but important role of ethics. A wider view extends this conversation culturally and inter-culturally into the moral commons of the global community. A person who is committed to inter-cultural communication recognizes the importance of keeping culture-specific ideas and beliefs in perspective. Understanding and respect will provide a foundation for moral reasoning encouraging discussion and dialogue about what is deemed important in one's life, nation, and the world.

Ronald C. Arnett (2006, 315-338) supports this ideal and makes a pragmatic case for civility as a conversation for negotiating personal, institutional, and national differences. He says, "We live in a time in which ethical standpoints that traditionally have undergirded discourse are in contrast, dispute, and disruption. Dialogic civility is an interpersonal metaphor grounded in the public domain and in a pragmatic commitment to keeping the conversation going in a time of narrative confusion and virtue fragmentation." This is a pressing need.

Concentrating on ethical problem-solving is a constant reminder that we live in a globally shared world that at times can be violent, confusing and disruptive. A global ethic will involve an extension of our personal and community norms concerning how nations ought to function in relation to each other, to global politics, society, and the economy. Such discussions will also entail how nations treat their citizens, especially racial and religious minorities and the economically disenfranchised, and how they treat immigrants freeing war and devastation. In America and without, we should not underestimate the quest for power, especially the promotion of American "exceptionalism" with its concomitant disregard for others who are culturally, religiously, ethnically, and sexually different. Unrestrained power can have a corrupting and negative effect, pushing the marginalized among us to the back edges of hope, and, as it fences others out, it has the tendency to fence us in - into a narrow and radical provincialism that shrinks our moral horizon. To break down the barriers that separate us from others, attention should be given to the following:

1. Ethics and Values – The emphasis on ethics isn't superficial or intermittent, but is significant to the everyday life and to learning. In our families, schools, and communities we should develop a clear appreciation for the role of ethics and values in building strong, positive democratic civil groups and governments.
2. Thinking Critically and Logically – Critical thinking is a key component in life, as it is in learning. It values independent thought and standards for clear and conscientious reasoning. We don't always have to agree, but we have to figure out what we believe and articulate our beliefs clearly and consistently.
3. Learning the Importance of Relationships and Civility – A key to building relationships and civility is the ability to trust each other. This will come slowly, as personal values often blind us to the acceptance of the worth and dignity of others.

Awareness is Our Greatest Ally

"The moral faculties are generally esteemed, and with justice, as of higher value than the intellectual powers. But we should always bear in mind that the activity of the mind in vividly recalling past impressions is one of the fundamental though secondary bases of conscience. This fact affords the strongest argument for educating and stimulating in all possible ways the intellectual faculties of every human being" - (Charles Darwin 2011, 393)

We acknowledge and accept value shifts and recognize variations in moral views. And we generally acknowledge on-going human conflict as irresolvable differences in the human moral spirit. We have been unable to find a shared moral ground with all nations and all people. Most accept this as normal and some say we never will, admitting that provincial values are personal, community, or cultural absolutes. We react and often discriminate against others whom we perceive are hostile to our values and beliefs. These perceived threats come from different religions, powerful nations, aggressive attacks within and outside our national borders, people with political differences than our own, from different ethnic groups inhabiting our national borders, and from religious groups who espouse gender inequality. These are some of the barriers to sustaining civil communities and nations. Awareness is important and we should understand the importance of the many values compromising our lives.

And we can learn from our youth – perhaps more than their parents they are accepting of individual differences, less critical and more tolerant. We all need (mental and physical) room, a forum, in which we can explore different ideas and courses of action, and express our opinions in a non-coercive and non-intimidating setting. We need a place to examine our beliefs and values and practice civility in the give-and-take of argument and the rational interchange of ideas. There aren't many places like this left; hopefully, the school classroom will emerge as such a place.

When we willingly engage in this conversation we will naturally find connections to our cultural histories. These connections will add ethical perspective in a world beset with mixed value-messages. We are faced with clarifying our own ideas about significant contemporary issues and problems. Perhaps our most cherished beliefs and values will be put to the test through interaction with others. In part, to build a better world, we must think and think seriously about our values and behaviors and apply our rational and human instincts for the creation of consistent moral standards for living.

Opening our minds to all modes of thinking and to views different from our own is important for understanding value diversity. This is an inner moral task and should be an ongoing dialogue between us and others. The challenge is difficult, but the need is great. One person who caught this moral vision is Dr. Lewis Zirkle, who created SIGN, Surgical Implant Generation Network. The mission of SIGN is to promote equality of fracture care throughout the world by providing free orthopedic implants to poor patients in developing countries. SIGN and Dr. Zirkle not only provide free orthopedic implants but takes them to these countries and teaches surgeons there how to use them. Both professionals and nonprofessionals have opportunities for moral leadership and it is important we search for them, follow-up on our moral commitments, and demonstrate our service-leadership capacity.

Having grown up with Lew Zirkle, when he said, "This is just the right thing to do," I was not surprised. He has dedicated his time, energy and much of his own money to this project. Moral insight is necessary; more importantly is moral commitment and putting our values into practice for the service of others.[8] (Foltz 2009) Through his trust, time, and teaching, Dr. Lewis Zirkle has created a worldwide community of surgeons, engineers, and volunteers that is ongoing and compliments his moral vision of serving poor people around the world with his time and talents. Morally important is our effort to capture this vision and act upon it.

Conversations That Matter

"We live in a time in which ethical standpoints that traditionally have undergirded discourse are in contrast, dispute, and disruption. Dialogic civility is an interpersonal metaphor grounded in the public domain and in a pragmatic commitment to keeping the conversation going in a time of narrative confusion and virtue fragmentation" - (Ronald C. Arnett 2006)

How to act under conditions of incomplete information is the highest and most urgent human pursuit.[9] As T. S. Eliot wrote, "Words, strain, crack, and sometimes break, under the burden."[10] When cultures interconnect economically, socially, and religiously, these circumstances often leave us in a hopeless morass of confusing and often conflicting opinions. Knowledge is important and so are facts, but both bear the stain of individual, political, and religious interpretation.[11] Pointing to the randomness of human behavior many think a commonly shared ethic is impossible to achieve. This is often used as a reason for protecting and expressing traditional, habitual values as moral absolutes. A willingness to engage in dialectical discussions about our values, about searching for a common ethic, is one of the greatest challenges of the modern world.

Three kinds of overlapping conversations will energize our discussion of values. These are ground floor discussions foundationally needed to reach the ceiling of a moral human ecology our ideals project:

First: we begin by examining our basic value assumptions and the principles that guide our lives. We will be tested to put our values in a broader context of American identity and then, in the context of global pluralism. With the emergence of Islamic terrorism and acknowledging America as a nation of immigrants, thoughtful consideration, as well as action, is needed. Also, with the political climate of 2017 sending mixed value messages, perhaps we too are confused. Examining and identifying our fundamental value commitments are important. We then need to rank our values in degrees of personal, community, and even national importance and highlight those values we share with others. This is one step leading to moral consensus in a globally shared world.

Several strategies guide this conversation:

1) We will be confronted with clarifying, explaining, and supporting our assumptions and provide reasons for their acceptance by others.
2) Also, the requirements of tolerance and civility obligate us not to attack or critique the sources (family, church, beliefs etc.) of another's values, only to judge their means, intent, and consequences as they shape human behavior.
3) Once we use our values publically, we unhinge them from our private world and provide an open forum for discussion and reflective consideration by others. An attitude of openness and respect for diversity will enable us to move forward in becoming identifiable ethical communities.
4) Finally, verbal clarity is important. Words used in their cultural context often vary in meaning. Seeking a shared ground for understanding values and morals entails an honest dialogue between persons, organizations, and nations. Following this prescription will be challenging, but without it, a shared moral vision cannot take root and flourish.

Second: we move forward by articulating the moral principles generated from our shared values. Our discussions will involve searching not only for moral principles but for moral consistency as well. Moral principles will include the following and much more:

1) Principle: We should strive to be people of good character.
2) Principle: Because we are all different, we should have a right to hold and express our personal values.
3) Principle: We should care for one another.
4) Principle: We should always treat others with dignity and appreciation.
5) Principle: Love your neighbor as yourself.

6) Principle: We ought not to discriminate against others but value their individual rights and personal dignity.

7) Principle: All humans have the same inalienable rights; namely, the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

8) Principle: We ought to promote the greatest good for the greatest number.

9) Principle: We ought to always try to understand the views of others and be more tolerant of human diversity and differences.

Third: the application of our moral beliefs usually occurs in a rule-making form, sometimes in law. Our families have rules and so do our schools; we are a nation of laws and embedded in law are many unarticulated moral ideals. Discovering or recognizing these moral principles is important for they provide both guidance and sanctions helping to stabilize communities. In our families, schools, and workplaces moral principles become the ethical rules by which we live. They should be identified and discussed for they are used to judge behavior as good or bad, right or wrong. Consistency is important. A lack of consistency renders personal, social or institutional moral judgments arbitrary, without foundation or merit. These rules will have a personal flavor but encouraged by our moral vision, we are encouraged to discover values we share in common, values having community-building and world-building power.

A Life of Civility

"Dialogic civility calls us to public respect as we work to co-constitutively discover the minimal communication background assumptions necessary to permit persons of difference to shape together the communicative terrain of the 21st century. Dialogic civility is ultimately a reminder that life is best lived with concern for self, others, and sensitive implementation with the historical moment, while consistently reminding us that our communicative actions have public consequences that shape the communicative lives of many people." (Ronald C. Arnett and Pat Arneson 1999, 277)

Our purpose is normative, recommending moral civility in our treatment of others and understanding the normative nature of our living environment. Nature, our physical environment, is often perceived as a fact, but it's actually a value that undergirds our physical survival. Treating nature as a value means treating nature as we wish to be treated. It is better to be inclusive in our definition of morality and civility than narrow and exclusive. Courtesy, politeness, manners, and civility are all forms of other-awareness. Being civil means weaving restraint, respect, and consideration into the fabric of this perception. Civility is a form of gracious goodness toward others and the environment that sustains our living. Ideally, civility is the actualization of morality within and between persons, communities, societies, cultures, and nature. It requires vigilance to maintain and is not an unconscious process.

Thus, seeking a shared morality, a common moral point of view among uncommon values, entails the extension of civility to a much wider humanity than just our own society and nation. It also entails a moral ecology of persons, all persons, based on positive moral relationships. Yet, we should understand our values will be communicated with personal, cultural and self-referential speech. And we will be biased but must work to overcome our prejudices. In our inferences about others are hidden assumptions calling out to be exhumed and clarified. This will be difficult and more difficult for those entrenched in narrow beliefs they are unwilling to appraise.

Moral objectivity is, of course, unattainable if we do not commit ourselves to this purpose. Yet, it remains a goal to which we should aim. We are not asking others to be neutral, only open-minded and tolerant. We are summarily challenged to cleanse our cultural lenses of their biases, rethink our most cherished beliefs, and act morally. We know this will be difficult, but we must try. We are compelled by our own humanity to search for values emphasizing human rights, integrity, respect for persons, and human dignity. Being moral and civil and making a commitment to protect our natural environment are demanding behaviors to consistently maintain.

That human beings should communicate and come together in moral unification seems a natural predilection, but when social cohesion and civility are eroded, trust and social isolation are often the results. But, be aware; social isolation and social fragmentation can be destructive.[12] (See Caccioppo and Patrick 2008) They come at the price of losing our identity as persons, our self-worth. Being alone, either as persons or isolated as nations, is destructive to moral health. National-isolation, like self-Isolation, usually ends up in finger pointing and attitudes of superiority. Feelings of national or religious exceptionalism, more often than not, negate our moral vision. This can happen personally and nationally. A disconnect from others means we must work hard to consciously and deliberately build stronger human bonds. We should never miss an opportunity to do this. Yet, many believe a dialogical discussion of ethics with the purpose of reaching a common (shared) moral point of view will mean giving up a part of who they are. The strain of individualism has a strong hold on us and this makes self-evaluation difficult. Lorenz Sells (2013) comments:

> When the attributes of our identity are externalized, those attributes control us. Our sense of self worth becomes dependent on external considerations. We must have enough money, means, and status in order to consider ourselves happy. In pursuit of maintaining this false sense of happiness, we cling all the more strongly to external identifiers because so much self worth emanates from them. It can take losing these things, losing our identity, to see our true nature outside of them. (...) We choose the people we hang out with, the things we do, and the stuff we buy. That choice comes from somewhere. The source of that choice is much closer to our identity than the product. To understand our choices we must examine why we do the things that we do.
>
> In experiencing my loss of identity, I could see that many of my actions were motivated by a desire for external recognition. I was either trying to impress others or worried about how they would judge me. However, any situation where myself expression is contingent upon the validation of others is bound to limit me from being myself. And if I'm not being myself, how can I possibly be happy?
>
> True identity is being true to oneself. For me this is cultivating genuine self respect and a willingness to be vulnerable. This makes for a more flexible identity that is based on how I feel about my actions

rather than the outcome of my actions. If I feel good then I know my behavior is aligned with values that bring me real happiness.

No one is exempt from this malady. The tragedy of this fear is twofold: first is the pain and loss of freedom and belonging, coming from trying to hide who we are, masking our true selves. The other is a loss of those effective relationships necessary to resolving everyday moral dilemmas. These losses make an honest discussion of values virtually impossible. They also limit our ability to reach across familial or social boundaries with respect, compassion, and benevolence. They make ineffective our voice in the moral commons. But people see how we live and this always colors what we say. The difficulties in self-disclosure are apparent as are the difficulties in living this message. This will not be a popular nor easy road to follow. Today we are challenged to bring forth and orchestrate all the rhythms of human awakening that have ever been in our search for what we can become.

In Conclusion: Relationships Define Our Values

"Deep ecology does not separate humans – or anything else – from the natural environment. It sees the world not as a collection of isolated objects, but as a network of phenomena that are fundamentally interconnected and interdependent. Deep ecology recognizes the intrinsic value of all living being and views humans as just a particular strand in the web of life." – (Fritjof Capra 1996, 5)

There are hidden connections – connections and relationships that define who we are and how we respond to others. After all, we are not merely influenced by things, but our thoughts about things. (Schopenhauer 1995, 25) Our hidden values can be revealed by reason and by introspection, but reason is not their source. They lie much deeper in our cultural background. Often what is of importance to us as sacred and eternal is blocked from us by our cultural beliefs, habits of the mind, and hurried activities. (See Wittgenstein 1984) Indeed, seeking community in a divided world projects a precarious vision. About this vision I lament: Assumptions gathered like a blanket they cover a mind that queries, a voice that speaks Courage mustered, troops ready for battle Self-affirmation perhaps the goal I seek.

Our cultural, beliefs and assumptions are revealed in the language we use and in the language we choose. So, care must be taken when discussing our values. What is it that we assume as true that others do not? Do these assumptions prevent effective dialogue; do they stop communication before it actually begins? Is truth only personal, a standard we project in our social lives for judging our values and those of others? So, we hope. "Hope" is a metaphor implying the intrinsic nature of human commitment and motivation – the real that is hidden behind what appears to be. And hope doesn't imply just wishing for something better to happen. Hope is not merely a future projection but implies an ethic that is internalized and activated in every moment of life as our present decisions are the antecedal properties of the hope we project. Indeed, as Hume noted, the mind does have a "great propensity to spread itself on external objects."[13] In this pursuit, honesty in self-inspection and awareness of the values of others is our greatest ally.

There is little that is uniform and structured about an inquiring mind. Much about us - religious, political, philosophical etc. - falls into the well of the unexamined. Immanuel Kant commented in a moment of insight, "Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made."[14] So, Kant gave us a "purely" rational rule to follow – to help make us straight. We are reminded by Isaiah Berlin "To force people into the neat uniforms demanded by dogmatically believed-in schemes [moral or otherwise] is almost always the road to inhumanity. We can do only what we can, but that we must do against difficulties." (Berlin 1998, 16) Culture and the presuppositions and values it holds will always maintain a normative sway over our lives pushing us toward a unified, integrated, way of life, a life without deficiency, but this can be deceptive for, as we are aware, incognizant and unrestrictive cultural habits are often discombobulated and divisive. Yet, there remains a social hope for ethical unity and for a universal moral human community. And this hope is an assumption driving ethics, both secular and religious.

As Emerson so aptly wrote, "Every man takes care that his neighbor shall not cheat him. But a day comes when he begins to care that he does not cheat his neighbor. Then all goes well. He has changed his market cart into a chariot of the sun. What a day dawns, when we have taken to heart the doctrine of faith! to prefer, as a better investment, being to doing; being to seeming; logic to rhythm and to display; the year to the day; the life to the year; character to performance; and now have come to know, that justice will be done us; and if our genius is slow, the term will be long"[15]

Mitch Album said it this way, "The way you get meaning into your life is to devote yourself to loving others, devote yourself to your community around you, and devote yourself to creating something that gives you purpose and meaning." (Album 2011, 43) On the other hand, people whose values are restricted to the immediate, with little knowledge of the past, and who maintain a shallow outlook of the future have limited moral growth. They live their lives on the surface and give little thought to issues that have moral meaning and purpose. Teachers, ministers, politicians, and civic leaders should begin discussions of morality, ethics, and civility. We should also give serious thought to what we value in ourselves and what we value in others. We are faced with an enormous task of articulating a moral ecology of persons grounded in moral human relationships. We are indeed, seekers of community in a divided world.

Endnotes

1. The argument here is that humans are naturally ethnocentric and this is reflected in their values and the justification of their values, and is something that potentially prevents objectivity, but something we should work to overcome.
2. Albert J. Raboteau, "American salvation, the place of Christianity in public life" (Boston Review, April/May 2005). http://bostonreview.net/archives/BR30.2/raboteau.php. Raboteau says, "If American democracy offers religion an opportunity, American pluralism offers it a challenge. Pluralism challenges us to experience religion as more than a cultural identity. Pluralism means encountering the values and attitudes and beliefs of others with

respect for those who hold them. Pluralism, when taken seriously as respect for difference, rejects relativism for avoiding the hard truth that we do indeed differ. It is the difficult road we walk to achieve a mature understanding of the truth and the opportunity to share that truth with others who are seeking it. It challenges us to appropriate, internalize, and live out the religious identity passed to us by family and society. It creates an opportunity to discuss and to argue for one's own position."

3. "Moral Human Ecology": a holistic ethic that will include persons, nations, and the physical environment based on the idea of "deep ecology," enriching the perception that our lives are a network of fundamentally interconnected and interdependent relationships.
4. *Learning to live together in peace and harmony; values education for peace, human rights, democracy and sustainable development for the Asia-Pacific region*: *a UNESCO-APNIE VE sourcebook for teacher education and tertiary level education,* p. 4 (Bangkok: UNESCO PROAP, 1998). http://unesdoc.unesco.org/ images/0011/001 1 4 3/114357eo.pdf.
5. In this book Dacey makes a case for the public assessment of our values.
6. Goodwin, Richard N., "Reflections: The American condition," *New Yorker,* 21 and 28 January & 4 February, 1974; I, 35-60; II, 36-68; III, 48-91.
7. For clarification, see: *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, "John Stuart Mill." https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/.
8. I did not know about Lew's work until a mutual friend loaned me Foltz's book. I was not surprised when I read it
9. Taleb, Nassim, *Philosophy now, a magazine of ideas.* In this interview Taleb says, "My idea concerns decision-making under conditions of uncertainty, dealing with incomplete information, and living in a world that has a more complicated ecology than we tend to think. This question about justifiable responses to the unknown goes way beyond the conventionally-phrased 'problem of induction' and what people call 'scepticism'. These classifications are a little too tidy for real life. Alas, the texture of real life is more sophisticated and more demanding than analytical philosophy can apparently handle. The point is to avoid 'being the turkey'. [*There is a philosophical parable about a turkey who on the basis of daily observations concludes that he's always fed at 9am. On Christmas Eve he discovers this was an overhasty generalisation – Ed.*] To do so you have to stand some concepts on their head – like your concept of the use of beliefs in decision making." https://philosophynow.org/ issues/69/Nassim _Nicholas_Taleb.
10. Eliot, T. S., Four Quartets, Lines 152-155 (http://www.davidgorman.com/4Quartets/1-norton.htm).
11. Nietzsche, Friedrich: "There are no facts, only interpretations." A quote commonly attributed to Friedrich Nietzsche.
12. The American Psychological Associations says, "Cacioppo's findings also show that prolonged loneliness can be as harmful to your health as smoking or obesity. On the flip side, they demonstrate the therapeutic power of social connection and point the way toward making that healing balm available to everyone." See also, http://psycnet.apa.org/record/2008-07755-000.
13. David Hume, *A Treatise on Human Nature* (London: John Noon, 1739) as quoted and analyzed by Daniel C. Dennett (2017, 354-370).
14. In an English translation of original 1784 article: "Idea of a Universal History on a Cosmo-Political Plan" in the *London Magazine,* pp. 335-393.
15. Emerson, R. W., quoted in the *Friends' Intelligencer*, Vol. 72, p. 401.

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Gender Equality: Global Development and Status

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Abstract:

Gender equality holds the key–position in the worldwide development. In every society people, as male and as female, are expected to make some exclusive role performance. This role internalization is done through the process of gender socialization. Irrespective of gender, people have equal access to the resources and services necessary to achieve their individual potential and fulfill their obligations to household, community and more broadly, society. Traditionally, the expected role performance of the female places them in a secondary position in the social structure and in the minds of men and women alike. All institutions–social, economic, political, religious and ideological have been dominated by men. Despite legislative steps prejudices, traditional attitudes and practices continue to perpetrate discrimination against women and actually, no country in the world can claim to have fully achieved gender equality. In the light of global developments on the issue, this paper will examine the steps taken so far by the society/government and make necessary suggestions, wherever possible keeping in view the practical approach of the problem. Since the issue is global, variations in status and state are bound to occur, but it would take a larger view of the matter in the interest of humanity as a whole.

Keywords: Society, Nation, Gender Equality, Challenges, Prospect.

Introduction

The term "gender" arose as an analytical tool for analyzing the inequalities between the sexes due to the patriarchal institutional structures. It started with assessing gender role and gender analysis, gender needs, gender interests and perspectives. At present, the entire world community and the developing nations, like India in particular, is focusing its attention on matters relating to gender discrimination which led to societal imbalances. The realization of the necessity of bringing to the limelight the issues of gender, gender equality, gender inequality has been primarily due to the fact that women constitute one of the crucial segments of the human population and it is widely accepted that without the active participation of women, all developmental programmes remain fruitless. Women's special status and women's debilitated status stem from a common ideology, from a belief in an essentialist, biological and psychological incapacity which spans not only assessment of physical capability but also mental capacity (Edwards 1985,11). Be they philosophers, religious preachers, political leaders, social reformers or scientists, they all justified the inferior status of women in society. The natural differentiation between man and woman does not imply inequalities. Yet, natural and social differentiations have been manipulated through the creation of systems of stratification and pattern of inequality.

In this regard, the notion of society needs to be understood in terms of social conditions which specified the women to particular types of works and assigns that provided them lower status than that of men. Her lower status, in comparison to men, is generally irrationally legitimatized on the basis of her childbearing capacity, distinct physical attributes and a built which is shorter in height than man and in a certain sense, her vulnerability. In fact, the social structure was itself so arranged and patterned that its consequences led to inequality between genders. In a patriarchal society, the institutional patterns of residence, inheritance and lineage, patrilocal, patrilineal and patriarchal family structure, all represent and justify inequality between genders (Bhatnagar 2009, 1035-39). There is a direct relationship between marital residence and male dominance. Researches reveal that non – male based residence gives women more freedom of choice in mate selection, more protection from a potentially abusive husband and more freedom to end an unsatisfactory marriage. Altogether economic, legal, social and cultural beliefs generated a social definition and self-image of women in a society.

Objectives of the Study

Gender equality is the goal, while gender neutrality and gender equity are practices and ways of thinking that help in achieving the goal. It doesn't mean that women and men have to become the same, but that their rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on whether they are born male or female. It is a fairness of treatment for women and men according to their respective needs. In this sense, it is also more than representation, and strongly tied to women's rights which often requires policy changes. As of 2017, even the global movement for gender equality has not incorporated the proposition of genders besides women or men. In this context, on global scale, achieving gender equality requires eliminating all kinds of harmful practices against women and girls. In this respect, the study will deal with the following:

- Contextual meaning of gender equality.
- Status of gender equality at global level, with changed perceptions.
- Position of gender equality in developing countries, including India.
- Measures/ steps taken at national and international levels.
- Prospects and Challenges in achieving the goal of gender equality.

Methodology/Approach Applied

The research methodology in this study aims to describe and analyze the national and global contexts of gender equality, in reference to its prospects and challenges at both levels. As the materials available on aspects of gender equality are mostly descriptive, analytical and theoretically ambiguous, the research used secondary sources, books, journals and newspapers in order to to analyze and explain the events leading to the changing perceptions of gender equality, along with a change of policy, where required. At large, the study relies on facts, collected materials because it would help in testing the study propositions.

Finally, in the course of the study the main focus remained on different related aspects of gender equality, the work has excluded otherwise very useful narrations of other contexts, in order to concentrate solely on study themes. The paper is intended to explain the problem that has not been dealt with the way the present study does.

Dimensions of Gender Equality

Apart from these, religion as an institution has been one of the most pervasive and persistent factors in defining women's role and their status. Ruether identifies religion as 'Undoubtedly, the single most important shaper and enforcer of the image and role of women in society. The transcendental source–which is omnipotent and sacred–acquires extremely powerful instrumentality of legitimacy for various pronouncements affecting the status of women directly and indirectly. In behavioural and institutional forms, it governs the entire life cycle and everyday life of women in most of the societies' (Ruether 1974, 9). Likewise, in monotheistic religions, a woman can never have her full sexual identity affirmed as being in the image and likeness of God, whereas this experience is freely available to every man in the existing culture. The overall milieu of values creates conditions in which women work, behave and live in a particular way and it also creates a psyche and self–image which leads to development of self–perceived as inferior to men. Further, it leads to formation of belief systems regarding women and also assigns them specific roles and defines the code of their behaviour pattern both within the family and outside.

Basically, the gender inequality itself existed in the structure of division of work into public and private domains which leads to: (I.) Non–recognition of the work related to women in family–child–rearing and other domestic functioning. (II.) Certain economic activities undertaken by her in fields, economic activities related to handicraft etc., are not recognized as her economic contribution, both by the society and, for a long time, by planners and officials. (III.) Creation of such values and institutions which make her work within family and deprive her of all such activities which are outside home and socially recognized. Commonly, there are two distinct features of gender role of women. First, her role as a woman and second, her status as a woman; and unfortunately, women suffer from dual deprivations: one that of being a woman and the other, of being a woman of a lower caste or class. Thus, women are never viewed as persons on their own rights. Moreover, women don't view themselves as autonomous beings due to their cultural socialization. Because of their marginalization in society, women hardly exist as a public phenomenon.

The issue of gender equality is closely related to law, equality and justice, and its denial has led discrimination of women in almost all fields of human activity. Social equality and social justice are one of the most prized ideals of contemporary society, but social inequality and injustice have been a feature of every known society – past and present. Different forms of atrocities are linked to one another and are manifestations of gender ideology. "The world which has always belonged to the men is still in their hands, the institutions and the values of the patriarchal civilization still survive in larger part" (Peggy and Judith 1992-93, 30). In these circumstances, the status and role of women and related issues, have attracted the attention of the academicians, political thinkers and social scientists both in developing as well as developed countries, because of the widely accepted truth that a society built on the inequality of men and women involves wastage of human resources, which no country can afford. It is unanimously accepted that gender equality could be realized only by making women economically, socially and politically empowered. Women's empowerment has become the goal or ultimate objective of many development policies and programmes which also demanded indicators of empowerment, both to reveal the extent to which women are already empowered and to evaluate if such policies and programmes have been effective towards their stated aims.

Initial Global Response

The process of the first phase of development in relation to the human societies commenced in post–World War II period and the goal was the rapid economic growth through rapid industrialization, in order to foster fast economic growth, from which would eventually benefit the entire population. After de-colonialization, during the 1950s and 1960s, only the economic role of women in reproduction as homemakers, bearers and rearers of children and housewives was perceived by the development organizations, which was reflected in the inclusion of family planning, population, mother and child care policies in development planning in several developing countries, like India. The initial development plans and their implementation were based on the separation of the public and the private spaces. The public space was designed on the model of the worker without any caring responsibilities and was the sphere of the breadwinner, who was obviously the male. It placed women in the private space which gave her the caregiving and domestic role. The concept of development, in a broader sense, is related to improvement in the quality of life, based on equality and social justice through such programme and activities which consequently could alter the structure and culture and create self–generating continuous processes. However, gradually new openings came which were instrumental in breaking the traditional shackles not only for women but some other deprived sections, also.

Meanwhile, the old role–models and concepts began to change globally. In the 1950s and 1960s, the women activists who took active part in freedom movements of the newly independent states took keen interest in raising the development questions in the UN and challenged the legalistic perspective of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), which was formed by the world body in 1947 to monitor UN activities on behalf of women. The said commission observed, "Women who contribute half of the world's population by virtue of an accident of birth, perform two–thirds of the world's work, receive one-tenth of its income and own less than one-hundredth of its property" (Karmakar 1999, 168). Soon it was realized at world level that, because women comprise more than half of the human resources and are central to the economic, as well to the social well–being of societies, development goals cannot be fully reached without their participation. The changing dimension of development and the international movement for the development of women have created a policy perspective for gender equality which recognizes both women's and men's needs and, most importantly, their healthy interactions. Against this backdrop of situation, Dreze and Sen viewed that gender equality and social justice are the urgent need not merely because of the fact that it is an "issue" of the day. Rather, "the emancipation of women is an integral part of social progress, not just a women's issue". The movement started earlier has called upon worldwide countries and international development agencies to adopt measures for integrating women into the development process, which received a major breakthrough in the 1970s.

The new policy perspective was promoted further by the publication of Easter Boserup's book, *Women's Role in Economic Development*, in 1970, which demonstrated that development processes have been strongly male-biased and bypassed women led the international aid community to attempt to integrate women into the production system so that the economy could grow more vigorously. The book not only ignited a worldwide discussion on the need of women's participation but also seriously challenged the argument that benefits from development projects would automatically "trickle down" to women and other disadvantaged groups in Third World nations. Perhaps, being influenced by the new concept, a new approach - "Women in Development" (WID) - was coined, which was based on the philosophy that women are lagging behind in society and the gap between men and women can be bridged by remedial measures within the existing structure (Phukon 2008,771-76). In 1975, the First World Conference on Women held in Mexico brought about the issue in the forefront. As a result, the United Nations declared in the mid-seventies the "United Nations Decade for Women" (1976-85). It followed in 1977 with the introduction of its first guidelines on WID. In 1986, the Women in Development issue became one of the four priority issues of UNDP and thereby, the Division of Women in Development (DWID) had been created in the next year (1987) (Mia 2007,742-44). In 1992, the DWID has been renamed as the "Gender in Development Programme" (GIDP). In the 1990s, the UNDP's new development discourse and its focus on 'equity' and empowerment created a new dimension in terms of women's development approach.

Global Shift of Opinion

Gradually, the world opinion and institutions as well responded in favour of gender equality and, in line in the late 1980s, the concept of Women in Development was shifted to Gender and Development Approach (GAD). The new approach is based on two perspectives: firstly, it argues that women's status in society is deeply affected by their material conditions of life and by their position in the national, regional, and global economies; secondly, it recognizes the fact that women are deeply affected by the nature of patriarchal power in their societies at the national, community and household levels. It advocates for basic intervention with the analysis of men's and women's roles and needs, in an effort to empower women, to improve their position in relation to men in ways which will benefit and transform society as a whole. In the GAD, there are two policy approaches - the Practical Gender Needs (PGN) and the Strategic Gender Needs (SGN). Practical gender needs relate to women's daily needs in caring for themselves and their children, whereas strategic gender interests relate to the task of changing gender relations and challenging women's subordinate position. With this new approach, GAD focuses on the interconnection of gender, class and race and the social construction of their defining characteristics. It recognizes the differential impact of development policies and practices on women and men and sees women as agents, not simply as recipient of development.

Within this context, meaning and perspective, the UNDP in the decade 1990s, introduced agenda for fruitfully incorporating the various development approaches. Its new development discourse and focus on "equity" and "empowerment" created a fresh dimension in terms of women's development approach. The earlier paper prepared by the GIDP, named "Gender and Sustainable Human Development: Policy Perspectives" (1995); now "gender equality and equity" is put forward as the essence of the programme and the operation of UNDP (Razavi and Miller 1995, 22-23). The content of the paper also justifies women in terms of the goals of equality and empowerment. Women's empowerment is central to human development. Human development, as a process of enlarging people's choices, cannot occur when the choices of half of humanity are restricted. Targeted actions aimed at empowering women and righting gender inequalities in the social and economic sphere, as well as in terms of civil and political rights, must be taken alongside efforts to engender the development process.

Thus, the perspectives of global policy have enabled the developing countries to identify the underlying causes of gender inequality. And, these have helped to develop a more desirable strategic approach, which has made it clear that "Gender Equality" and "Sustainable Human Development" are intertwined. Also, it has recovered a new sense of reality that girls and women should have opportunities for personal growth, security, realization of rights, control of fertility and health, literacy and opportunities to participate in political and economic system (United Nations Development Programme 1997, 9). In tune with this international movement, there has been a profound change in the status of women. The gender gap is narrowing down and women are entering in the production system, thus breaking the barriers of social moulds.

Status in Developing Countries

Other developing countries, alike India, perhaps the most complex democracies in the world, have a history of commitment, since the beginning of the 1970s, to women's welfare and empowerment through constitutional provisions, legislation, policy and plans; even while at deep levels, structural gender biases persist within families, communities, economies and politics. Women still don't occupy a space as equal members and citizens in India and in other liberal democratic countries. The Government of India's II and III periodic Report on the Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of Discriminations against Women (CEDAW) 1997-2005 stated that the underlying causes of gender inequality are related to social and economic structures that are based on the social norms and practices. In India, where patriarchy from immemorial times has maintained a strong grip, the realization of gender equality would not be a fruitful one, unless some sort of positive discriminations for women, like special social protection, is not given.

Gender discrimination acts as a slow poison for the society and it is a growing recognition that countries cannot reach their full potential as long as women's potential to participate fully in their society is denied. Women's participation has become a key factor for success of all developmental programmes. In third world countries, the concept of development has come to be identified with government programmes, managed by the government, with or without the involvement of community. Institutions, like panchayat, have been associated and involved in execution of these plans. The social structure and cultural values determine consciousness. Consciousness-raising shall help in greater participation in the women empowerment programmes. The term "women empowerment" has come to connote the processes by which the efforts of the women themselves are united with those of governmental authorities to improve the economic, social and cultural conditions of women and to integrate these women into the life of the nation and to enable them to contribute fully to national progress. Thus, women with respect to development have to be viewed as both the participants and beneficiaries.

In general, we see two contrasting trends: first, the growing poverty and misery of women accompanied by multifarious efforts of deprivation and secondly, despite the long wait for the change of women's position in society, the present global scenario gives some evidence to reaffirm that "gender equality for the millions of people is not attainable". Rather today, women are getting to the top more than ever before and their knowledge and insights are being treated significant, and the misconceptions about women are being dispelled. Further, there is a need for development for women as a specific category and their full integration in the total development process. N. Yavari–d' Hellencourt, the coordinator for the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNDFW) viewed in this regard, "If we do not empower women, there will be no peace and no way out of poverty" (Shirley 2002, 17) because women have more potentiality than men and they can play the role of silent developer in a family. Because "a woman gives first priority to her children; her second priority is the household. A man has different priorities; he does not give family the top position" (Muhammad 1997, 16). Thus women, at large, hold a key position in all-around the development of a nation - both developed and developing.

Conclusions and Findings

It is time to rethink, regroup and move forward on the issue of gender equality. An essential step forward has been made in the general discussion concerning the role of women in society. Mechanisms for change such as women's forums, citizens' forums and issue–specific organizations and other support groups should mobilize, establish goals and develop a plan of action. In fact, it is evident that the gender development policies are formulated without understanding the ground realities of the situation faced by the women. The value–base of the society restricts women's role and status, and the government programmes regulate women's rights to access and control self and resources. Any sensitive issue occurring in the society affects women since they have limited control, power and choices over resources. It is not enough to have right laws and the institution of justice, but also a change in values is necessary for the right implementation of justice to women out of patriarchal biases. It would be a significant contribution to women empowerment and justice in all societies in order to address the gender gaps and find a gender equality with sustainable human development.

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On "Marriage Dissidents": From Marriage to "Radical Parenting"

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Abstract:

While "marriage equality" represents progress, "marriage" as a legal concept insufficiently recognizes its roots as a problematic institution. By examining the essentialism of "traditional marriage," we can begin to understand many of the existing contemporary problems of marriage, which same-sex marriage may have imported. Marriage has historically contributed to a profound sense of sexism that, in general, oppresses women and promotes a white, middle-class heteronormativity that can be problematic for many, including same-sex couples who, having vindicated their civil rights, might be perpetuating a dysfunctional social institution.

Keywords: Heteronormativity, Marriage Dissidents, Marriage Equality, Revolutionary Parenting

The year 2015 was a watershed moment in the gay rights movement. Many in the movement were ecstatic that the United States Supreme Court took the courageous step in legalizing same-sex marriage nationally. (*Obergefell v. Hodges*, 576 U.S. - 2015). Indeed, it was not long ago that we faced an uncertain Supreme Court on the question of same-sex sexual intimacy and were relieved at the outcome of *Lawrence v. Texas*, holding unconstitutional laws that criminalized consensual same-sex sodomy. (539 U.S. 558 - 2003) Like others in the legal and gay rights community, we had been nervously awaiting that decision, worried that perhaps the Court would use the occasion to strike *down* the privacy rights line of cases upon which John Lawrence and Tyron Garner's legal argument depended. After all, we feared, how could these gay men be found to have a right to same-sex sexual intimacy when the right to privacy in general - created out of thin air by a liberal Court in *Griswold v. Connecticut* (381 U.S. 479 -1965).- could be declared to have been a constitutional "mistake" and overturned by a more conservative Court? The beneficiaries of such judicial action would be, of course, the opponents of reproductive freedom, ever on the offensive and determined to destroy the legacy of *Roe v. Wade*, which itself depended upon the right to privacy established in *Griswold*.

As it turned out, *Lawrence* was a boon and marked, not the end of a liberal experiment in constitutional jurisprudence, but a major civil rights victory and is a portent of even better things to come for all Americans. Although it had its rough patches at times (i.e., California's Proposition 8), the law has changed amazingly in terms of supporting the gay rights movement since 2003. Now that we as a nation have achieved our goal of marriage equality, we need to start asking difficult questions about what we have achieved, at what cost, and what that means going forward as a more inclusive and tolerant society. For instance, in our enthusiastic support for marriage equality did us, as a movement, overlook some important implications and necessary critiques of that which we were advocating?

From a legal point-of-view, it was obvious that marriage equality, and gay rights generally, were the civil rights issue of this generation, and that the law, while historically harsh and even cruel toward homosexuals, was changing and that it was inevitable that the anti-homosexual bias in the legal system was as outdated and *anachronistic* as the racist laws of the pre-civil rights years. The years since Stonewall have been nothing short of a revolution in laws and social change that are both *tumultuous* and significant achievement representing years of hard work and sacrifice by many. We are glad to live in a nation that has so changed. We are proud of what we have accomplished and glad, on this front at least, the world will be a better place for our children. Nevertheless, the success of the marriage equality movement should not keep us from continuing to ask the difficult questions that remain fundamental to our larger quest for freedom and justice in American society.

First, we question the "equality" of the phrase "marriage equality." Practically speaking, who in our society can get married? Evidence seems to suggest that marriage has become a middle class, largely white institution that excludes the poor and those without college education. If marriage is as important to our society as we often claim it is when faced with social movements like marriage equality, then the class constraints on marriage need to be addressed. Moreover, it is not clear to us that heterosexual marriages are "equal"; we suspect that they continue to disadvantage women in some way as they have done in the past. In short, the marriage equality movement has done *nothing* to problematize the institution of marriage itself, one that fails so many on so many different levels, the least of which is the question of whether we should continue to equate family with marriage.

Second, and related to the above, to what extent is the marriage equality movement anti-queer? If so, and we believe it is, what has that cost us in terms of coalition building and alliances across the LGBTQ spectrum? Too often, the BTQ part of the coalition is left out. Thus, we remain sensitive to the question of what capital was spent at whose expense? What causes were ignored in the quest for marriage equality? Is the LGBTQ coalition over? Will married gays become conservative and reproduce the culture that the gay rights movement has long fought against? What about the larger issue of social justice that was central to the early gay rights movement? Arguably, a commitment to social justice is more important than ever and may have already been lost.

Third, we are concerned about the intersection between gay rights, religious acceptance, and the larger problem of religious politics in our society. Will the acceptance of same-sex relationships by more religious groups make it difficult for critics of religion to attack the various churches on other grounds? So, for example, while we want religions such as the Catholic Church to modify their anti-gay stances and policies, and while we are pleased by the stances taken recently by Pope Francis with regard to gay persons (Donadio 2013), what does this mean for our larger critique of religion, of which its anti-gay stance was but *one* of many problems - its misogyny being a major barrier to social justice? Other problems of religion, particularly of the fundamentalist type, involves intolerance, irrationalism, and an attack on science. A religious community can be accepting of gays and still be an impediment to social justice. Will the lesbian community remain as vigilant in criticisms of religion at that point?

In this paper, we argue that the idea of marriage equality insufficiently recognizes the essentialist arguments tied to marriage that often seek to preserve patriarchal structures. By examining how "traditional marriage" was grounded in these essentialist ideas, we can begin to understand problems with the institution of marriage altogether, and how although marriage today may be something very different, it has historically promoted a profound sense of sexism that hurts women in general. We will highlight how couples are pressured into entering the institution of marriage and argue that people should be able to choose *not* to participate in the institution of marriage while still having access to the same rights as married couples. We will examine family law cases that demonstrate how married people's rights are privileged over others in the legal sense and how this often does not serve the best interest of families as may have been intended. We will then review the arguments made by the "marriage dissidents" and connect those to the privileging of marriage seen in the case law. Through this lens, we can begin to stop viewing families as something completely private and separate from the larger social interest. In other words, by not allowing the State to define and preserve our intimate relations, families could be better served by the community in the sense that we could begin to recognize the benefits of what bell hooks calls "revolutionary parenting" rather than prioritizing a patriarchal concept of "motherhood."

Looking Beyond the Symbol

Although the concept of marriage has evolved to a more egalitarian view than that of the past, traditional marriage was historically centered on a discerning sense of sexism that kept women legally inconsequential as citizens. Under traditional marriage, the family was considered an indissoluble and homogeneous unit centered on the ideal of procreation and the hegemony of the husband/father, who was sovereign over the members of the household. Courts primarily considered marriage to exist within the essentialist view presented in *Black's Law Dictionary*, which describes marriage as "the civil status of one man and one woman united in law for life, for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties legally incumbent on those whose association is founded on the distinction of sex." (Garner 2009) This "distinction of sex" is important in that members of a family were ranked in a strict hierarchy that assigned value based on status, of which gender was fundamental. Cases such as *Mackenzie v. Hare* (the Supreme Court decision to expatriate a U.S. born female citizen for marrying a man who was not eligible for citizenship himself) demonstrate how the legal doctrine of coverture worked to subsume women's legal rights to that of her husband. (*Mackenzie v. Hare*, 239 U.S. 299-1915) Sexist notions of women existing as property of men were entrenched in the law in various ways throughout history. Husbands could charge other men with "criminal conversion" (a crime of exerting unauthorized use of someone else's property) or "criminal conversation" (an action in civil law) for having sexual relations with his wife. In addition, men had the right of sexual access to their wives as well as the right to mild chastisement of the wife in cases of disobedience, making sexual assault and domestic violence non-existent in the legal sense. In many states, husbands were excused of legal responsibility for murdering other men who sleep with their wives, as this was considered justifiable in the name of "treason against the conjugal rights." (*Briggs v. State*, 238 Ga. 171-1977). In essence, both the law and the institution of the natural sciences made the husband's power over wives and daughters ubiquitous and unquestioned. Both were considered his property and the husband had both the right and the obligation to protect it, regardless of what the women wanted.

Now that marriage has shifted toward a generally more non-essentialist view, we are quick to forget these aspects of history that made marriage problematic. Couples are often preoccupied with the *symbol* of marriage. Even those negative aspects of marriage that reliably pressure individuals into participation are often overlooked with the positive rhetoric of "love" as well as the material enticements provided by the wedding industry. We will demonstrate, we can continue to find theoretical faults with the institution of marriage in a more contemporary sense, particularly in the area of legal privilege.

Married Privilege and the Attack on Family

Although we like to believe that the idea of "family" is highly valued in our culture, this is actually not the case. While many politicians and public figures openly discuss their commitment to family values, many social, economic, political and legal practices often do just the opposite. The legitimation of relationships and what constitutes a "family" lies almost entirely in the hands of the State, which is unique given that, as Claudia Card points out, "[t]he State was often one of the things that these relationships formed a bulwark against." (Card 1996, 4) On some level, the Courts *do* recognize that there is more than one way to be a family and for the state to privilege one over the other is unconstitutional. Such was the position in the case of *Moore v. City of East Cleveland* (431 U.S. 494 - 1977), where Inez Moore was able to argue that a zoning ordinance restricting a combination of her extended family members from living under one roof was a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court determined that family was "by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family." (431 U.S. 504 – 1977) Still, our concept of what constitutes a legitimate "family" may not always protect individuals against non-marital discrimination, as was the case in *Hewitt v. Hewitt* (77 Ill. 2d 49 - 1979). Although the plaintiff, Victoria Hewitt was able to prove to the court that she and defendant Robert Hewitt had "lived within the legitimate boundaries of a marriage and family relationship of a most conventional sort," the courts still categorized them and their three children as a pseudo-family due to lack of a marriage license between the couple. The result was that Victoria was unable to recover "an equal share of the profits and properties accumulated by the parties" during their period of cohabitation (77 Ill.2d 52 – 1979). Despite the fact that the Hewitt's had lived up to the expectations of a "conventional, respectable and ordinary family life" that is often glorified in our society, this did not offer them any sort of legal rights, protection, or responsibility when the relationship ended. In fact, the courts went so far as to admit that they feared granting the property rights between unmarried cohabitants might contribute to "enhancing the attractiveness of a private arrangement over marriage." (77 Ill.2d 62 – 1979)

What is it that makes the State want to avoid private arrangements and contracts so badly? The government has an interest in controlling the behaviors of intimate partnerships. In one case, *Marvin v. Marvin*, the courts states "a contract between non-marital partners is unenforceable only *to the extent* that it *explicitly* rests upon the immoral and illicit consideration of meretricious sexual services." (557 P.2d 106 (1976), 112) If sexual relations outside of the institution of marriage are considered unlawful, the motivation must, on some level, be the State attempting to control our sexual activity and intimate partnerships as citizens. Could this patriarchal mindset be the root of the problem when it comes to discriminating against unmarried peoples? According to Card, the answer may be "yes," as marriage provides an option for legitimating "behavior otherwise illegitimate and make available to us social securities that will no doubt become even more important to us as we age." (Card 1996, 7) Relationships that do not conform to marriage often remain nameless, and Card points out that "along with such namelessness goes a certain invisibility." (Card 1996, 7)

Without the protection of a name to define relationships, couples risk having their relationship behaviors classified as "deviant" simply because they do not adhere to the values that are theoretically associated with a marriage license. This seems to be in direct conflict with the contemporary idea that marriage is no longer strictly a means of promoting procreation and more so about a right to engage in adult bonding. With this concept of "adult bonding" in mind, we can begin to see a break down in the logic of why a marriage license would theoretically be necessary at all.

Another aspect of governmental pressure is a couple's desire to protect their families. While many feel that State regulation of intimate partnerships through the institution of marriage offers a sense of protection, particularly in regards to divorce, the benefits do not always outweigh the negatives. Card states that "we and many others like us might be pushed into marriage," especially when we become concerned about protection and legal rights, and that "marrying under such conditions is not a totally free choice." (Card 1996, 4) With more than 1,500 legal benefits, it is difficult for many committed partners not to consider marriage at some point in their relationship. However, the social and moral rhetoric presented along with the idea of marriage (i.e., "love," or "religion") often prevents us from looking beyond its symbol just as much as it encourages us to forget its sexist and patriarchal roots. The result is that these social pressures and privileges are quickly forgotten. We simply do not think about what we "get" when we enter marriage, how our marriage is subsidized by the state with a cacophony of institutionalized public benefits. For most, these benefits appear to flow naturally, as if they were the proper order of things, like rain falling from the sky. But it is not. Someone had to decide that these things were important and to create them. Someone drew the line and someone else polices the border.

In other words, it can be difficult for individuals to see the entire scope of how patriarchal norms can influence our decision-making when it comes to marriage. People often do not realize that these rights are not inherent to them as human beings until they are suddenly unavailable. If we allow the government to decide whose relationships are legitimate, there is nothing to say that this regulation could not one day become discriminative towards couples even when they *are* married for selective reasons. As marriage equality becomes more of a norm, pressure will be brought to bear on those couples, or even individuals who choose to not enter into long-term relationships, to play the marriage "mind games" or risk being branded as being "bad" or "deficient." Such social pressures can lead, potentially, to a "good guy/bad guy" hierarchy with heterosexual-inspired marriage being the standard of measurement.

One fundamental point is that an opposition to marriage does not necessarily mean an opposition to intimacy, long-term relationships, or "durable partnerships of many sorts." (Card 1996, 3) As Card writes, "I understand marriage as a relationship to which the State is an essential third party" and although marriage was historically only available to "members of propertied classes," its purpose being to aid in the creation of a "family," it is now seen as a form of adult bonding. (Card 1996, 4) If adult bonding is what the State says marriage has become, then why such emphasis on maintaining relationships within the traditional language of "marriage" at all? Card points out that "for those who would work to enlarge the concept of family to include groupings that are currently totally non-contractual, in retaining patriarchal vocabulary there is a danger of importing patriarchal ideals and of inviting treatment as deviant or 'second class' at best." (Card 1996, 4) Card continues:

> Let us not pretend that marriage is basically a good thing on the ground that durable intimate relationships are. Let us not be eager to have the state regulate our unions. Let us work to remove barriers to our enjoying some of the privileges presently available only to heterosexual married couples. But in doing so, we should also be careful not to support discrimination against those who choose not to marry and not to support continued state definition of the legitimacy of intimate relationships. I would rather see the state deregulate heterosexual marriage than see it begin to regulate same-sex marriage. (Card 1996, 6)

Although Card, in this case, is referring to the concept of marriage equality, she makes the point that marriage in itself is an institution of privileging certain individual's rights over others.

This is particularly influential in regards to deciding what types of family relationships are recognized as legitimate by the state, and how they are seen as worthy of this privilege. Pressure to marry because of how one family might benefit from State recognition invites us to participate in an institution, which as Card points out, is hierarchical in nature. We do not want to risk having no rights at all, so we subject ourselves to a system that tells us what rights we can have based on how closely we can fit into a homogeneous mold.

Even though, like Card, we make these statements in reference to same-sex marriage, it speaks to the more peripheral issue of the marginalization of individuals who challenge traditional institutions by coming up with new ways of adult bonding and defining their own relationships/families. Does trivializing non-married relationships, especially those that chose not to conform to a traditional system of monogamy, really matter? How does this affect people in the larger social sphere? According to many authors writing about same-sex marriage, the pressure to conform to a certain ideology of "normalcy" is one that frequently even straight people have difficulty meeting. We expand on these ideas by explaining how marriage, in effect, "tames" people, focusing them on careers, materialism, and other entrapments that work against collective action and self-determination. This is particularly problematic for those who do not fit into a white, middle-class, and heterosexual value system.

"Marriage Dissidents": The Queerest of Them All

Not everyone in the gay rights movement, broadly defined, is satisfied with the focus on, and attainment of, marriage equality, but our sense is that most gay people are in support of it -that the anti-marriage critique of gay marriage by gay people belongs largely to a political and/or cultural fringe. While we agree mostly with the radical politics of this group (its critique of capitalism, for example), we do not necessarily agree with the confusing nature of some of its sexual politics. Moreover, for reasons we will explain below, we see what these anti-marriage queer activists want, politically and socially, as *separate* from the question of marriage equality. In other words, we do not see the movement for marriage equality being incommensurable with many or most of the goals desired by queer people that oppose it. Still, the arguments against marriage equality from this community deserve to be addressed.

M. V. Lee Badgett, research director of the Williams Institute for Sexual Orientation Law and Public Policy at UCLA, dedicates a chapter of her book, *When Gay People Get Married*, to discussing what she calls "marriage dissidents." Badgett reviews the arguments of this group which she summarizes as (1) marriage leading to the end of gay culture; (2) fear that the campaign for marriage equality is hurting progress in other areas important to the gay and lesbian community; and (3) that the institution of marriage will marginalize lesbian and gay people who do not wish to be married. (Badgett 2009, 129-150) To these concerns, we want to add two others: that marriage, being fundamentally heteronormative, is *irreconcilable* with a gay identity and/or lifestyle, and that the marriage equality movement is an expression of neo-liberalism, a politically offensive phenomenon to people on the left. We will review and discuss each of these concerns below, all the while recognizing that the categories overlap, and making clear distinctions between them impossible.

We start with the supposed threat to gay culture that marriage dissidents' fear follows from marriage equality. According to Badgett, there is a concern among marriage dissidents that marriage equality will bring with it the end of gay culture as it has existed. Such critics are concerned that the main assumption behind the argument for marriage equality among mainstream gay rights activists - that to be gay is to be no different than being "straight"- will, if largely accepted, cause "traditional" gay communities to wither away. Such view assumes that "gay culture" is one thing to preserve or that what has counted as "gay culture" in the past is what should define it in the future. Critics fear, perhaps correctly, that what made being gay distinct may soon be unrecognizable or lost.

This fear of loss is represented by queer activist Mattilda Bernstein Sycamore, who complains that "Gay marriage advocates brush aside generations of queer efforts to create new ways of loving, lusting for, and caring for one another, in favor of a 1950s model of white-picket fence, 'we're-just-like-you' normalcy." (Sycamore 2008, 3) To this line of thinking, Sycamore adds that the word "homo" now stands for "homogeneous." (Sycamore 2008, 4) Another queer activist sums up this concern by warning against the "blandification of gay culture." (Shepard 2008, 124) So-called "blandification" or homogenization comes at the loss of the "we-ness" that lesbians and gays created as part of the consciousness-raising struggle of gay pride and it's morphing into a queer identity. As Patrick Califia laments, "When the term 'queer' first came along, it was such a relief to be able to embrace a label that encompassed so much of my experience and identity, but normalization is a relentless as marching troops of army ants. 'Queer' is on the verge of becoming nothing but a synonym for 'gay.'" (Califia 2008, 97) The problem here is that to be "queer" is not necessarily to be "gay," particularly when "gay" means white-middle-class gay men. In other words, some queer activists wonder what happens to the queer identity when it becomes subsumed by the assimilated white wealthy group of powerful gays who define the gay movement in terms of their own interests.

Badgett's second category of concern among marriage dissidents is that, by focusing on winning marriage rights (or the right to serve openly in the military or in the priesthood etc.), progress in other important areas of interest to the gay community will be hurt. For many gay people, the everyday needs of survival are more pressing than distant notions of marriage, which is unlikely because many gay people are people of color and/or impoverished and, consequently, do not see marriage as a possibility, as gay marriage takes place largely among white, middle- class people, as does marriage in general in this country. The argument here is that the larger, more diverse collection of gay people who do not benefit from marriage would much rather see activist energy spent on anti-racism and anti-poverty work, rights for transgender people, AIDS awareness, suicide prevention for young gay people, and improving the treatment of queers and transgender people in the adult and juvenile justice systems. (Spade 2008, 51) These critics of marriage equality point out that marriage is largely about middle-class norms and expectations, and that assimilationist goals are more about gaining "straight privilege" than they are about challenging power or flattening the social hierarchy.

Badgett's third category of concern among marriage dissidents is that marriage will bring with it the marginalization or exclusion of white gay people who do not want to participate in marriage. As marriage equality becomes more of a norm, pressure will be brought to bear on those couples as well as other individuals who choose to enter into long-term relationships, to get married or risk having their relationship branded as being bad or deficient. Such social pressures can lead, potentially, to a "good gay/bad gay" hierarchy with heterosexual-inspired marriage being the standard of measurement. Good gays, this argument goes, should look like and act like heterosexuals. Sycamore echoes this concern when she writes that "[a]gainst the nightmare backdrop of assimilation queers striving to vie outside conventional norms become increasingly marginalized." (Sycamore 2008, 5) In an interview with National Public Radio, Sycamore elaborates:

> Gay has become a narrow identity based in accessing straight privilege, whereas queer, to me, includes a wider diversity of people. And it also includes a politicized standpoint that means, you know, challenging the status quo and creating new ways of loving and living and with transforming our lives and one another, and also challenging the violence of traditional institutions.[1]

In other words, Sycamore's critique is that the gay marriage movement limits people's options to traditional monogamous relationships rather than allowing or encourage people from experiment with new relationship forms. Paula Ettelbrick, for example, argues that marriage equality is a challenge to gay identity and culture as well as an undermining of different forms of relationships. (Ettelbrick 1996, 107-166) She argues it will trivialize non-married relationships. This concern is shared by activist Patrick Moore, who warns that "in redefining what it means to be gay in America, the gay community itself is on the verge of marginalizing those who refuse to conform to a system of heterosexual morality." (Moore 2004) Indeed, he argues this point further: "With the Census Bureau reporting that divorce rates are climbing and new marriages decreasing, it seems that gays are fighting to get into a burning house. If the legalization of gay marriage is achieved, will homosexuals be further marginalized if they can't or won't conform to a heterosexual idea that even straight people can't meet?" (Moore 2004) Moreover, "By universally equating queer sex with love, and love with long-term relationships, the gay movement is selling itself short." (De Vries 2008, 145)

A more radical critique is on display in an interesting collection of essays that appeared to express a collective "disillusionment" with the mainstreaming of the gay movement and with the liberal "assimilationist" gay political agenda. (Conrad 2010) The authors of these essays equate the movement for marriage equality with neoliberalism. They argue, not incorrectly, that marriage tends to be a middle-class institution that reinforces middle-class values. The institution of marriage, in effect, "tames" people, focusing them on careers, materialism, and other entrapments that work against collective action and self-determination for gay people, particularly for gay people of color who tend to not belong to the middle class. Moreover, marriage equality is seen as a "false hope" or an illusion, as gay people, they argue, will be just as ill-treated as before they were allowed to marry, and that the people who benefit from marriage equality are the same people who benefit now: the elite white gays who already have privileges in other forms of identity.

Additionally, the radical critique of marriage equality is that once marriage equality is achieved, the fear is that privileged gay men will have no interest in fighting for social justice on other fronts (if, indeed, they do now) - like eradicating poverty, universal health care etc. These people will abandon the struggle for "mutual sustainability' within queer communities and will, in fact, abandon such communities. Sycamore is particularly adamant in making this point:

> Assimilation is violence, not just the violence of cultural erasure, but the violence of stepping on anyone who might get in the way of your upward mobility. Gay (and lesbian!) landlords evict people with AIDS to increase property values, gay bar owners arrest homeless queers so they don't get in the way of business, and gay political consultants mastermind the election of pro-development, anti-poor candidates. (Sycamore 2008, 4)

In all, marriage equality, according to this critique, is a superficial response to the problems that gays and lesbians and non-gender binary folks of all stripes, along with minorities and poor people generally, suffer.

Our response to the above critiques from gays and lesbians (or queers, more generally) against marriage equality is that we recognize that there is more than a degree of truth in their critique. Moreover, we certainly share many of their concerns: we also believe that it is a waste of resources to have to be fighting for gay civil rights, that our society and world have more pressing problems with regard to social justice - for instance, fighting poverty, militarism, and environmental degradation. Fighting for civil rights in the twenty-first century seems so anachronistic. We also agree with the critique that the receipt of economic security and health care should not be dependent on marital status, as it largely does now. We also understand that gay people, like any other people, can be self-serving, greedy, and act out of base class interests or embody class privilege - for instance, critics point out that wealthy white gay landlords in high-density gay neighborhoods are often no better at treating tenants than wealthy straight landlords. Further, as the hostile social pressures that marked gay life for so long dissipate, the individuality of people who happen to be gay will be given free rein to blossom, which means that people will begin to see themselves less-and-less as "gay" or as *less* gay in the ways that earlier gay people felt about themselves and their communities. All of the above may be true. Nevertheless, the quest for marriage equality is a just and an important one, if for no other reason than the fact that life has only gotten better for gays and lesbians because they *stood their ground* and fought for their rights.

Marriage may be an imperfect institution, and we are not here defending it per se, only defending the choice and freedom of all to have marriage, if they want. We understand, at least in principle, the radial queer fringe who see their identities as too radical to participate in marriage, and that is fine. For example, while we cannot agree with Stephanie Schroeder's argument "that queer people having children conservatize not only themselves and their children, but tar the entire queer community as well [by mainstreaming it]"(Schroeder 2008, 103), we recognize that not everyone needs to have children - but many people, including gay people, *do*, and being a parent does not necessarily make one political conservative or mainstream (it does, we hope, make a person more *responsible*). Raising children is not necessarily only about exchanging our "activist/community membership cards for shitty diapers and college tuition bills." (Schroeder 2008, 104) Parenting is also about radicalizing, as well as raising, the next generation.

While the various critiques of the marriage dissidents are important, and while we condemn their marginalization from the mainstream gay rights community that, at times, seeks to silence them, the concerns of the marriage dissidents are, we argue, misplaced. Marriage quality and gay rights help radical queers as well, providing them with more allies and a more tolerant legal environment generally. As for their radical critique of capitalism, we embrace it wholeheartedly, but we believe that the political goals of the marriage dissidents can be better achieved through more traditional leftist methods in alliance with straight people in progressive parties that have outgrown (hopefully) its homophobia.

Overall, our argument is that marriage equality will work toward putting to rest the distinctions most people make between straight and gay people - or at least advance us greatly in that direction. Yes, religious bigots will continue to exist, but they, and not gay Americans, will operate from the margins. Most mainstream opponents of gay rights will move on with their lives as opponents of racial integration moved on with theirs. Such normalizations, we think, constitute a qualitative improvement for our nation. As a legal scholar and lesbian activist Barbara Cox argues:

> Yes, we must be aware of the oppressive history that weddings symbolize. We must work to ensure that we do not simply accept whole-cloth an institution that symbolizes the loss and harm felt by women. But I find it difficult to understand how two lesbians, standing together openly and proudly, can be seen as accepting that institution? What is more anti-patriarchal and rejecting of an institution that carries the patriarchal power imbalance into most households than clearly stating that women can commit to one another with no man in sight? With no claim of dominion or control, but instead of equality and respect. I understand the fears of those who condemn us for our weddings, but I believe they fail to look beyond the symbol and cannot see the radical claim we are making. (Cox 1995)

In reality, however, there is no such thing as "gay society" or "non-gay society", just as there is no "black" society to be contrasted with "white" society. There is only "society" with all its vibrant diversity.

Revolutionary Parenting

Despite more contemporary and non-essentialist concepts of adult bonding, perspectives on marriage continue to be influenced by concepts of family and child-rearing. Views on how marriage and relationship privileging should be carried out by the State, with regard to certain individuals, are often fortified with the rhetoric of "protecting the children." This is the same language which upheld the belief that an interracial couple could not be permitted to marry:

> The amalgamation of the races is not only unnatural, but is always productive of deplorable results. Our daily observation shows us, that the offspring of these unnatural connections are generally sickly and effeminate, and that they are inferior in physical development and strength, to the fullblood of either race. It is sometimes urged that such marriages should be encouraged, for the purpose of elevating the inferior race. The reply is, that such connections never elevate the inferior race to the position of the superior, but they bring down the superior to that of the inferior. They are productive of evil, and evil only, without any corresponding good. (*Scott v. Georgia*, 39 Ga. 321 (1869), 323)

This language of "amalgamation" has endured well up until present day with many, and the same rhetoric of "child protection" has frequently been used to argue against same-sex marriage. What is often ignored is the larger, more general belief that child rearing requires a specific formula of two (married) parental figures, and feminist social critic bell hooks points out how this ideology can be problematic in many ways, particularly in a feminist context. hooks argues that a one to two parent model for child rearing in families recapitulates sexist notions about men and women's parenting abilities, much like the way that the traditional and essentialist roots of marriage create relationship hierarchies. "Motherhood" is often romanticized by women and considered "a sphere of power they would lose if men participated equally in parenting." (hooks 2000, 140) This emphasis on the "maternal" (even when it is being "acted out" by men) is problematic for hooks and other feminist theorists, in that it gives children few role models of what "male parenting" should look like, as well as "perpetuates the idea that parenting is a woman's vocation, and reinforces male domination and fear of women." (hooks 2000, 141) Society, however, says hooks, is unconcerned; she notes that "[t]hese facts raise two issues that must be of central concern for future feminist movement: The right of children to effective child care by parents and other child-rearers, and the restructuring of society so that women do not exclusively provide that care." (hooks 2000, 141) hooks continues by saying that as time goes on and as "more heterosexual and lesbian women choose to bear children with no firm ties to male parents, there will exist a greater need for community-based child care that would bring children into contact with male-rearers so they will not grow to maturity thinking women are the only group that does or should do child-rearing." (hooks 2000, 142) Her emphasis here is that child rearing does not necessarily have to be done by parents. (hooks 2000, 142) This causes a disrupt to the belief system that children *need* two parents in order to be effectively brought up in society, which redefines what a family *is* and ultimately deconstructs an argument for the necessitation of marriage as being in the best interest of children.

hooks accounts for the fact that many feel tax-funded public child care is merely an attempt by women to avoid parenting. (hooks 2000, 143) Not only is public child care one of many options to engage in revolutionary parenting, but hooks points to a larger issue that isolated parenting of any kind, whether it is one or two parents, is not in the best interest of families. Here, hooks references Elizabeth Janeway and her book *Cross Sections*, which asserts that most families subscribe to what Janeway calls "an unusual pattern of parenting in the world, one that has proved to be unsuccessful because it isolates children and parents from society." (hooks 2000, 144) Rather than avoiding parenting, the effort to see that public childcare is provided for by society is an effort to "enlist community aid to supplement the proper obligations of parents, as was often the practice in the past." (hooks 2000, 144)

Revolutionary parenting is not limited to public childcare obligations. "Child care," says hooks, "is a responsibility that can be shared with other-rearers, with people who do not live with children. This form of parenting is revolutionary in this society because it takes place in opposition to the idea that parents, especially mothers, should be the only child-rearers." (hooks 2000, 144) Such shared responsibility is only possible in community settings where people are able to know and trust one another, which is a direct opposition to the separation and private nature of the family unit that the essentialist foundations of traditional marriage require. (hooks 2000, 145) But its main function, asserts hooks, is that it gives children an opportunity to learn how to respect a number of different adult caretakers, as well as provides emotional, intellectual, and material support, if their parents cannot meet their needs. (hooks 2000, 145) However, hooks warns, this is not possible in a community where "parents regard children as their 'property,' or their 'possessions.' This is problematic given that the law *does* see children (and historically, wives) as such." (hooks 2000, 145) Perhaps this is the general issue when it comes to society's beliefs about the nature of families - that in many ways we still revert to the essentialist idea that the members are virtually a type of "property" owned by a single patriarch. The result is that we are inclined to view our partnerships and families as being strictly private, especially in a legal sense, and same-sex couples are not immune to falling into this mold when they marry. Not only do we feel that a "good" and "normal" family's business is sharply their own, but we also theoretically feel no communal obligation to help any families (whether biological or socially constructed) who may be unable to live up to the rigid standards for what constitutes an "actual family", that essentialist marriage has created and carried over to today. The exception being when circumstances become such a "threat" that they require State intervention, but nevertheless, the community turns a blind eye when faced with the concept of caring for the wellbeing of families other than our own. However, Card contends that hooks' alternative form of child rearing and family development is actually "more common than is generally acknowledged in a society in which those whose caretaking does not take place in a nuclear family."(Card 1996, 2) Yet, somehow they are "judged by those with the power" to set standards which label them as "unfortunate and deprived." (Card 1996, 2) Again we see the insertion of language that would suggest a kind of deviancy when describing this type of parenting, rather than an alternative social institution.

Conclusion

Although for most people, marriage in a contemporary sense comes nowhere near the level of constrictive and patriarchal standards that it once did, many of its essentialist roots are still held up in the courts through various methods of judicial proceedings. Intimate partnerships in themselves are not the problem, but rather the dilemma lies in the government playing a major role in the defining and regulating of relationships. This is in part due to the symbol of marriage being extremely flawed, as well as the legal privileging of marriage and the nuclear family. As hooks points out, many couples and families do not fit into the homogenous mold of what constitutes a "legitimate" relationship or "family," and thus are at a greater risk of experiencing legal adversity. Ironically, the old essentialist values are often applied more strictly toward those couples that are *not* married and the families that result from their partnerships.

We can see this in the way that the law often upholds biases against behaviors that are considered deviant, which as Card points out, is not a difficult label to achieve. A couple could simply choose not to marry, and suddenly they have relinquished their rights should the relationship dissolve, leaving them vulnerable when it comes to issues such as property, finances, or child custody. Card reminds us that the pressures that these situations present in many cases result in an un-free choice to sign a marriage license simply for protection. The concept of revolutionary parenting, on the other hand, deconstructs this notion of how exactly families need to be protected, and what from, resulting in a theoretical dismantling of many arguments in favor of marriage. By no longer permitting the State to regulate our unions, we could begin to move towards alternative concepts of partnerships, parenting, and the creation of families, rather than remain stuck within patriarchal and oppressive structures, such as "motherhood" or generally isolated projects of parenting. By no longer continuing to hide families behind a veil of "privacy," society may begin to take a greater interest in supporting relationships and families in a manner that would render government regulation obsolete.

Endnotes

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Masculinities on the Wall: An Approach to Mural Representations of the Carnation Revolution in Lisbon

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Abstract:

In 2014, several Portuguese muralists painted murals about the Carnation Revolution in order to celebrate its 40th anniversary. The initiative aimed at reviving the memory of the murals and graffiti painted in Portugal during the 1970s. These murals represent the memory of struggles in which the figure of the hero lends substance to the narrativity of the popular revolution that overthrew the New State dictatorship in 1974. This article argues that when analyzing those murals, they show that the memory of the Revolution generated a discursiveness represented by hegemonic masculinity, which also conforms to the gendered discourse of the neoliberal agenda. Feminism and negritude were hardly ever empowered as alternative forms of masculinity for representing the revolutionaries and were relegated to (quasi-)invisibility. The figures represented in those male-authored murals located in the center of Lisbon convey hegemonic masculinity and most have already been washed off. Those representing negritude and feminism, as alternative forms of masculinity, emerge - though not exclusively - in the urban periphery. In the periphery, they resist time and convey an interventive discourse of memory of resistance, showing what the prevailing memory discursiveness has not considered central in the Revolution.

Keywords: Carnation Revolution; Murals; Masculinity; Memory; Identity; Resistance

Introduction

On 25th April 1997, the monument *Evocação do 25 de Abril de 1974* was inaugurated on an esplanade marked by four large pillars atop the slope in Eduardo VII Park, Lisbon. Lisbon City Council had commissioned Portuguese sculptor João Cutileiro to create a monument for the Revolution. This memorial sparked reaction in the media very quickly: a rock-shaped fountain, supported by struts and set in a basin with a crumbling wall and broken columns, was compared with a penis. The author argued that he had had no intention of building a phallic monument, even though he acknowledged that 25th April had been a "remarkable ejaculation" (Marques 2010). Thus, the Revolution was artistically celebrated as outstanding human action, as opposed to the oppressive splendor of the authoritarian regime. It had been designed as an anti-monument according to the principles of monumentality. Its apparent chaotic structure and the use of water compared the Revolution to an empowering fountain. The gushing water symbolized the origin of a powerful life and a new era. Identifying the 25th April as the source of power introduces the widespread belief that, as far as art is concerned, power was easily represented as and associated with a form of masculinity, understood as a set of biological features determining sexual distinction: the revolution had been *made by men* and it was *men's stuff*.

The decades that followed the year 1974 were marked by tension between two approaches to the discourses regarding the memory of the Revolution: a dominant approach, historically framed within neoliberal ideology that expanded in the West from the end of the 1980s including to Portugal, particularly after Cavaco Silva took office as Prime Minister of the 11th and 12th Constitutional Governments between 1985 and 1995 – and another strand of memory, relatively stifled up until 1994, bound by the collective duty of not forgetting the oppression and suffering inflicted during the New State.

The governments led by Prime Minister Cavaco Silva had been oriented towards the need to reconcile the past with the present in order to appease the Portuguese conscience and let memory run its course. Traverso argues that after the 1980s, movements towards the preservation of memory made their mark on public space in Europe. The past was continually called forth in the present, in a media-amplified collective imaginary associated with public commemorations (Traverso 2016, 10-11).[1] In Portugal, the years of the Revolution and of the Ongoing Revolutionary Period (PREC) were frequently referred to as years of distress and unrest and, simultaneously, the political elites avoided debating the long period of the dictatorship. Until 1994, the memory of resistance to the dictatorship was undervalued, particularly because of the economic and social crisis that followed the PREC. Governmental and economic elites blamed the revolutionary years as the causes of the crisis that followed the PREC up until 1985. The memory of the New State oppression was publicly softened by the economic crisis and the political confrontation on the decolonization and the revolutionary process (Loff 2015, 63-64). The communist and far-left wing projects that had driven the Revolution in 1974 were remembered after the 1970s as defeated and isolated missions. It was less the New State regime than the Revolution that was the center of discussion, whilst a counter-revolutionary, conservative and nostalgic memory gradually clouded the memory of resistance. In addition, it enhanced the public perception of the Carnation Revolution as a negative landmark (Loff 2015, 64).

After the 20th anniversary of the Revolution, and particularly after the socialist party held took office in 1994, much of the memory of resistance emerged in public space. Loff contends that this emergence was not only due to the revisionist approach to the New State and the Revolution; those who had claimed to have been affected by the Revolution and decolonization felt represented by those in power since 1978 and, as a result, did not feel affected by the discourses that stressed the need for reconciliation. The latter were grounded upon the principle of the normalization of the democratic process as representative of the victims of the new State, as well as those of the Revolution, on equal terms (Loff 2015, 114), an assumption that the bearers of the memory of the resistance did not accept. After a decade during which media space had shown perpetrators as humane, the voices of the supporters of the revolutionary process became more visible. The number of publications of autobiographies and interviews of former political prisoners increased significantly during the late 1990s.[2]

However, there is an aspect of these voices worth further examination. Historically revisionist approaches had given priority to former PIDE officers, military and former settlers in the colonies; in other words, white, male and family breadwinner figures were given public space.[3] Despite the Colonial War being a major reason for the Movement of the Armed Forces to organize the coup in 1974, its memory was dissociated from that of the Revolution. The link between the two involved associating the memory of decolonization with the sympathy that many Portuguese soldiers felt towards the African liberation movements, a debate that until the mid-1990s had been avoided. Women's experience during the Colonial War and the decolonization became more visible only after the 2000s.[4] Up to the early 2000s, socially dominant figures were mainly white, heterosexual, male, breadwinner, outnumbering black, homosexual and female figures. Although Portuguese society had changed significantly since the mid-1970s, and the patriarchal model of social organization slowly gave way to a less imbalanced structure, the former had by no means vanished.[5]

When the nation commemorated the 40th anniversary of the Revolution, Portugal had gone through significant change. The gradual inability of the country to refinance its government debt without the assistance of third parties led to an official request for a bail-out in 2011. It was formally signed, and austerity measures were decided upon, a decision that ultimately provoked widespread social dissatisfaction. Statistics showed an increasing number of workers on strike and of demonstrations on the streets between 2009 and 2014, particularly after the bail-out came into effect. The symbols of the Carnation Revolution were back on the streets: the slogan *Povo unido jamais será vencido* (People united will never be defeated) was shouted, black flags were waved as symbols of hunger and protesters singing *Grândola Vila Morena* interrupted parliamentary sessions and the events with official dignitaries. The government and official institutions organized several events to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the Revolution, showing a different attitude from that taken between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s (Loff 2015, 138).[6]

The contemporary production of graffiti and murals phenomena was influenced by May 1968 and by the emergence of hip-hop culture in the US in the early 1970s (Kozak, 2004:5). In South America, murals were important to ignite enthusiasm with the Chilean experience in the early 1970s, whereas the cities of Buenos Aires, Mexico City, Bogota, Caracas were important hotspots of graffiti in the 1980s. Graffiti and murals were used as ways to convey resistance. At times of social unrest, political activism also made use of street art and murals to write messages to protest against the government's policies.[7] During the late years of the New State, graffiti had been used to protest against the Colonial War but, after 1974, murals conveyed the atmosphere of hope and enthusiasm during the PREC. This art, fundamentally used by political parties, such as the PCP (Portuguese Communist Party) and the PCTP/MRPP (Portuguese Workers' Communist

Party/ Reorganization Movement for the Party of the Proletariat), is ephemeral and, by the late 1990s, most of those murals had been erased. Nonetheless, their memory was preserved by the 25th April Documentation Centre at Coimbra University. The preservation of the historical memory of the Portuguese murals was important for the younger generation of street artists, who started their artistic activity in the 2000s, to understand the heritage left by their predecessors, who had worked in a different political and social context, because it opened pathways for understanding the legacy of graffiti as political intervention in Portugal (Câmara 2015, 219).

In 2008, the Gallery of Urban Art (GAU) was set up as part of the Department of Cultural Heritage of Lisbon City Council. This section aimed at intervening in the city, particularly in the degraded Bairro Alto, to preserve the cultural heritage of the city. This action consisted in "a bottom-up approach to urban problems" because it responded to the growing visibility of graffiti and street art, by controlling the practice and the tensions between residents and users of the city quarters (Costa and Lopes, 2015).

In 2014, António Alves, former muralist of the PCTP/MRPP, decided to organize an initiative that celebrated 25th April through mural painting. By representing the Revolution, *25 de Abril 40 Anos 40 Murais*, which was not politically sponsored, brought generations together: those who had experienced 1974 as adults and those who were born after, thus, closing the gap between graffiti and mural art styles.[8] The first set of murals were in Alcântara and represented the Colonial War, the African liberation movements, the struggles of the proletariat and the peasantry**,** and the events of 25th April. There was another set of murals in the area of the Lavra Funicular. They also included figures and abstract motifs. Furthermore, the GAU (Urban Art Gallery), a department of the Lisbon City Council committed to the promotion of street art, decided to inaugurate seven murals on the present-day memory of the Carnation Revolution in Calçada da Glória, Lisbon. This mural exhibition was entitled *Venham mais Sete*, punning on Zeca Afonso's song *Venham mais Cinco*, and the Portuguese street artists: Carlos Farinha, Hugo Makarov, Miguel Januário, Miguel Noronha, Nomen, Telmo Alcobia and Tinta Crua were invited to represent the Revolution artistically. Lisbon Municipal Association also organized the public competition *25 de Abril Hoje* to create a mural on one of the walls of the headquarters. The jury, headed by Júlio Pomar, decided on Tamara Alves's project. As part of a series of academic initiatives to commemorate the anniversary of the Revolution, the New University of Lisbon invited the Portuguese street artists Vhils (Alexandre Farto), Miguel Januário, Frederico Draw, Diogo Machado and Gonçalo Ribeiro to paint a mural on the wall of the building of the Faculty of Human and Social Sciences, as an art manifestation by artists born after the Revolution.[9] These representations add the significance that the past has in everyday life or, as Raphael Samuel contends, commemoration should be read as "perceptions of the past which find expression in the discrimination of everyday life" (Samuel 2012, 17).

Enzo Traverso argues that the establishment of memory industries and tourism became neoliberal imperatives after the 1990s (Traverso 2016, 11).[10] Licensing graffiti and street art also promote art as a commodity, because street art contributes at promoting urban tourism. Within the neoliberal strategy of depoliticizing memory, the murals on the 40th anniversary of the Revolution establish the extent to which the memory of the past was reified for mass consumption. Street art extracts "sources and styles from a cultural encyclopedia of images and message styles, editing out some transmitted features and re-appropriating others" because appropriation is "a sign of participating in a tradition" (Irvine 2012, 263). As Martin Irvine contends, street art is an argument about visuality, the social and political structure of being visible" (Irvine 2012, 239). The political relationships between the artists, street and art are also enhanced in Teresa Caldeira's contention that street art introduces order into sensitive issues ("*certa ordenação do sensível*") (Caldeira 2012).

This article argues that, when analyzing the murals that celebrated the 40th anniversary of the Carnation Revolution from the point of view of representations of masculinity, they show that the memory on the Revolution generated a discursiveness mainly represented by hegemonic masculinity and hardly empowered feminism and negritude, as alternative forms of masculinity of representation, relegating them to (quasi)invisibility. Unlike negritude and feminism, hegemonic masculinity is the form of masculinity that conforms to the neoliberal agenda. Visibility is understood as the ability to place issues before the eyes of most people (Campos, 2016:55). It is both geographical and metaphorical. The heart of Lisbon, as the place of commerce, is also the place where hegemonic forms of masculinity are depicted in the murals. Calçada da Glória, Alcântara and the campus of the New University of Lisbon are in the center of Lisbon.[11] In the outskirts of the city, black masculinity and feminism are empowered as masculinities for the memory of resistance in order to show what the memory discursiveness has not considered central in the Revolution.

Masculinity, Heroism and the Street Writer

To mount the case that the Portuguese murals painted in and around Lisbon in 2014 produced different forms of masculinity and that these forms convey tension with the prevailing discourses on the memory of the Revolution, a definition of masculinity is necessary. This paper acknowledges the definition of masculinity taken in the performative sense, used in MacDonald's and Rosewarne's studies on masculinity in graffiti. Rather than being a set of biological traits, it is "something that gains its meaning through a process of construction and display" (MacDonald 2001, 97) and is "behavior engaged in by boys to enforce and illustrate their biological identity" (Rosewarne 2014, 4). Masculinity is a cultural concept that defines codes of behavior associated with action and power. Studies on masculinity show that the term "hegemonic masculinity" defines successful ways of "being a man" (Beynon 2002, 16). Hegemony is "meant (as) ascendancy achieved through culture, institutions, and persuasion" (Connell 2005, 832). As Almeida pointed out, hegemonic masculinity is an "ideal cultural model" because men cannot control men and women completely and forever (Almeida 1996, 163). It is a conservative ideal of the patriarchal social model, dominating the public sphere. It is masculinity associated with the figures with earning capacity, traditionally related to manual labour and breadwinners.

The growing attention to globalization has had an impact on research about masculinities. The significance of transnational arenas for the construction of masculinity has also been argued. Connell proposes a model of "transnational business masculinity" among corporate executives that related to neoliberal agendas of globalization" (Connell 2005, 849). He contends that Neoliberalism is, in principle, gender neutral and the male body being set an example as the ideal expression of the entrepreneurial culture (Connell 2005, 1816). Despite the neoliberal re-masculinization, celebrations of strength and domination associated with manhood are not traditional patriarchy.[12]

It is worth mentioning that this paper focuses on the representations of masculine figures in murals, although the approach to masculinity should also consider the masculine traits associated with writers, i.e., those who paint murals. Studies on street art have established that street writers are usually young and that the activity is predominantly male (MacDonald 2001; Cerejo 2007; Campos 2010; Rosewarne 2014; Ross, 2016).[13] Up to the early 1980s, most Portuguese muralists were male and politically engaged. The risk was inevitable to the practice of graffiti because it was an illegal practice and the message was clearly against the New State policies. Moreover, the left-wing political parties, such as the PCP and the PCTP/MRPP, were illegal and their supporters led clandestine lives. After the Carnation Revolution, murals that promoted the PREC were supported by right- and left-wing political parties. Painting graffiti and murals deserved then recognition for their bold practice, particularly before 1974.[14] In 2014, the activity of those muralists was remembered as a good model, particularly to the following generation.[15]

Even though street art thrived in Portugal after 2005, especially after street art festivals at the end of the 2000s, Portuguese male writers still largely outnumbered female writers.[16] The present-day quantitative imbalance of women and men writers in Portugal confirms MacDonald's findings (MacDonalds 2001). Some of the most prolific Portuguese female writers are Tamara Alves, Bubland, Sphiza, Glam, Maria Imaginário, Vanessa Teodoro and Xuma. Only three out of this list, Tamara Alves, Glam and Vanessa Teodoro, participated in the street art initiatives on the Revolution in Greater Lisbon.

Street writers see themselves as heroes (Campos 2010, 206-207). This representation is grounded on the expectations of an activity that involves overcoming extraordinary difficulties and dangers, such as climbing tall buildings and avoiding being arrested. Heroism in street art is associated with risk-taking, bravery and transgression. (MacDonald 2001, 101; Featherstone 2001, 17; Rosewarne 2014, 5). Street writers also expect that their heroic activities bring them recognition as reward. Recognition does not imply being known by their names. Most writers work in crews and sign their work with a tag, their artistic signature; therefore, they hope to be recognized for their personal creative style. They also believe that street art allows "them to construct and confirm their masculine identities" (MacDonald 2001, 96). As a relational construct, masculinity is built on deliberate and functional deviance - illegal painting - that generates peer recognition or reputation; in other words, it makes them earn "respect" by their peers, generating "an esteemed masculine persona" (MacDonald 2001, 96).[17] As far as women writers are concerned, their task is a difficult one. Whereas male writers work to prove they are 'men', female writers work to prove they are not 'women' (femininity according to this "logic" as a synonym of 'incapability') (MacDonald 2001, 130). It is worth mentioning that Tamara Alves, the writer of the mural on the headquarters of Lisbon Municipal Association and sole female writer in the city center, challenged traditional approaches to masculinity in her mural. Nevertheless, since all murals under analysis were commissioned, i.e., they were approved by institutions as ways to promote the memory of the Carnation Revolution; masculinity as a code of behavior linked to risk-taking decisions is not relevant for our analysis. Therefore, this paper focusses on the masculinity represented in murals.

Masculinity as Legitimizing Identity[18]

Heroes start revolutions. Marx, Lenin and Che Guevara, represented as revolutionary models in the 1970s murals, were replaced in 2014 by the Portuguese Zeca Afonso, Salgueiro Maia, Ribeiro dos Santos and Maria de Lurdes and Father Max. Zeca Afonso is the singer-songwriter of *Grândola Vila Morena,* which was the second signal to start the coup on 25th April 1974; Salgueiro Maia was the captain of the Portuguese army and, together with his troops, forced the dictatorship to resign on 25th April; Ribeiro dos Santos was a student at Law, murdered by a PIDE policeman in 1972; Maria de Lurdes and Father Marx had taught adult workers in Trás-os-Montes before they were allegedly murdered by the counter-revolutionary movement MDLP in 1976. The circumstances of their assassination have not been totally explained and their perpetrators have never been condemned in court.

Zeca Afonso's symbolic importance is metonymical as his songs of protest, particularly *Grândola Vila Morena*, symbolize the revolutionary attitude (Figure 1). *Grândola Vila Morena* was the signal on 25th April but other songs, such as *Os Vampiros* (1963), *A Morte Saiu à Rua* (1972) and *Venham mais Cinco* (1973), were recorded before 1974, and were critical of the regime.[19]

Salgueiro Maria embodies the values of self-determination, courage and liberation. The photo of Salgueiro Maia taken by Alfredo Cunha on 25th April inspired the figures painted in Alcântara and on the wall of the campus of the New University. Frederico Draw, who painted the latter, drew the captain's face with stronger and darker lines to convey the importance of changing ideas in changing times (Soares 2014).

Carlos Farinha reinvented Eugene Delacroix's *Liberty leading the People* (1830) and replaced the feminine figure with the representation of Salgueiro Maria to show the same values in his mural for *Venham mais Sete* exhibition.[20]

Ribeiro dos Santos, Maria de Lurdes and Father Max represent various aspects of heroism associated with self-sacrifice. To cherish their memory is almost to cherish the memory of martyrdom. Hannah Arendt contends that totalitarianism annihilated the contemporary condition of martyrdom because it had stripped martyrs of their personal identity and social existence (Arendt 1998, 496). The representations of Ribeiro dos Santos, Maria de Lurdes and Father Max ensure their right to be remembered as martyrs of the New State and of the counter-revolutionary movement.[21]

Thus, and despite the long-standing hegemonic, depoliticized memory, these individualities represent the resistance and defiance that made the revolutionary process. Symbolically, these values stand as the response required at times of recession and unrest in 2014.

The memory of the Carnation Revolution relied on the centrality of the Portuguese people as the collective hero in 2014. The Revolution was possible in 1974 because of the mass support of the Portuguese people. Heroism is rooted in the action of transforming a new society and has contributed to the construction of Portuguese exceptionalism as the core of "*Portugalidade*", to ignite national pride. For example, Fernão Lopes's chronicles tell us that if the Master of Avis had not been supported by the Portuguese, the plots of the Spanish monarchy and the Portuguese nobility would have been successful; similarly, historians tell us that if the Portuguese people didn't support the Movement of the Armed Forces, the coup d'état would have failed completely.

The political slogans reproduced in 2014, *Liberdade, Pão, Paz, Terra, Democracia, Habitação, Saúde* (Freedom, Bread, Peace, Land, Democracy, Housing, Health); *Unidos Venceremos* (United, We will win); *O povo é quem mais ordena* (The People are in command); *Não vos mataram, semearam-vos* (They did not kill you, They sowed you) and *Fora a NATO* (NATO leave) are combined with representations of the peasantry, proletariat (factory workers and dockers) and human collectives (families and children). Whenever figures were painted to stand for business sectors, such as dockers, factory workers and peasants, the collective is represented mainly by men and by women, dressed in their typical suits and uniforms. In other words, the power of the human collective consists in the symbolic strength made up of women and men. In these collectives, male figures take the front positions either individually or together with female figures and never the opposite.[22]

There are also murals in which the human collective is made up of children – boys and girls – when the pursuit was underpinning the relevance of the *revolutionary praxis* for the future. In those murals in which the collective represents the human strength required to continue the *revolutionary praxis* in 2014, gender-based distinctions are omitted. Nevertheless, in those murals in which the human strength is represented, pictorial emphasis is oriented towards male physical traits: muscle-defined, bearded/ mustache male figures dressed in professional uniforms and/or flat caps.[23]

These figures convey masculinity as the basis of the patriarchal social model that prevailed in Portugal and that was not brought down after the Revolution. The visibility given to the role of men as strong, determined leaders and breadwinners, relegating women to non-leading roles or making the memory of their roles in 1974 invisible pre-exists the Revolution, and it was absorbed by the memory discursiveness. This pictorial representation does not undermine the "renewed centrality of men to celebrate competitive success and force" that dominates the neoliberal agenda (Cornell 2005, 1816) and even generates a continuity of the discursiveness produced by the pageantry of masculinity displayed in street advertising outdoors or television commercials.

Paul Singer argued that Socialism is the utopian mode of production that competes against the Neoliberal economic system and its capitalist mode of production; thus, it is a deterrent to the collapse of democracy (Singer 1998, 82). Teixeira Fernandes contends that militantism encourages the pursuit of utopia to overcome a crisis (Fernandes 1996,14). Utopias emerge in any place where meaning is a pursuit. Vasco Gonçalves, the Prime Minister of the II-V Provisional Governments (1974-1975), was the major advocator of the utopian potential of the Revolution and continued to be so after the PREC collapsed in 1975.[24] In his speeches to Portuguese workers, Vasco Gonçalves sought to engage men and women on equal terms in the revolutionary process.[25] In 2014, the Carnation Revolution was the Portuguese militant utopia that emerged as the offensive to the prevailing culturally conservative and revisionist neoliberal rhetoric.[26] As far figurative representation is concerned, when writers decided to represent the revolution as action, strength and decision-making, murals showed it primarily as *men's stuff*. This is significative for the gap that separated the initial formulations of the Revolution as the utopian pursuit in 1974, and the representations of the Portuguese social structures in 1974 and thereafter, which were crystallized in the commemoration of the Revolution in 2014, particularly in urban centers.

These figures do not challenge the memory of the Revolution as a landmark in the history of Portuguese democracy and do not undermine more politicized approaches that advocate the validity of the political project. It is worthy of mention that these murals were produced by men only and represent a long-standing point of view on masculinity. Ultimately, these murals fail the representation of the alternative form of masculinity made possible in the utopian potential that presided the project of the Revolution in 1974. Ironically, the figurative representations in the murals contradict the councilwoman in charge of the Lisbon City Council's cultural department, who stated to the media that these murals kept a transgressive stance in 2014.[27]

Masculinity as Project Identity

The murals drawn by Tamara Alves and Vanessa Teodoro reconfigure the dominant male discourse. When Lisbon City Council chose Tamara Alves's project, the jury pinpointed the fact that her project was not based on stereotyped pictures, instead conveying Portugal as a modern, diverse country (Câmara Municipal de Lisboa 2014). The street writer explained that sex equality and solidarity were the core concepts of her project: "Corpos que lutam e se enlaçam, corpos que se confrontam e se sustentam, corpos que combatem e se ajudam. São mulheres e homens de igual para igual, um povo unido numa dança que mantém o conceito de luta, de trabalho de equipa" (Bodies that fight and are bound together, bodies that confront and support each other, bodies that struggle and help each other. These are women and men head-to-head, people united in a dance that holds the concept of struggle and teamwork) (Câmara Municipal 2014).[28]

Tamara Alves's mural introduces a view on masculinity, different from the one prevailing in the murals in the city center. Symbolically, this mural is a more faithful depiction of the social structure as described by Vasco Gonçalves in 1974 than the murals painted during the PREC. Those murals were based upon the contemporaneous society, subordinated to patriarchal authority, whilst Tamara Alves's mural represented the *ideal* social organization. The significance of this ideal is enhanced by the appropriation of collective space: in this case, the municipal council ("Assembleia Municipal") which is the deliberating governing body of the capital. This is where change in the city's organisation is planned.

In the area of Lavra Funicular, there was a collective mural presenting the only reference to the Women's Liberation Movement, set up in 1974. The body of the painted female figure is muscled, suggesting empowered feminism. In 2014, this mural, enhanced by a poem on women's emancipation, constituted an alternative to neoliberal remade masculinities.[29]

Vanessa Teodoro's *Sisters' of Revolution* in Loures also conveys empowered feminism, but the concept of physical emancipation is enhanced by that of sisterhood. [30]

Castells contends that, in the age of globalization and unmitigated expansion of capitalism, "feminism" as an empowered form of masculinity emerged as a counter identity to that of patriarchy:

> If this assumption is challenged, the whole system crumbles: the linkage between controlled sex and reproduction of the species is called into question; sisterhood, and then women's revolt, become possible, by undoing the gendered division of sexual labor that splits women; and male bonding threatens manhood, thus undermining the cultural coherence of men-dominated institutions. (Castells 2010, 262)

These figures represent Liberty, Revolution and Equality and symbolically underpin the participation of three women in this initiative.[31] Like the mural in Lavra, "Sisters of the Revolution" resonates with women's struggles for social and political visibility. Historically, Portuguese feminism's struggle is characterized by a refusal of hegemonic masculinity. This mural cannot be dissociated from the memory of the trial of Maria Isabel Barreno, Maria Teresa Horta and Maria Velho da Costa in 1973 for their publication of *Novas Cartas Portuguesas*. In 2014, the 'trial of the three Marias' is artistically transformed into sisterhood. The voluptuous bodies in Teodoro's mural represent the memory of segregation and marginality; they reassert the right to speak about physicality, sexuality, and desire without risking humiliation.

Geography matters in these murals, as it does in Tamara Alves's mural. Whereas Teodoro's mural outside Lisbon center is still preserved, that in Lavra has already been removed.

The Colonial War was a major factor in the outbreak of the Carnation Revolution. Nonetheless, this fact is almost secondary in the representation of the Revolution in 2014. It is worth mentioning that the memory of the experience of the war exists but is dissociated from that of the Revolution. The link between both implies associating the memory of colonialism and decolonization and the sympathy of many Portuguese soldiers with the African liberation movements. As mentioned above, this was the debate in which the right-wing avoided to engage, a decision that depoliticized the figure of the soldier. It is a "whitewashed psychic" Revolution (Gil 2004, 16). The memory of the war was almost non-existent in the murals and was replaced by degendered suffering: various degendered human figures under the banner "Tarrafal: Aldeia da Morte" (Tarrafal: Death Village).

The only identifiable figure blatantly associated with the Colonial War is Amílcar Cabral, the PAIGC leader, murdered by PAIGC dissidents plotting with the Directorate General of Security in 1973. The murals with Cabral in Alcântara and in Quinta do Mocho convey different discourses of memory. Whereas in Alcântara, it is a small mural, painted next to one with the flags of the Portuguese-speaking African countries, and integrated into a sequence of other murals about the Revolution, the mural of Amílcar Cabral covers the façade of a building in Quinta do Mocho. This was painted by António Alves. It is in the avenue that delimitates this neighbourhood from the direct road access to Lisbon and separates the underprivileged Cape-Verdean and Guinean families from the upper classes. It is a space of transition, the heterotopia that confronts the visitor with the reality of exclusion. This mural signals the memory of anticolonial resistance and the Guinean and Cape Verdean residents reactivate this memory by preserving this mural. The words *Unidade e Luta* (Unity and Struggle), the PAIGC motto, - non-existent in Alcântara - underpin the right to resist social exclusion.[32]

Judith Butler contends that Frantz Fanon's formulation "the black is not a man" is a critique of masculinity because it implies that blackness is an effeminized form; in other words, it is a subordinated form of masculinity. This also implies that masculinity and racial privilege shore up the notion of the human (Butler 2004, 13). A black man and a woman represent emasculated human forms. The depiction of Amílcar Cabral stems from the memory of the resistance that conjures 1974 as an incomplete project in 2014: the need to decolonize the memory of the Revolution. Symbolically, by introducing the issue of decolonization, this mural disavows racial privilege as part of masculinity. In the center of Lisbon, the memory of the colonial war and African liberation lacked assertiveness because it was in the middle of a sequence with other murals that represented different memories of 1974. In Quinta do Mocho, the mural is self-assertive. The fact that António Alves painted it – despite being integrated into a collective - is not a coincidence because, having worked as a muralist since the late years of the New State, he sees in murals a way to intervene politically and socially. Location and size underpin the right to resist social exclusion and through the representation of the PAIGC leader, this mural conveys masculinity through negritude.

Concluding Note

In conclusion, when the murals suggest that figures and values of the Revolution still carry meaning in 2014, they stand as recipients of the legacy of the Carnation Revolution and acknowledge that the political memory associated with this utopia resonates with the resistance urged at times of economic recession and social unrest. Crises encourage people to believe in the possibility of alternative worlds as ways outs. Ruth Levitas (Levitas 2013) argues that utopia should be considered the ideal method because only a form of utopian thought that engages with the actual institutional structure of the present, as well as the potential institutional structure of the future, can help us to move on. When alternative forms of masculinities are considered as forms of discursiveness to discuss history, they contribute to restore the utopian potential of the Revolution, because they provide discursiveness on feminism and negritude with the visibility the official memory currents of the Revolution denied them. The fact that they hardly penetrated the city center – and when they did, most were eventually washed off and replaced by other graffiti – and remained in the outskirts of the capital is indicative of these murals constituting acts of resistance. The fact that they still resist nowadays is also worthy of mention when considering utopias of resistance.

Masculinity understood as domination and power is not far from a butch and femme theory of performance when representing the Revolution in urban centers. It is the location of murals which establishes the difference and adds to the debate on masculinity. The memory of resistance is pictorially preserved in the periphery through feminism and negritude as empowered forms of masculinity. Hegemonic masculinity is associated with the depoliticized memory of the Revolution as a past event of the history of Portugal, whereas feminism and negritude call on the Revolution as a utopian revolutionary praxis and underline its political relevance in 2014.

Endnotes

1. In Portugal, the restoration of historical centres, such as Loulé, Nisa, Tomar and Vila Real and inaugurations of museums, libraries and cultural centres between the end of the 1980s and up till 1994, illustrate ways through which *the past was reified* for mass consumption (Traverso 2016, 11).
2. These are a few of the many autobiographies published between 1995 and 2000: Virgínia Moura (1996) *Mulher de Abril. Álbum de Memórias*; Dias Lourenço (1997). *Alentejo: Legenda e Esperança*; Carlos Brito (1998). *Tempo de Subversão. Páginas vividas da Resistência*; Jaime Serra (1999); *Eles têm o direito de saber. Páginas da Luta Clandestina*; António Almeida Santos (2000) *Quase Retratos*.
3. In 1994, the debate at the 20th anniversary of the Revolution, organized by SIC, the first private television station, was between José Tengarrinha, former political prisoner, Sousa e Castro, former member of the Revolutionary Council and Óscar Cardoso, former member of the New State police, who took the opportunity to deny any torture and executions carried out prior to 1974 (Loff, 2014:93)
4. Olga Gonçalves, Maria Velho da Costa, Ângela Caíres, Lídia Jorge, Juana Ruas and Wanda Ramos are among the women writers who, despite not having lived the Colonial War, wrote about it. Isabela Figueiredo (2009), *Cadernos de Memórias Coloniais*; Dulce Maria Cardoso (2012), *O Retorno* are examples of the publications on the late years of Portuguese colonialism and decolonization by women writers.

5. According to António Barreto, the percentage of women employees rose from around 20% in the 1960s to 50% in the 2000s; wage differences decreased, but men's wages were still 15-20% higher.
6. Since 2002, a few right-wing politicians have worn lapel carnations in Parliament on April 25. Manuel Loff pointed out that the generation of political leaders born in the end of the 1950s and in the 1960s wore the symbols of the Revolution and praised the Revolution in disengaged terms (Loff 2015, 137-38).
7. The North-American practice is mass-consumption-oriented, and pop iconography and figurative imagery are its correlates. The European tradition is engaged in combining practice with poetic, political and philosophical thoughts (Campos 2013). In the 1970s, Portuguese murals combined political thoughts with figurative imagery; in the late 2000s, Portuguese street art was closer to the North-American tradition. Portuguese murals showed what Tristan Manco defined as the overall shift of graffiti in the 21st century: from being predominantly topographic, graffiti evolved into iconographic art (Manco 2004, 16). Murals are more pop icon-inspired and considerably less politicized. Nevertheless, when the national economy deteriorated, the most critical murals of the government's measures in the city centre were male-authored. Examples include Nomen's halls of fame *Pray for Portugal*; *As Marionetas de Merkel*, associated with Slap and Kurtz; and *Jesse Passos Coelho James*, associated with Slap, Kurtz, Exas and Luka. They were painted in Amoreiras in 2012. After legislation on graffiti being introduced in 2013, masculinity was less a form of transgressive action than of transgressive discursiveness.
8. The Portuguese Association of Urban Art (APAURB) validated the projects and decided on the spots for the murals. This action also took place in other cities, such as Aveiro, Évora, Loures. In Loures, *25 de Abril 40 Anos 40 Murais* was integrated into the initiative *Os Muros que Abril Pinta*, organized by Loures City Council.
9. This invitation was within the framework of the conferences *A Revolução de Abril – Portugal 1974-75,* organized by the Institute of Contemporary History of the Faculty of Social and Human Sciences (New University of Lisbon), in partnership with the Lisbon City Council, Mário Soares Foundation, José Saramago Foundation, the 25th April Association and D.Maria II National Theatre.
10. The law no. 61 of 23rd August 2013 regulates graffiti. Graffiti is forbidden in public places, such as monuments and public transport and penalties range between 100 and 25,000 Euros. Art.3 assigns authority to the city councils to decide on licensing graffiti.
11. António Alves decided to start the initiative in Alcântara, Lisbon, because there was a very large mural, painted during the PREC, which lasted for many years before it was vandalized and erased. Therefore, the initiative set off where the memory of the murals lasted longer. See https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/estorias/os-murais-de-alcantara_n729388. Particularly up to the 1990s, it was a typically working-class neighbourhood; recently, it has gradually been gentrified.
12. In her book on the representation of masculinities in Portuguese mass media, Soraya B. Januário concluded that *action-man* was the form of masculinity that prevailed in 2016: "a forte presença do "homem-ação", promotora de um ideal de masculinidade, sobrepõe-se às demais" (A strong presence of action-man, promoting an ideal of masculinity prevails over any other) and acknowledged the persistence of patriarchalism in Portuguese society ("resquícios de pensamentos sedimentados em ideias patriarcais" (remnants of thoughts grounded on patriarchal ideas) (Januário 2016, 357).
13. Those who paint graffiti and other forms of street art (hall of fames, throw-ups and tags), complying with a tradition influenced by the 1970s hip hop in New York, are called writers.
14. In 2014, António Alves was described as a "veteran of graffiti", with outstanding work. See https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/estorias/os-murais-de-alcantara_n729388: "Mesmo os

adversários políticos se viam forçados a prestar homenagem à arte do incansável grafiteiro, a quem chamariam com um misto de admiração e inveja mais um "pinta-paredes" maoista" (Even the political opponents could not help but recognizing the art of the tireless graffiter, whom they would call another maoist "wall painter" in a mixture of admiration and envy).

15. Seixas do Carmo, a member of the MRPP, recalled their militant activities, as follows: "Nós éramos novos e as pessoas tinham uma consciência grande dos problemas que atravessávamos na altura" (we were young and people in general were very much aware of the prevailing issues of that time). https://sol.sapo.pt/artigo/103259/25-abril-ainda-ha-partidos-que-pintam-murais-politicos The archives of Mário Soares Foundation show PCTP/MRPP murals, identifying their authors. Data show that there were a few women involved in mural painting after 1974. See http://www.casacomum.org/cc/pesqArquivo?termo=alves+reis&facetFilterFundo=692
16. These include *Visual Street Performance*, the *Ebanocollective* project in Graça, *Wool* – Covilhã Festival of Urban Art, *Muro* –Lisbon Festival of Urban Art and *Loures* Festival of Urban Art.
17. This shows the discursive nature of masculinity. In his *Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault established that masculinity was a discursive phenomenon which conveyed a dispute on moral values (Foucault 1972, 49).
18. I draw on Manuel Castell's work on identity construction. In his *The Power of Identity*, he examines the social, political, and cultural dynamics associated with the technological transformation of societies and with the globalization of the economy. He identifies three types of collective identity: the *legitimizing identity*; the *resistance identity* and the *project identity*. Whereas the *legitimizing identity* is introduced by the dominant institution of society to extend and rationalize their domination, generating a civil society, the *project identity* emerges when social actors build a new identity that redefines their position in society in the pursuit of the transformation of overall social structure. He gives the example of feminism moving out of the trenches of resistance of women's identity and women's rights, to challenge patriarchalism, thus the entire structure of production, reproduction, sexuality, and personality on which societies have been historically based (Castells 2010, 8).
19. Atrapalharte, *Zeca Afonso* See http://www.cmloures.pt/Media/Microsite/Artepublicaloures/loures.html
20. Carlos Farinha, "*25 de Abril", Venham mais Sete*, GAU, Calçada da Glória, Lisbon. http://farrinha.wixsite.com/carlos-farinha/fashion?lightbox=i11mdz
21. *40 Anos 40 Murais*. For Maria de Lourdes and Father Max, see https://www.facebook.com/636423436406363/photos/a.636567573058616.1073741829.636423436406363/643290375719669/?type=3&theater; For Ribeiro dos Santos, see https://www.facebook.com/636423436406363/photos/a.636567573058616.1073741829.636423436406363/636983596350347/?type=3&theater
22. *40 Anos 40 Murais*. See https://www.facebook.com/636423436406363/photos/a.636567573058616.1073741829.636423436406363/647081878673852/?type=3&theater
23. *40 Anos 40 Murais*. See https://www.facebook.com/636423436406363/photos/a.636567573058616.1073741829.636423436406363/643291985719508/?type=3&theater
24. At an interview in 1999, Vasco Gonçalves was still a firm believer in the conceptual importance of utopia: "Para mim sem utopia não há progresso. A utopia sempre precedeu a acção e a luta pelas grandes ideias. Nunca será atingida, mas é um guia para a acção prática para estimular o empenhamento na luta pela felicidade do homem" (As far as I am concerned, if there is no utopia, there is no progress. Utopia has always preceded action and the struggle for grand ideas.

It will never be fulfilled, but it is a guide for practice to foster the committed struggle for human happiness) (Armando da Silva Carvalho," Ideais de Abril apontam para o future (The April ideals pointed towards the future)", *O Militante (The Militant)*, no.239, March-April 1999).

25. During his speech to Sorefame workers in May 1975, Vasco Gonçalves said, as follows: "Refiro-me sobretudo às mulheres. As mulheres são muito tímidas, têm medo de dar as suas ideias. Mas as mulheres têm uma força enorme dentro delas. Não vos julgueis inferiores aos homens, exprimi também as vossas ideias, discuti com os homens. As mulheres não devem pensar: — «isto aqui é trabalho de mulher, isto aqui é trabalho de homem». — Não devem pensar assim. [...] (I address particularly to women. Women are very shy, they are afraid of speaking up. But women hold enormous strength in them. Do not deem yourselves inferior to men, also speak your ideas and discuss them with men. Women should not think "this is a woman's work and that is a man's work – You should not think that way)" In Vasco Gonçalves's *Discursos, Conferências de Imprensa, Entrevistas*. Available at https://www.marxists.org/portugues/goncalves-vasco/1975/05/17.htm
26. Onésimo Teotónio Almeida points out that 25th April 1974 emerged as a utopian construct stemming from Marxism and the establishment of a new world alongside the rebirth of a new man (Almeida 2017, 295).
27. "Estabelecendo um paralelismo com os murais do período revolucionário consequente à Revolução de 25 de Abril de 1974, Catarina Vaz Pinto referiu que estas intervenções "mantêm o olhar transgressor e contestatário" de então, *com atualidade artística*, mas evocando os valores do movimento libertador. "A revolução está aqui, está dentro de nós", concluiu a autarca" (Establishing a comparison between the murals painted during the revolutionary period following the Revolution on 24th April 1974, Catarina Vaz Pinto stated that these interventions "convey the transgressive and contesting gaze of that time with artistic up-to-dateness, at the same time they call on the values of the liberating movement. "The Revolution is here, inside us", the councilwoman concluded). In http://www.cm-lisboa.pt/noticias/detalhe/article/arte-urbana-evoca-25-de-abril
28. Tamara Alves, *25 de Abril Hoje*, Lisbon City Council. See http://www.cm-lisboa.pt/noticias/detalhe/article/concurso-arte-urbana-25-de-abril-hoje
29. 40 Anos 40 Murais. See https://www.facebook.com/636423436406363/photos/a.636567573058616.1073741829.636423436406363/673047669410606/?type=3&theater
30. Vanessa Teodoro, *Sisters of the Revolution*, Loures, See http://www.cm-loures.pt/Media/Microsite/Artepublicaloures/loures.html
31. Information given by Vanessa Teodoro on email sent to me on 24th November 2017. The third woman was Catarina Monteiro aka Glam. Her mural is abstract and, consequently, it is not examined in this article.
32. António Alves, *Amílcar Cabral*, Quinta do Mocho. *40 Anos 40 Murais*. See https://www.facebook.com/636423436406363/photos/a.636567573058616.1073741829.636423436406363/752730928108946/?type=3&theater

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Stanislavskij's Method Improves Personality Aspects in Pre-adolescents

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Abstract:

In Stanislavskij's method, emotions are produced through body actions, where the body is the custodian of the actions associated with emotions. This association could improve some aspects of personality. Everyone can feel themselves in an immediate way. Hence, an increased knowledge of emotions and thoughts can improve the relationship with others. In the current study, 74 boys and girls took part in a research to ascertain if participation to a workshop on Stanislavskij's method can improve some personality aspects, according to the Big Five theory. The workshop was divided into two stages: (1) subjects were invited to tell a story with their body, sounds, and in narration; (2) discovering the places of Carloforte island. The final event was a personal rendering of the experience.

The six-month experiment included three weekly meetings of three hours each. On the first day, the BFC was administered to each subject and re-administered on the last day of the experiment. Results showed that Energy, Friendship and Openness factors improve after the workshop. This can be explained by the Stanislavskij's method enabling subjects to feel emotions and handle conflicts immediately through the body and the use of actions.

Keywords: Stanislavskij's method, Pre-adolescent, Theater workshop, Personality, Big Five Children.

Introduction

The link between Psychology and Theater is very strong. These two disciplines, even presenting different methods and goals, are actually much closer than the researchers admit. The major link is observed between Stanislavskij's thought and Psychology, although performance on stage is the goal for the former and individual well-being is the goal for the latter.

Stanislavskij (1936; 1938; 1950) claims that the actor must be freed from his personal schemes and, to be credible, he/she must "melt" with the character he plays. Only about one hundred years later, Berne (1967) will talk about personal scripts. Stanislavskij asks to interpret the character "psychologically", referring to a set of psychological situations that coincide with the actor's experience. To do this, Stanislavskij draws on different artistic experiences and creates a system of physical exercises to transform the body into a tool ready to accept the psychological nuances of the character. According to the author, the body is the custodian of the actions corresponding both to emotions and states of mind for the theater workshop.

Stanislavskij's method is a system in which emotions are produced through the use of actions, analytical research of the given circumstances of the text, and imagination (Bussels, 2012). Hence, these characteristic aspects of Stanislavskij's method show a psychological value because the body is a mean to join emotions. Through the action, the emotions linked to it reappear in all its cognitive and neuro-autonomic conditions. Thus, one can learn to get familiar with emotions, to get to know them and use them in an adaptive way. Stanislavskij stresses the objectives, which are the character's goals within each scene (Bussel, 2012).

Also, this aspect shows a psychological background. Moving with a pre-fixed goal is crucial to recognize the self and for a more internal locus of control.

From another point of view, the creative aspect has been observed to create wellbeing both as an immediate "activator" of positive emotion and as a process of problem-solving that can be generalized to more than one reality (Hennessey and Amabile, 2010). Moreover, positive mood is associated with creativity and innovative action (Hennessey and Amabile, 2010). As for the emotional aspects, Fauladi and Shabidi (2010) remarked that creativity plays a primary role in reducing anxiety and depression.

Another critical point is the group as a system for experimenting and creating one's own identity. In this context, a theater workshop is a typical group activity. In a workshop, the creative process operates simultaneously for every individual involved, as well as for the group. The process understanding is organically synergic (Bicherstaff, 2011).

For these reasons, it was decided to experiment a Stanislavskij theater workshop in preadolescents. As a matter of fact, the union with peers in preadolescents plays a vital role in the construction of self. In this context, the current study aims to ascertain if participating in a theater workshop can change some aspects of personality according to the Big Five Children (BFC) model. Specifically, it was studied if the actor's work, carried out in school, can stimulate to experiment new skills and problem-solving involving personality aspects according to the BFC model. A better knowledge of emotions in preadolescents, experienced through physical actions, should improve self-efficacy, positively affecting personality.

Methods

This study was carried out on 74 subjects (40 males and 34 females) divided into an Experimental group, with 38 subjects, and a Control group with 36. All the students attended the second year of the secondary school course of the Don Gabriele Pagani Institute of Carloforte (12.4 years old ± 6.0 months). Boys and girls were randomly assigned to Experimental or Control groups. The Experimental group was involved in a workshop on a Stanislavskij's method held by professional actors. The Control group was involved in a volleyball training activity aiming to participate at a junior national competition.

Procedure

The workshop was divided into two phases. In the first, the subjects were invited to work on the body (*i.e.* tell a story with the body); on the voice (*i.e.* tell a story with the sounds, both vocal and coming from musical instruments) and on the narration. The second phase was based on the discovery of the places on Carloforte island. The final event was a personal rendering of the experience. Both groups were involved for six months in the experiment with three weekly meetings of three hours each. All the subjects carried out their own activities in the school gym. On the first day, the Big Five Children (BFC) was administered to everyone. The same test was re-administered on the last day of the experience.

Theatre Workshop of Stanislawkij's Method

The workshop was divided into two stages: (i) pre-expressive and (ii) improvisation into the habitat.

(i) Pre-expressive stage. This stage focused on: actions and reactions; play; sound, dance, and rhythm. All activities focused on the body in order to re-establish a perfect contact with the body itself. At this stage, some theatrical techniques were used: "the body as a story-teller", "the sound as a story-teller" and "the voice as a story-teller".

1) The body as a "story-teller". These techniques were based upon the different parts of the body. First, the backbone as the movement generator was considered. Then, differentiation of the superior part of the body from the inferior one was stressed. Again, the homo-lateral movement was refined by moving either the right part of the body or the left one, separately. Last, focus on the lightness or heaviness of the body and on the impulse coming from head, shoulder, hands and posterior was put. All these exercises aimed to expressive as well as creative improvisations.

2) The sound as a "story-teller". These techniques focused on telling a story by means of sounds, where voice and words were linked profoundly to the body and implied speaking as a physical action. Boys and girls were invited to focus on breath and how vocal emission, linked to movement, becomes more fluent. Moreover, the sound changes according to the body parts associated to it.

3) The voice as a "story-teller". Boys and girls were divided into three groups. Each group was given a story. Subjects had to tell a story by using the expressive means developed in the previous steps (*i.e.* body and sound as story-tellers).

Improvisation into the habitat

This stage consisted of a three-day itinerary across the island of Carloforte. Through improvisation techniques, as well as songs and stories, the subjects "met" three local mythological characters of the island called *Vegiumen*, *Raza du Paise,* and *Puvuppo*, respectively. They told to these characters the story developed in the previous stages. As a final point, a rendering containing all the elements elaborated in the six-month theatre experience was organized.

Big Five Children (BFC) Test

The following definitions of the principal dimension and their facets were used as generative criteria for statements in BFQ.

Energy/Extraversion (E): refers to the characteristic that in the literature are subsumed by Extraversion (McCrae and Costa, 1987) or by Surgency (Goldberg, 1990). The label "Energy" seemed more appropriate to the specific meaning that in the Italian context is associated with the words "Extraversion", often used as a synonym of Sociability, and "Surgency". This dimension is organized into the following two facets: "Dynamism", referring to expansiveness and enthusiasm, and "Dominance", referring to assertiveness and confidence.

Friendliness (F): refers to the factor usually labeled Agreeableness (McCrae and Costa, 1987) or Friendliness vs Hostility (Digman, 1990). This dimension is organized into the following two facets: "Cooperativeness/Empathy", referring to concern and sensitiveness towards others and their needs, and "Politeness", referring to kindness, civility, docility, and trust.

Conscientiousness (C): refers to impulse control in both its proactive and inhibitory aspects (Digman, 1990; McCrae and Costa, 1989). This dimension is organized into the following two facets: "Scupulousness", referring to dependability, orderliness and precision, and "Perseverance", referring to the capability of fulfilling one's own tasks and commitments.

Emotional Stability (S): refers to aspects of "negative affectivity" (Watson and Tellegen, 1985; McCrae and Costa, 1987). This dimension is organized into the following two facets: "Emotion Control", referring to the capacity to cope adequately with one's own anxiety and emotionality, and "Impulse Control", referring to the capability of controlling irritation, discontent, and anger. For the children version "Emotional Instability" is used.

Openness (O): refers to the factor labeled Culture (Norman, 1963), or Intellect (Goldberg, 1990), or Openness to Experience (Costa and McCrae, 1985). This dimension is organized into the following two facets: "Openness to Culture", referring to the broadness or narrowness of one's own cultural interest, and "Openness to Experience", referring to openness to novelty, tolerance of different values, interest toward different people, habits and lifestyle.

Data analysis

The data consist of the answers of each subject to the BFC, divided by factor (Energy, Friendship, Conscientiousness, Emotional Instability, and Openness) in the two surveys: Test and Retest.

In order to verify the differences between the Test period and the Retest period and, therefore, to verify changes in the personality aspects of the subjects, a mixed ANOVA 2 x 2 x 5 was performed.

Factors were: Gender (2 levels: male and female), Groups (2 levels: Experimental. Control), Time (2 levels: Test and retest), BFC (5 levels: Energy, Friendship, Conscientiousness, Emotional Instability and Openness).

Results

ANOVA 2x2x2x5 (mixed design) showed significant results for interaction between Groups x Time and BFC ($P<0.01$); Gender was not significant (male: 49±11; female 53±12).

Duncan test showed:

1. Significant differences for Energy for Experimental group between Test and retest ($p<0.05$).
2. Significant differences for Friendship for both groups between Test and retest ($p<0.05$).
3. Significant differences for Friendship in retest phase among groups ($p<0.01$).
4. Significant differences for Openness for both groups between Test and retest ($p<0.05$).
5. Significant differences for Openness in retest phase among groups ($p<0.01$).

All other comparisons were not significant ($p>0.05$).

Graph. 1 shows a significant increase from Test to Retest for Energy in the Experimental group. The Control group did not show significant differences between Test and Retest (Graph. 1).



Graph. 1 – Differences from Test to Retest for Energy in the Experimental and in the Control groups.

Graph. 2 shows significant differences between Test and Retest for Experimental and Control groups for Friendship. At the Test, no significant differences between Experimental and Control groups were found. At the Retest, a significant increase in Friendship for both groups was found, but a significantly higher increase for the Experimental Group was observed (Graph. 2).



Graph 2 – Differences from Test to Retest for Friendship in the Experimental and in the Control groups.

Graph. 3 shows significant differences between Test and Retest for Experimental and Control groups for Openness. At the Test, no significant difference between Experimental and Control groups was found. At the Retest, a significant increase in Openness for both groups was found, but a significantly higher increase for the Experimental Group was observed (Graph. 3).



Graph 3 – Differences from Test to Retest for Openness in the Experimental and in the Control groups.

Discussion

The current study shows a significant increase between the beginning and the end of the workshop for Energy, Friendship and Openness. This means that the workshop can be a helpful tool to test oneself and live emotions freely. Furthermore, the group may be a protection both for the single and the group. Also, the Control group shows a significant increase for Friendship and Openness, because it is a social and group activity whatsoever, but a greater increase for the group participating in the Stanislavskij's method (1936; 1938; 1950) workshop was observed. The link between actions and emotions is helpful to recognize oneself's emotions as well as the other's ones. This implies, in one hand, a greater openness and acceptation of the other and, on the other hand, a greater openness towards the experiences of life.

Finally, for Energy, a significant increase in the Experimental group, while in the Control group no significant change was detected. This is likely due to the need to get involved in the first person, a typical situation of Stanislavskij's method. Furthermore, the greatest increase in Energy can be explained by Stanislavskij's method pushing subjects to test themselves, try emotions and handle psychological conflicts immediately through body, as well as physical actions. Finally, also learning to move with a goal implies the responsibility of one own actions and puts the individual as the only actor of his/her own life.

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Disability Cultures and Artifacts.
Wheelchair as *Silent Helper* and *Little Black Dress*

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Abstract:

Studies on disability culture have been conducted since the mid-90's, by American scholars, and since 2000, by the British ones. Researches on this topic states that disability is a separate culture and that there are different voices, some of approval and some of disapproval, among persons with disabilities. The article discusses, describes and justifies the idea of disability culture, as viewed by Brown (1996; 2002), Barnes and Mercer (2001), like cultures of disability characterized by internal diversities. The article doesn't deal with the whole spectrum of subsequent structural differences in disability cultures but emphasizes the differences regarding a single element of culture - a physical artifact, which is the wheelchair. The first part of the article contains the analysis of the general anthropological concept of culture in the American and British researches, the analysis of the concept of disability culture and its internal differences which create the disability cultures. In the second part, I analyze the secondary data analysis artifact itself - a wheelchair conceptualized by 8 Polish women with a physical disability. The data from the secondary analysis indicated the role of the wheelchair, furthermore the informants' wishes for the optimal wheelchairs and the information about the unaccepted ones, as well. 8 female informants treat the wheelchair as an artifact of everyday life, enabling independence, the organization of daily activities and sex. They have their own preferences regarding the construction of wheelchairs, the color and binary functions; moreover, they give it names, such as cabriolet, legs, Gandalf or a Little black dress.

Keywords: Cultural anthropology, Culture, Disability cultures, Cultural artifact, Physical artifact, Females, Wheelchair.

Introduction

Human disability has existed since the dawn of time. Recent interesting studies, conducted by medical anthropologists, indicate that *Homo Sapiens* of Cro-Magnon, who lived in the 28.000 BCE, probability had type 1 neurofibromatosis (Charlier et al. 2018). By analyzing the lives of people with disabilities and their families in historical and anthropological aspects raises questions about the relationship between culture and its members with disabilities, about disability representations in culture, the identity of disabled groups, key values, norms, lifestyles, rituals, taboos, artifacts etc. The analysis of the phenomenon called *disability culture* has been conducted by scholars since the mid-90's in the American research circles and since 2000, in the British one. In the next pages we aim to present the concept of disability culture as it was conceptualized by Brown (1996; 2002) and Barnes and Mercer (2001). They consider that disability cultures are characterized by internal diversities, even in the contexts of the artifacts of the given cultures. In this article, I will discuss the conceptualization of a wheelchair as it was seen by 8 Polish women with physical disabilities.

Anthropological roots in defining culture

From over 150 definitions of culture existing in anthropology and sociology in American, British or French scholarly works, the first descriptive one was constructed in the nineteenth century, by the evolutionist Edward B. Taylor. The author formulated the definition of culture by perceiving it as a synonym of civilization, indicating key areas in the structural layer. The author writes: "culture, or civilization in a broad ethnographic sense, is a complex whole that includes knowledge, beliefs, art, morality, law, customs and all other abilities and habits acquired by a human being as a member of society" (Taylor 1871, 1). Boas considers that

> Culture can be defined as a whole of psychological and physical reactions and actions that characterize the behavior of people forming a group collectively and individually, in relation to their natural environment, to other groups, to the members of the group and each separately. It also includes action products and their role in the life of the group. However, the calculations of various aspects of life do not constitute culture. Culture has a certain structure and its elements do not remain independent of each other. (Boas 1911, 149)

Another researcher, Benedict, wrote that "something that really connects people together is their culture, or ideas and norms that they have in common" (Benedict 1934, 16). On the other hand, Linton believes that culture is "the total sum of knowledge, attitudes, patterns of habitual behavior, shared and transmitted by members of a given community" (Linton 1940). In turn, Herskovits emphasizes that "in culture there are certain regularities that allow it to be analyzed by scientific methods, it is an instrument for adapting people to the whole environment and for obtaining resources for expressing their creative expression" (Herskovits 1948, 625). Another definition that must be pointed out was constructed by Kroeber and Klockhohn. The authors argue that "culture consists of all the patterns of thinking, feeling and reacting, acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols, which together with their embodiments in human products are significant achievements of human groups, the core of culture is traditional (e.g. historical, accrued and selected ideas), especially values connected with them" (Kroeber and Klockhuhn 1952 in Berry 2011, 226).

Goodenough indicated that culture is "a model of community life, regularly appearing activities and material and social arrangements characteristic of individual groups." (Goodenough 1957, in Burszta 1998, 49). He believes that "the culture of a given community consists of everything you need to know, or what you have to believe in order to act in a way acceptable to its members and in a role accepted by each of them" (Goodenough 1964, in Burszta 1998, 49). The anthropologist of culture, Geertz defined culture as follows: "it means historically transmitted patterns of meanings contained in symbols, a system of inherited concepts expressed in symbolic characters through which people communicate, consolidate and develop their knowledge about attitudes towards life" (Geertz 1966, 89).

In addition to the American perspective, along with the key concepts of culture highlighted by the British researchers, it is also important to mention, in this regard, B. Malinowski's sense of culture. He significantly emphasized the concept of organization in culture and treated it as a whole, consisting of elements on the background of significant relations between members of a culture. According to Malinowski, culture was a tool for adapting to the living conditions, and it was characterized by goals and functions. Malinowski also treated culture as a result of adapting man to the world (Malinowski 1944).

Also, on the basis of British social anthropology, it is worth pointing out the analysis of the social structure made by Radcliffe-Brown and his vision on culture, as "analysis of social structure and function redirected anthropological inquiry to the institutions of human life and to the role such institutions play in the maintenance and reproduction of society" (Radcliff-Brown 1952 in Moore, 2009, 158). Furthermore, the British anthropologist Douglas (1966; 2003) conducted an interesting analysis of cultural structures, which analyzed purity and pollution categories in cultures, being interested in comparisons, intercultural research, structure, and classification within cultures. Moore writes: "Douglas traced the convoluted lines of magic, taboo, mana, and contemplation. But in the last half of *Purity and Danger*, Douglas focused on relationships between ritual and social systems." (Moore 2009, 277)

Subsequently, Giddens (1989) indicated that "culture consists of the values the members of a given group hold, the norms they follow, and the material goods they create" Giddens (1989, 31). The author emphasized the importance of products of culture as material artifacts. Other artifacts of culture pointed to the symbolic layer highlighted Masłyk-Musial (1996). The author believes that culture is built thanks to the human community that creates symbolism, language, myths, and values. With the help of artifacts, people express culture, confirm its specificity. Symbol creation is, according to the author, a continuous process, like giving meanings. Masłyk-Musial (1996) says that symbolically included culture assumes the existence of networks of meanings - a web of symbols and the communication between them. Patterns of symbolic meanings are expressed through the myths, values, history of the organization of rituals and heroes.

Summing up the above review and the classic definitions of culture, I want to point out that they illustrate the American and British way of defining the 20th century culture and provide a canvas for further consideration on disability cultures in this article. The definitions on which I base the further analysis were constructed by Kroeber and Klockhuhn, Goodenough, and Malinowski. On the one hand, the concept of culture in this paper is seen as a set of ways of thinking and reacting symbolically. Culture is also a reservoir of values, artifacts as well as the roles of members who do everything to be members of the given groups. Furthermore, culture is considered also as an organization enabling life and adaptation through relationships and interactions, as Malinowski (1944) noted.

Thinking about the analysis of selected cultural artifacts, I consider the concept of artifact indicated by the researchers, specifying it in regard to organizational cultures, including (Schein 2008): cultural artifacts (language, myths, and legends), behavioral artifacts (ceremonies, rituals), *physical artifacts* (art, technology, material objects). I will focus this artifacts analysis here on a selected *physical artifact* – the wheelchair and the concept of wheelchairs, and their roles in the lives of eight Polish women, in their early or middle adulthood (20-40 and over 40 years of age).

Disability cultures

Disability culture has been accompanying humanity since its inception, inscribing itself naturally into the everyday life of dominant cultures. It cannot be denied the existence of the disability, since the immemorial human existence, as the prehistorical sources point out, the presence of people with disabilities is known in all cultures around the world (Borowska-Beszta 2012). Disability cultures have been formed in different parts of the world, due to different circumstances, including relation to the *anomaly* (Douglas 2003), which sometimes it increased migration. Historically, an interesting culture of disability was formed among the deaf and the hearing people living together in the seventeenth century, on the island of Martha's Vineyard (Barnes, Mercer 2001), off the coast of North America.

Another undoubted cultural and European phenomenon constituting the original disability culture, was created as a result of migration; it happened in the seventh century in Belgium, in the city of Geel, which became the destination of disabled migrants from different European countries and a place of residence for them. Thus, Geel created a prototype of disability culture, a valuable medieval support for people with disabilities in foreign families. Such support recognized the dignity of people with disabilities and their needs (Borowska-Beszta 2012). Those two examples reflect not only the long presence in history of people with disabilities but also indicate one way of constructing disability cultures through migration in the world.

The term of *disability culture* appeared in the 1990s and it added a new dimension to the process of understanding people with disabilities and conceptualizing disability in the context of culture. The British researchers, Barnes and Mercer (2001) and earlier, the American scholar Brown (1996; 2002) wrote about this phenomenon. Disability culture should be interpreted on the background of general definitions of culture, created by sociologists and anthropologists. This means that culture manifests itself in material, spiritual or symbolic exchanges and invariably accompanies everyday life. Culture is also the image and a set of rules that influence the relationship between its members, the quality of their relationship and communication, and their lifestyles. Among the key dimensions of culture are family (kinship), language, education, art, religion, law, transport, economics, and work. It consists of specific features, highlighted by anthropologists. They are the spheres and forms of everyday practices, such as routine activities and rituals, creativity and art, learning, mobility, and work-related activities.

Other features of culture are attitudes toward time, explicit and hidden norms, beliefs, (including sacrum), customs, individual values and group values, and taboo spaces. Culture is also manifested through layers of material or symbolic artifacts, both ideographic and behavioral related to aspects of communication, gestures, and sustained patterns of behavioral data in cultures.

The problem of historical analysis of disability cultures is widely treated by Barnes and Mercer (2001). While comparing the surveys on disability culture in the American and the British studies, the authors point out that American concepts emphasize linguistic and textual aspects and the connection with bodily diversity, unequal status, power and their cultural meanings, while British scholars especially stress the representation of disability in the media, providing an ideological pretext for social exclusion (Barnes, Mercer 2001, 521).

Barnes and Mercer's analysis of the cultural, historical and media status offers the definition of *disability culture* as following: "disability culture presumes a sense of common identity that unites the disabled people and separates them from their nondisabled counterparts" (Barnes, Mercer 2001, 522). The authors emphasize that "there is a further presumption, that a disability culture rejects a notion of impairments-difference as of symbol of shame and stresses instead solidarity and the positive identification."(Mercer, Barnes 2001, 523). It should be pointed out that the very concept of disability culture met a various level of approval from disabled people's side, which is also noted by Barnes and Mercer (2001), after Finkelstein (1996 in Campbell and Oliver 1996, 111).

Finkelstein (1996) says that:

> There is a great deal of uncertainty amongst the disabled people whether we want <<our own culture>>. After all, we all have had own experiences of resisting being treated as different, as inferior to the rest of society. So why now, where is much greater awareness of our desire to be fully integrated into society do we suddenly want to go off at a tangent and start trying to promote our differences, our separate identity? Secondly, at this time if we do want to promote our own identity, our own culture, there has been precious little opportunity for us to develop a cultural life. (Finkelstein 1996; Campbell and Oliver 1996, 111)

It should be added that since the publication of the last remark articulated by Finkelstein (1996), after 22 years, people with disabilities in United States and European countries significantly promote the new achievements and artifacts of the disability cultures.

Contemporary various *disability cultures*, as concepts, are coherent and may be understood as constructs of organizational cultures, existing in the frame of the dominant culture. They fit into the universal dominant culture, manifesting their own unique dimensions on its background. Disability cultures have their own everyday lives, norms, routine activities and rituals, bonds, values, sense of humor, taboo and lifestyles, as well as ways and styles of communication. In addition, the members of disability cultures create artifacts (physical, symbolic) and share similar experiences regarding relations between dominant cultures and disability cultures.

It is also worth taking into account, in this artifact analysis, the concept of a cultural artifact as defined by Reber and Reber (2005). They note "such an artifact that has the form and functions defined by culture" (Reber and Reber 2005, 61). Furthermore, disability cultures manifest their own activity in real life plans and in virtual spaces of social networks, blogs etc. (Smieszek and Borowska-Beszta 2017).

The diversity of disability cultures

Brown (1996; 2002) uses one common definition of *disability culture*, by locating artifacts and values of disability culture related to experiencing oppression over the past centuries, creating artifacts and considering disability as pride and valorized common value. An analogous idea can be seen in Barnes and Mercer's (2001) analysis, indicating both the change of the concepts of *impairment* and *disability* to a positive meaning and highlighting the system of oppression, as the joint experience of disabled people (Barnes, Mercer 2001).

While Barnes and Mercer (2001) and Brown (2002) do not emphasize the topic of internal diversity within disability culture itself, it should be noted that disability cultures, including people with disabilities, their relatives, members of associations and communities are diverse. This means, in my opinion, that within the *disability culture* there are structures that differ in terms of, among others, artifacts (linguistic, behavioral, physical), values, routine activities, rituals, symbols, standards etc., indicating that talking about one general disability culture, as Barnes, Mercer (2001), Brown (2002) do, is an oversimplification.

Discussions on the structures and types of disability cultures are conducted in the world. The *Deaf Culture* concept is very clear, which, according to Barnes and Mercer, was constituted on the basis of the social exclusion of deaf people (Barnes, Mercer 2001), which in addition to artifacts, has shared a separate sign-language system. In addition, similar identity criteria are met by the culture of people on the spectrum of autism (*Aspi Culture*) and their families, present in online forums or other networks (Borowska-Beszta 2012).

What distinguishes disability culture internally is also related to the different concepts of disabilities itself and the attitude towards them. I should mention that another concept of disability exists in Deaf Culture, Blind Culture and a different one in Cultures of People with Intellectual Disabilities (Learning Disabilities) or Homelessness Cultures, that have members with acquired disabilities, due to the system oppressions or own lifestyle choices. Similarly, the Cultures of the Mentally Ill People and Cultures of Intellectually Disabled people have different positions in the Western dominant culture, than Deaf Culture or Blind Cultures.

In my opinion, not all disability cultures can be labeled in one common disability culture. The differences essentially include all the elements of organizational cultures indicated in e.g. by Schein (2008).

The analysis of differences in particular disability cultures concern almost all elements of culture, from artifacts through values or hidden assumptions of disability cultures, which I pointed out while analyzing taboo, hijack and fatalism patterns in generational families and cultures of people with disabilities in Poland (Borowska-Beszta 2018).

Additionally, we must bring into attention that disability cultures have a heterogeneous and multidimensional form in various parts of the world, and are subject to the regularities of the dominant culture. In disability cultures, the transmission of cultural knowledge and artistic expression, which are the axis of cultures, are transmitted through socialization and learning. In addition, the core values of disability cultures that determine their identity, i.e. *disability itself*, are also transmitted biologically, although this is not the only way to have a disability which can be acquired for exogenous factors throughout entire life.

This key value called *disability* indicates the uniqueness of *disability cultures*.

Continuing with the considerations regarding the internal diversity in disability cultures, starting from symbolic artifacts, (e.g. language) the culture of people with hidden (*invisible*) or physical disabilities, including those with movement disability, it should be added that the above-mentioned disability cultures use a completely different formal and semantic verbal language and forms of messages than, for example, those members of disability cultures having intellectual disabilities (levels from mild to profound). Once more, these qualities will not necessarily be, in my opinion, essential quality and key symbolic artifacts in Deaf culture, Blind culture or in cultures where disability has been acquired through lifestyle.

In reference to the above remarks, I believe that, in the concept of a multitude of disability cultures, all disability cultures with a multitude of artifacts and symbols share only a common brace of disability phenomenon (innate or acquired) and the oppression of the dominant culture. Other values and the quality may be different. In addition, even if cultural data is created by artifacts, they are unique and cannot be simply translated into artifacts for other disability culture, for example, a sign language system is a product of the Deaf Culture, alternative communication systems of the Aspi Culture, Braille system of the Blind Culture. Moreover, wheelchairs are a product of Cultures of people with Movement Disability. All those mentioned above are not necessarily being used by the People with Intellectual Disabilities.

Analogous, every particular culture uses specific ideographic symbols and logos in order to indicate their own identity. It turns out that only in the Culture of Chronically and Terminally Ill People is present the image of an animal (cancer), and it is the symbol of that only given culture. The blue color is nowadays a mark of the members on spectrum of autism and Aspi Culture, the purple color belongs to the members of Epilepsy Culture.

In addition, other artifacts will be present as forms of body decorations - tattoos, for example, among members of the Culture of People Intellectually Disabled. Recently, in 2018, American mothers of children with Down syndrome decorated their hands, areas around the neck, ears, and other parts of their bodies with *three arrowheads* pointing upwards and representing the trisomy in the 21th chromosome. The above remarks only indicate internal differences and the richness of disability cultures according to the plan of physical artifacts. I suppose that wider studies will reveal differences also in values, norms, routine activities, cultural rituals or taboo content in disability cultures.

Furthermore, speaking of disability cultures, there are different ways of enculturation and transmission of cultural knowledge. It also means that taboo area will be constructed differently, e.g. in the Culture of People with Intellectual Disabilities (Learning Disabilities), which in the Polish case, among others, is characterized by the long-term silence of parents, siblings regarding the future of a disabled brother or sister, after the death of parents (Borowska-Beszta 2018). The topic is not discussed openly in families for years.

In turn, by analyzing the question of time, I would like to stress that the attitude towards the concept of time is different in the Cultures of People with Intellectual Disabilities (monochronic), for example, and in the Cultures of People with Physical Disabilities or Deaf and Blind Cultures (polychronic) (Borowska-Beszta 2012; 2013).

By observing selected behavioral and symbolic artifacts in cultures of people with intellectual, physical, sensory and emotional disabilities, besides the cultures of people with chronic diseases or mental disorders, it should be noted that other artifacts will be produced, and it will be expressed with the help of different types of communication. For example, in the Culture of People with Intellectual Disability (Learning Disability), there is usually present a simple verbal communication system that minimizes abstract concepts, complex sentences and words. Such profoundly simplified communication systems are not present in the Cultures of People with Physical Disabilities, as for example those using wheelchairs and having a regular intellectual functioning level, or in cultures of people with sensory disabilities.

What's more interesting, any efforts of transferring one form of behavior in communication (*symbolic artifact*), from one disability culture to another one, could create consternation or even the protest of the members.

In conclusion, I would like to point to the layers that connect the disability culture. I agree with Barnes and Mercer (2001) and Brown (1996; 2002) on the fact that it is about the disability term, as a phenomenon of human functioning, and stories of oppression that lasted for centuries. In addition, what unites disability culture members is, in my opinion, related to the *presence* and the *open exposition* of disability itself, which in every disability culture becomes the key and the regulator to access them. This function is, therefore, a common and a universal pattern characterizing any disability culture. In order to be accepted and to get access to it, either in real or in online virtual reality, one should show his own disability, the disability of a family member, the circle of close friends etc. A common element is also the imposed control of disability cultures members from the dominant Western culture, in which there is manifested at the level of birth control, in order to attempts to control and influence entire lifestyle and death.

***Wheelchair* as cultural artifact**

Below I would like to analyze one of the artifacts of the Culture of People with Physical Disability - the wheelchair. This artifact is designed and created for users with dysfunctions in the sphere of motion, that can be congenital or acquired. It is not generally a typical artifact for other disability cultures, as for example - Mental Illness Culture, Deaf Culture, Aspi Culture etc., unless there is an additional value present in these cultures associated with multiple disabilities, including the need for using the wheelchair. So, the wheelchair can be designed for people with very different dysfunctions and needs that also go beyond physical disability and involve severe, multiple disabilities. It must be pointed out that modern wheelchairs, even if created in dominant cultures, are customized for the needs of the users with physical disabilities. Concluding, they are intended mainly for users with dysfunctions in the sphere of movement, physical and chronically ill. Using metaphors, Sydor believes that "in a sense, the wheelchair is both a car and shoes, a kind of interface between a disabled person and the surrounding world" (Sydor 2003, 9).

As a physical artifact (Schein 2008) and a product of particular disability culture, it is sometimes understood and treated in a binary sense. Below I will analyze secondarily the concept and role of the wheelchair in terms of 8 Polish females with dysfunction in the movement sphere, wheelchair users. I refer to the key conclusions and raw data from the Nowogrodzka (2017) ethnographic research, which I successively reinterpret.

The research questions I put forth are: *What is the meaning of wheelchair in the lives of 8 Polish females?* and *What a wheelchair should or shouldn't be?*

I conduct a secondary analysis of raw data in order to indicate individual concepts of a wheelchair as an artifact of Culture of Physical Disability. The data was collected among 8 Polish females using wheelchairs in everyday lives. The participants in research are 8 disabled females who have physical disabilities of two types (congenital: 5 females, and acquired: 3 females).

The age of females was as follows: 6 women were in early adulthood and 2 women in middle adulthood. Fieldwork and data collection and the analysis lasted from November 2015 to the end of March 2017. The personal data of females has been encoded to the initials: A, C, D, E, F, G, H, and the researcher Nowogrodzka (2007) has preserved the B marking for herself. Below is a section of raw data along with my reinterpretations regarding the role of the wheelchair and its concept in the lives of the participants, together with data analysis describing the concept of wheelchair, highlighting the perspective of the optimal and least desirable wheelchair.

In addition, the ethnographic research conducted by Nowogrodzka (2017) indicated some conclusions, the key ones which I am referring to below. The author writes that wheelchairs, as physical artifacts, do not cause direct associations with own disability for 5 out of 8 female participants, and only 3 women, while looking at the artifact of everyday use, think about their own disability, how to overcome it or how many activities they can do together with children, thanks to using a wheelchair. Sometimes the wheelchair gets a new name and it is compared to a *car*, a *cabriolet,* and *Gandalf* from the *Lord of the Rings*, which was indicated by 3 women, and also *legs*, which were indicated by 3 informants. Nowogrodzka (2017) indicated that 6 women expressed values directly related to the wheelchair. Three informants stated that the wheelchair gives them freedom, one said it gives independence, two emphasized symbolic relationships with the burden of disability and only one identified it with the symbol of disability.

In addition, new features of the artifact - the wheelchair - came out in the research results. It turns out that research participants have used their own wheelchairs for other activities than moving around. The wheelchair has a function of a shopping basket or it is seen as a place for carrying something - indicated by 4 informants. In addition, it serves as a place to have sex (1 informant) and as a hanger for hanging clothes, or as a shelf, as one informant mentioned. (Nowogrodzka 2017, 147).

The concept of wheelchair: *Necessary Addition* and *Silent Helper*

All the participants of the research believe that the artifact, the wheelchair, is mainly an *addition* to *themselves*. The wheelchair is helpful in moving, it gives a great opportunity to carry out activities, and it gives a certain, however, limited freedom. The females point the artifact as an important object of everyday use, forming a part of their lives. The 8 informants have a positive emotional attitude towards the artifacts, accepting these subjects in their lives and their role.

A: Help in moving. Addition.

C: Huge (laughs). Because, as I mentioned before, if I did not have a wheelchair, I would not do anything. That I would not go out of the house, that I would not come to the association here, but only if I am somewhere in the mountains or the city I look at the tires that I will not break (laughs). Because if it's broken, it's just no more me (laughs).

D: It gives me freedom. Of course, this freedom is limited. Stabilization confidence while moving, the ability to overcome a greater distance in less time.

E: Necessary addition - I would call it.

F: Well, a tool that makes it easier for me to get somewhere, do something much faster, more efficiently.

G: Big. Very big. I know I cannot do a lot of things because of it, which I would like to do.

B: For example, what are these things?

G: What are these things? There are not many such things. (laughs) I would like to be an independent photographer.

H: All in all, the wheelchair and other devices are my life, they are a part of it, because they are with me 24 hours a day, even when I sleep they are next to me, they do not step away from me.

I: The most important, although not noticeable to me. Because it is something like *a thing* that is always with me, always with me, but I'm not really focused on it anyway, right? Wheelchair acts as a silent helper. It also plays the role of a prosthesis, because I have never looked at it, but now I realized it because if I did not have a wheelchair, I could not do anything (Nowogrodzka 2017, 94).

Cheerful, Soft **and** ***not Heavy*** **Wheelchair**

In the study, the 8 informants were asked to specify the construction and function of the wheelchair that best suited their expectations. Participants of the research indicated a category of lightness and some sort of discretion in the construction of the artifact itself, in terms of size and weight. One of the research participants personified the artifact, saying that it should be *cheerful* and also *delicate* and active cart (ACTIV). The aesthetic qualities, that is, the favorite colors of the wheelchair and the possibilities associated with the construction (carbon fiber), backrest and the option of grips enabling the help of other people when needed, weren't in fact without significance.

A: I think a lightweight wheelchair. Can fit anywhere. As modern people, we have higher expectations and desires. A small, handy wheelchair is certainly the most comfortable.

C: Certainly *cheerful*, *he* cannot be *honest*, but he should be, because I'm honest, but the wheelchair? How to be honest? No, I do not know to be blue - it's my favorite color, and gentle despite being a wheelchair.

D: Well, I have the best wheelchair, because I have GTMs at the moment. My wheelchair is of the Active type, i.e. I can climb under curbs, I should even be able to do it under such a 15 cm, but I not able.

E: Should be as light as possible, although not too light, it would be best if it was colored.

B: And what colors could have?

E: Red, blue and green best. Maybe some yellow inserts. (laughs).

F: I think that the present is the best so far, if I'm tired then someone can help me, if I want it, I can go alone and it is light enough for a light alloy made of metal, so it's easier for me to move. You do not need that energy to put everything in motion.

G: (laughs). Exactly, one that is light, but that it still fulfills its functions there so that it has a great support, which I will not have because I cannot afford it. The backrest looks something like a chair to the desk, so bent and you can adjust the height - very cool. What else? Pull-out handles. What else? From good material - carbon fiber, it is very good, very durable and very expensive.

I: First of all, for me, it should be an active wheelchair (Nowogrodzka 2017, 113).

Horror **Wheelchair like** ***Orthopedics*** **and** ***Hospital***

The worst wheelchairs, in the opinion of the 8 female informants, are heavy, massive, raw, and old constructed, resembling artifacts from medical cultures, hospitals but also from horror movies. These are wheelchairs that completely prevented and limited any form of independence. It is interesting that aspects, such as mentioning the hospital and the dependence of females on other people, indicated unpleasant associations of the undesirable physical artifact as a product of culture, in the time of the dominance of the medical model of disability.

A: I do not like wheelchairs and sticks like from a horror movie. Such basic, massive.

C: Certainly heavy, which is not enough that they have their weight. And I do not like wide ones.

D: Certainly not hospital, just like that.

E: I do not like heavy ones. If you know what I mean. Such *prehistoric* in shape. My first wheelchair was such that nothing could be manipulated at all, only I could sit and wait where they would take me.

F: I would not want to go back to such a wheelchair, where I will only be dependent on the person leading me.

G: (laughs) Orthopedic. Orthopedics wherein hospitals. On the other hand, I don't know if it should be completely electric, where there's only a joystick and left-right and you're going, right?

I: Well, this is a wheelchair other than active. Well, this popularly spoken: orthopedics (Nowogrodzka 2017, 114).

Wheelchair like *Little Black Dress*

Subsequently, the 8 Polish female respondents answered the question about the number of wheelchairs they can use on various occasions. The information was about the number of wheelchairs owned. One of them, informant A, additionally using a metaphor, illustrated her attitude towards wheelchair; she compared the wheelchair to the *little black dress*. She described her feminine attitude towards the physical artifact. The wheelchair was supposed to be a picture of luxury and elegance offered, as the *little black dress* does. After the analysis, it turned out that all 8 participants have only one wheelchair and do not have more such artifacts for different occasions, which is most likely related to the state of affluence and lower income of participants of the research.

A: I currently have my first wheelchair and as a woman, I decided it would be a *little black dress*. I always have the same can around and I do not pay much attention to their appearance.

C: Unfortunately, I do have only one

D: No, no, no, absolutely. One.

E: No, I only have this one.

F: I mean I have one more pair of cans and a wheelchair just in case something happens to it. But it is not related to fashion or sport.

G: No (laughs). I have this one, only wheelchair!

H: No.

I: No, I do have one, no more than this (Nowogrodzka 2017, 119).

To sum up the concept and role of the wheelchair, as a cultural, physical artifact used by 8 Polish females in their early and middle adulthood, I would like to draw attention to the fact that the analyzed physical artifact itself is in the close proximity to the space of all women participants. Females have a personal attitude towards the wheelchairs and they use its functions differently, according to own needs. Wheelchairs are for them artifacts that give freedom and the possibility of carrying out everyday activities, such as shopping or sex. The aesthetics and quality of the artifact's performance are not insignificant, as women prefer wheelchair with discreet features, lightweight with a neat construction and to be different from hospital objects or horror movies. Optimal features of wheelchairs are expressed as *addition*, *silent helper* or *little black dress.*

Conclusion

In this article, I defined the concept of culture, disability cultures and I analyzed a part of the raw data from interviews carried out by Nowogrodzka (2017). While the common concept of a single and broad *culture of disability* is recognized among the British and American academic grounds, the concept of diverse *disability cultures* must be recognized according to the complexity of which I tried to illustrate in the paper.

I am aware that speaking about the artifacts of physical disability cultures, that I have indicated in the text, is only a part of the possible analyzes. It is worth noting that wheelchairs are essential artifacts of the cultures of people with physical dysfunction. They form part of everyday life and sometimes, artifacts that are *impersonate* and *taming*. In addition, raw data analysis showed threads of the negative attitude of the 8 female informants towards the artifacts from the past domination of the medical disability model. Furthermore, the data indicated also gender and femininity related threads. Well, the concept of the wheelchair became for one female informant a kind of clothing, related to the *little black dress*, created years ago by Coco Chanel. The probably hidden message concerns the concept and additional function of the wheelchair, which is meant to be just as elegant as the mentioned *little black dress* and to allow the woman to feel the same way.

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